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ABSTRACT 
This Thesis seeks to shed light on the issue of how far secured creditor rights are 
protected in E U cross-border insolvencies by focusing on the perspective and position 
of English lenders. The main thread throughout is the legal concerns faced by lenders 
when lending to a company incorporated in England and Wales which operates across 
the European Union and has assets and creditors spread across various Member States. 
The initial stages of the structuring of a cross-border security arrangement in terms of 
the enforceability of the lending transaction and underlying security interest under the 
ordinary civil/commercial law outside of bankruptcy are considered. The potential 
contractual and proprietary issues faced by lenders are discussed through the lens of 
English domestic law which for the present purposes includes E U law such as the 
Brussels I and Rome I Regulations. After ascertaining how lenders can ensure their 
lending transactions and underlying security interests are valid and enforceable pre-
bankruptcy, the thesis explores the position of lenders in the face of insolvency 
proceedings and the issue of 'insolvency effects'. 
The thesis then goes on to analyze the impact of the EC Regulation on insolvency 
proceedings (the EIR) having regard to jurisdiction, recognition, applicable law and 
provisions which create exceptions to the application of the lex concursus and have 
i i i 
particular impact on the enforcement of lenders' rights in the event of default and 
formal insolvency. Developing case law is discussed especially in light of the potential 
impact on the interpretation and applicability of certain provisions of the EIR. The 
issue of 'insolvency effects' is discussed further in relation to how the EIR addresses 
the following: forum shopping; group insolvencies; effective co-ordination of 
insolvency proceedings across borders; dissipation of assets and other consequences 
which might be detrimental to creditors and devalue security; ascertainability; and the 
fact that the applicable insolvency law may have unanticipated effects on creditors. 
The thesis concludes by drawing together the issues discussed and evaluating how 
successful the EIR has been overall in addressing the concerns of lenders. By discussing 
the practical measures used by practitioners to mitigate insolvency effects as far as 
possible and, by suggesting some areas for reform, this thesis seeks to illuminate the 
contrasting arguments regarding whether there is currently optimum protection of 
secured creditor rights in E U cross-border insolvencies and make a modest contribution 
regarding what can be done to improve this level of protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
0.1 During the last few years some prominent insolvency proceedings have 
called attention to the application of the Insolvency Regulation1 in 
matters of E U cross-border cases especially in relation to the treatment 
of secured creditors. The surging interest relating to issues arising from 
cross-border insolvency proceedings within the U K can be attributed to 
the emergence of case law such as IMO Car Wash and the recent Wind 
Hellas case. There has been an increased trend of jurisdiction or 
forum shopping by debtors and creditors seeking to take advantage of 
the UK's favorable restructuring environment. 
0.2 Aggrieved creditors have referred to Britain as a "bankruptcy brothel"4 
and blame the procedure involved rather than the underlying business 
failure for their plight. Conversely, in a House of Lords debate on 11 
March 2010, Lord Drayson5 said that: 
"Independent studies by the World Bank have shown that the United 
Kingdom's insolvency framework is highly regarded - above that of the 
United States, Germany and France - particularly on the basis of its 
protection to creditors, the costs of proceedings and the speed with 
which the process is able to be carried out." 
0.3 A wider issue is how far secured creditor rights are currently protected 
in cross-border insolvencies within the European Union. This issue has 
brought pertinent insolvency legislation into scrutiny and hence the 
1
 Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000, hereinafter referred to as the 'EIR'. 
2
 In the matter of Bluebrook Ltd and others [2009] E W H C 2114 (Ch). This case is discussed in 
more detail in 3.9-3.12. 
3
 Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] E W H C 3199 (Ch). This case is 
discussed I more detail in 3.12. 
4
 R Watts & C Newell, "Firms flock to 'bankruptcy brothel' U K " , The Sunday Times, 
(London, 7 March 2010: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7052729.ece> 
5
 The former Minister of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. See Hansard 
HC, col 342 (11 March 2010). 
1 
European Commission is required to report on EIR by 1st June 2012 
and, if necessary, to produce proposals for its amendment.6 
0.4 This thesis seeks to shed light on the issue of how far secured creditor 
rights are protected in E U cross-border insolvencies by focusing on the 
•7 
perspective and position of an English lender. The main thread 
throughout is the legal concerns faced by the Lender when lending to a 
company incorporated in England and Wales which operates across the 
European Union and has assets and creditors spread across various 
Member States. Cross border insolvency refers to the situation where 
o 
such a company becomes insolvent and is unable to pay its debts 
consequently affecting the assets, business and creditors it has in more 
than one jurisdiction. 
0.5 From the standpoint of the Lender, Chapter One discusses the initial 
stages of the structuring of a cross-border security arrangement in terms 
of the enforceability of the lending transaction and underlying security 
interest under the ordinary civil/commercial law outside of bankruptcy. 
The potential contractual and proprietary issues faced by the Lender are 
discussed through the lens of English domestic law which for the 
present purposes includes E U law such as the Brussels I and Rome I 
Regulations.9 After ascertaining how the Lender can ensure the 
lending transaction and underlying security interest are valid and 
enforceable pre-bankruptcy, the rest of Chapter One explores the 
position of the Lender in the face of insolvency proceedings and the 
issue of 'insolvency effects'. 
6
 The Insolvency Service, 'Evaluation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 
2000 on Insolvency Proceedings - Evaluation Questionnaire', www.insolvency.gov.uk (The 
Questionnaire). See Chapter Three generally for a discussion of the issues identified in the 
Questionnaire which focuses on the problematic areas of the EIR over which there has been 
much controversy and practitioner input. 
7
 Hereinafter referred to as 'the Lender' as convenient shorthand. 
8
 Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) s 122(l)(f) states that a company may be wound up if the 
company is 'unable to pay its debts'. S 123 contains the definition of 'inability to pay debts' 
which encompasses the balance sheet test (s 123(2)) and the cash flow test (s 123(l)(e). 
9
 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001, hereinafter 'Brussels I'; and Regulation (EC) No 
593/2008, hereinafter 'Rome I'. 
0.6 What are 'insolvency effects'? Under all national laws, insolvency 
proceedings may interfere and bring about changes in the legal position 
of the debtors and creditors. The type of system in a particular state is 
therefore of much importance to the Lender in terms of which systems 
are more 'interventionist' and redistributive than others. Whilst 
discussing 'insolvency effects', Chapter One also introduces the 
opposing camps of opinion regarding the principles of Universalism 
and Territorialism and why the attitude of different courts to these 
principles is of fundamental importance.10 
0.7 Following from this, dependent on how interventionist a particular 
system is, what issues can rise in terms of enforceability of the lending 
transaction in the event of insolvency? If the security interest has been 
validly created according to the formalities of the applicable law and its 
validity is not affected by avoiding powers then, in the event of 
insolvency, the liquidator cannot interfere. Many insolvency systems 
have avoiding powers and/or asset claw back provisions. By way of 
example, Chapter One discusses some of the provisions under English 
domestic law and their potential effects. 
0.8 As a prelude to Chapter Two, Appendix 1 considers the draft 
bankruptcy conventions which preceded the EIR. Chapter Two cross-
refers to Appendix 1 in order to analyze the EIR's successes and 
discuss the problems which remain unresolved. The importance of the 
two opposing principles of Universalism and Territorialism are 
discussed further in Chapter Two especially due to their influence over 
the preliminary draft conventions and the 'modified universalism' 
model that has consequently been adopted by the EIR. 
0.9 When focusing on the development of the EIR's core features,11 the 
writer briefly explores the developments in insolvency in the United 
10
 The principles of Universalism and Territorialism are discussed further in 1.219-1.225, 2.10 
and 2.11, especially in light of their influence on the drafting of the earlier Bankruptcy 
Conventions. 
11
 Such as: COMI; rights in rem; and set off. See the following for further reference: 2.15 -
2.40; 2.111 -2.138; and 2.138-2.158. 
Kingdom pre-EIR from the Lender's perspective in order to rationalize 
what prompted the need for a Convention among European member 
states to coordinate the conduct of insolvency proceedings. The impact 
of the EIR on risk assessment is discussed and reviewed. 
0.10 Chapter Two analyzes and explores the relationship of the main 
features of the EIR having regard to jurisdiction, recognition, applicable 
law and to provisions which create exceptions to the application of the 
lex concursus and have particular impact on the enforcement of the 
Lender's rights in the event of default and formal insolvency. 
Developing case law is discussed especially in light of the potential 
impact on the interpretation and applicability of certain provisions of 
the EIR. 
0.11 The issue of 'insolvency effects' is discussed further in relation to how 
the EIR addresses the following: forum shopping; group insolvencies; 
effective co-ordination of insolvency proceedings across borders; 
dissipation of assets and other consequences which might be 
detrimental to creditors and devalue security; ascertainability; and the 
fact that the applicable insolvency law may have unanticipated effects 
on creditors. The way in which insolvency effects can be mitigated will 
be of critical concern to the Lender and, by exploring the relationship 
between certain Articles under the EIR the writer aims to focus on 
problematic aspects. 
0.12 Finally, in Chapter Three, some tentative conclusions are drawn 
regarding the legal implications of the EIR for the Lender by discussing 
the measures taken by practitioners to mitigate risks and how effective 
they have been in protecting the Lender's position. The concerns raised 
in Chapter Two are evaluated and suggestions made by which these 
shortcomings can be mitigated or overcome. For instance, in terms of 
making a transaction 'bankruptcy proof, the question arises whether 
COMI covenants provide a useful solution in protecting the secured 
creditor's position. In addition insolvency effects are discussed in 
relation to the controversial topic of COMI migration and whether 
secured creditors are benefiting rather than being prejudiced by forum 
4 
shopping. A helpful tool utilized in Chapter Three, regarding the 
possible shortcomings of EIR, is the Questionnaire. Various 
responses to the Questionnaire are discussed in light of proposed reform 
of the EIR. 
0.13 This thesis concludes by drawing together the issues discussed in the 
former chapters and evaluating how successful the EIR has been overall 
in addressing the concerns of the Lender. By demonstrating why the 
previous draft bankruptcy conventions were unworkable some light is 
shed as to why the position of 'modified universalism', as adopted by 
the EIR, is the only way in which the enactment of the EIR would have 
had any success. By referring to the historical evolution of the EIR, the 
writer demonstrates how the draftsmen of the EIR 'learned' from the 
failures of the earlier drafts and hence made essential changes to the 
text. By exploring the issue of COMI migration and forum shopping in 
light of emerging case law, the modernized attitude of creditors and 
debtors is portrayed and tentative conclusions are drawn about the fact 
that, despite Recital 4 of the EIR, not all forum shopping has negative 
implications. 
0.14 Overall, by discussing the practical measures used by practitioners to 
mitigate insolvency effects as far as possible and, by suggesting some 
1 Q 
areas for reform, this thesis seeks to illuminate the contrasting 
arguments regarding whether there is currently optimum protection of 
secured creditor rights in E U cross-border insolvencies and make a 
modest contribution regarding what can be done to improve this level 
of protection. 
12
 Insolvency Service Questionnaire (n 6). 
13
 See Chapter Three generally, e.g. the treatment of group insolvencies. See 3.21-3.40. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CROSS-BORDER 
SECURITY 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT UNDER NON-
BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Introduction 
1.1 The following example illustrates some of the problems the Lender will 
face at the inception of a security transaction. Where there is a facility 
financed in England and Wales and governed by English law, several 
multi-jurisdictional issues will come into play in relation to a cross-
border security transaction. These include: guarantors that have not 
been incorporated in England; parties that have multinational branches 
and carry out business globally despite being incorporated in England;14 
collateral consisting of various types of property (land, goods, contract 
rights) spread around different jurisdictions; the potential for changing 
circumstances during the lifetime of the transaction. In addition 
changes may arise from: companies setting up businesses in other 
jurisdictions; goods being moved from one jurisdiction to another; and 
a company entering into insolvency proceedings in a jurisdiction with 
which it only has minimal connection. 
1.2 Prior to entering into a security transaction the Lender's main 
consideration is the fact that different rules of private international law 
may be applicable due to the assets and other creditors being situated in 
14
 R Calnan, Taking Security: Law & Practice (Jordans, March 2006) 471-472, 13.1 
15Ibid. All-All. 
6 
several countries. Hence there is potentially a conflict of laws affecting 
the conduct of the debtor company's affairs including the realization of 
assets subject to the Lender's security. 
1.3 Conflict of laws is part of the law of England and Wales dealing with 
cases that have a foreign element. 'Foreign element' simply means "a 
contact with some system of law other than English law."16 The 
questions that arise in conflict of laws cases generally fall into three 
categories: jurisdiction; applicable law and recognition/enforcement of 
foreign judgments all of which categories can arise to a greater or lesser 
degree in cross border security transactions. In addition to domestic or 
internal law, modern countries generally all have rules regarding 
1 n 
conflict of laws. 
1.4 When structuring a cross-border security arrangement the Lender will 
have to take into account the impact of any potential domestic and 
conflict of law rules in other jurisdictions as well as those rules 
applicable in England. In contrast to an English court, a foreign court 
may apply different criteria in deciding whether it should apply its law 
1 o 
or another law to the outcome of a particular question. 
1.5 In practice it will be difficult for the Lender to get advice regarding 
each and every domestic and conflict of law rule that might come into 
play. At the outset the Lender must be aware of the risks and he will 
subsequently need to decide in which jurisdictions legal advice should 
be taken in relation to the cross-border security transaction.19 There 
could be creditors and assets in multiple jurisdictions and therefore, in 
conducting the risk assessment, the Lender will have to consider at least 
16
 See Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 8 
December 2009) (D & M) 1-001 and David McClean & Kisch Beevers, Morris, The Conflict of 
Laws, ( 6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005) (M & B) 1-002. 
1 7 D & M ( n l 6 ) 1-001 : 
"The main justification for the conflict of laws is that it implements the reasonable and 
legitimate expectations of the parties to a transaction or an occurrence." 
See also 1-003 -1-006. 
18
 In the context of secured financing, the courts which will be likely to resolve the conflict will 
be those in the jurisdiction where the secured assets are situated or subject to whose laws they 
have been created. See Calnan (n 14) 472. 
19
 Ibid. All. 
the key legal jurisdictions. The Lender who wishes to lend and take 
security transnationally will potentially have connections with at least 
four legal systems each having some scope for change in identity 
during the lifetime of the security transaction. These are: the location 
of the Lender; the location of the debtor; the place of the transaction; 
and the jurisdiction within which the subject matter of the security is 
located.20 
Allocation of Jurisdiction 
1.6 English courts apply rules of jurisdiction that consist of both E U law 
91 
and English law. The issues that appear in a conflict of laws case fall 
into two main types: firstly, does the English court have jurisdiction to 
determine this case?; and secondly, if it does, what law should be 
99 
applied? Once a court has assumed jurisdiction there is then a 
question of characterization and determining which juridical concept or 
9^ 
category is appropriate in that particular case and what choice of law 
applies. Then having exercised jurisdiction, in a cross border situation, 
the recognition and enforcement of its judgments in other jurisdictions 
will be critical in the efficient management, coordination and resolution 
of the case. 
1.7 Conventions negotiated under the auspices of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law and under the endorsement of the European 
20
 IF Fletcher & H Anderson, 'The Insolvency Issues' in Michael Bridge & Robert Stevens 
(eds), Cross Border Security and Insolvency (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 259. 
Note that the insolvency of the debtor introduces the possibility of a fifth legal jurisdiction, 
namely the place where the insolvency proceedings occur. 
21
 Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon coming into force, this reference would be to EC law under the 
EC Treaty. Brussels I and the EIR are strictly creatures of EC law made under the 
consolidated EC Treaty. However, after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the pillar structure 
including the EC was eradicated and it is usual just to refer to EU law. Although the writer 
refers to both EU and EC, references to EC tend to be historic. 
2 2 D & M ( n l 6 ) 1-003. 
23Ibid, 2-003. 
94 
Community have had a great impact on English conflict of laws rules. 
The most important of these are: the Brussels Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (and the parallel Lugano Convention); and the Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (the 
9S 
Rome Convention) which is now replaced by the Rome I 
Regulation.26 The Rome II Regulation27 has been established as a 
measure harmonizing domestic private international law rules 
applicable to torts. 
9R 
1.8 The Brussels I Regulation, which largely superseded the Brussels and 
Lugano Conventions, and Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility (Brussels 
9Q 
II) is directly applicable in the United Kingdom, as is the EIR, which 
regulates jurisdiction in insolvency matters. 
1.9 Brussels I and Rome I form a network of provisions which regulate the 
assumption of jurisdiction and choice of law treatment of cases before 
U K and all other member state courts. These two legal instruments 
are discussed in detail in the first half of this chapter in relation to the 
applicable law regarding the validity and enforceability of lending 
transactions and underlying security interests outside of bankruptcy. 
The second area of concern relates to the allocation of insolvency 
jurisdiction which could produce local insolvency effects that erode the 
Lender's position. The issues relating to the effects of insolvency 
proceedings and the applicability of the EIR are discussed later in 
Chapter One. Overall, issues relating to jurisdiction will only be 
24
 See n 21 regarding the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
25
 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Schs 1 and 3C; Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 
1990, Sch 1: D & M (n 16) 1-020. 
26
 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008. Hereinafter 'Rome I'. 
27
 Regulation (EC) No 864/2000. Hereinafter 'Rome IF. 
28
 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001. Hereinafter 'Brussels F. 
29Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 replacing Council Regulation (EC) 1347/2000 
('Brussels IF). 
30
 With the exception of Denmark. The effects of Rome II are not discussed as they do not 
relate directly to the validity and enforceability of cross-border lending transactions and are 
therefore beyond the scope of this thesis. 
9 
problematic to the Lender if the court that assumes jurisdiction is a 
practically inconvenient forum from the Lender's perspective and/or it 
leads to choices of applicable law that impact enforcement, whether or 
not the debtor is in formal insolvency proceedings. 
The applicability of Brussels I 
1.10 Brussels I sets out the rules for determining which national court of the 
E U Member States will have jurisdiction over disputes related to 
commercial contracts and facilitates the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments between Member States. It is therefore applicable when 
enforcing a security transaction outside of insolvency. The basic 
principle under Brussels I is that jurisdiction is to be exercised by the 
Member State in which the defendant is domiciled regardless of his/her 
nationality. In the case of companies or other legal persons, domicile 
is determined at the place where the company has its statutory seat or 
central administration or principal place of business. 
1.11 As contracts will inevitably be involved in a security transaction, 
special jurisdiction provisions will also apply. Article 5 provides that: 
See Art 2(1), Brussels I. Domicile is determined in accordance with the domestic law of the 
Member State where the matter is brought before a court. Persons who are not nationals of the 
Member State in which they are domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction 
applicable to nationals of that State (see Article 2(2). This is however subject to Art 22 which 
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of particular Member States regardless of the 
domicile of the parties in defined circumstances. 
32
 See Art 60(1), Brussels I. Note that, for the purposes of the U K and Ireland, 'statutory seat' 
means the registered office or, where there is no such office anywhere, the place of 
incorporation or, where there is no such place anywhere, the place under the law of which the 
formation took place (see Art 60(2)). In relation to the application of Rome I, Art 19 states that 
the habitual residence of bodies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated shall be the 
place of central administration. The contrast between jurisdictional rules based on place of 
incorporation and jurisdictional rules based on where a company has its 'seat' is blurred by 
Article 3 of the EIR which is a hybrid of 'seat' theory but with a default presumption that 
COMI equates to the place of incorporation and location of the registered office. Also see 
2.21. 
10 
" A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, 
be sued in matters relating to a contract, in the courts of the place of 
performance of the obligation in question." 
"Contract" in the text of Brussels I has a meaning independent of the 
categories in national legal systems and encompasses any matters 
"having their basis in an agreement." This is due to the fact that the 
concept of "contract" is not the same in every legal system, because of 
various understandings of delineations between contract, tort or 
property law.34 Despite the fact that the notion of contract itself is 
allowed an independent interpretation, it is left to national law 
(including its rules of the conflict of laws) to identify "the place of 
performance." This general clause Article 5(l)(a) is likely to apply in 
the case of a security transaction as Article 5(1 )(b) provides limited 
guidance in relation to assessing the place of the performance in the 
case of the sale of goods and in the case of the provision of services.36 
1.12 Inevitably, contracts governing security transactions will have clauses 
designating choice of court and choice of law. Article 23 of Brussels I 
allows parties to designate a court to have jurisdiction to settle any 
disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a 
particular legal relationship. The choice of court agreement, or 
prorogation of jurisdiction has the effect of displacing the otherwise 
competent court. Hence, if the parties have made a choice of forum, 
-in 
that court shall have exclusive jurisdiction. 
33SeeArt5(l)(a). 
34
 Case 9/87 Arcado SprilvHavilandSA [1988] E.C.R 1539. See also M & B (n 16), 70-74. 
35
 See Case 12/76 Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v Dunlop A.G [1976] E.C.R 1473; Case C-
288/92 Custom Made Commercial Ltd v Stawa Metallbau GmbH [1994] E.C.R 1-2913; Case 
C-440/97 GIE Groupe Concorde v The Suhadiwarno Panjan [1999] E.C.R 1-6307. See also M 
&B(nl6) , 73 
36
 In cases to which Article 5(l)(b) does not apply, the matter is governed by the general words 
of Article 5(l)(a): see Art 5(l)(c). 
37
 See further Art 23(1). See also Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I - 1383 
restricting the scope of forum non conveniens in the context of transnational civil litigation 
falling within Brussels I. 
11 
1.13 Rome I is discussed further in this chapter as it acts as an extension or 
prolongation of Brussels I and complements the application of Brussels 
I in contractual matters. Rome I does not apply to choice of court 
clauses in a contract. The existence, formal and material validity of 
choice of court clause is therefore assessed solely by Brussels I, while a 
choice of law is governed by Rome I. 
1.14 It is submitted that, in relation to conflict of laws in a secured financing, 
it is more probable that the courts in the jurisdiction where the collateral 
is located will resolve the conflict and, in the case of intangibles, this 
will be resolved by the jurisdiction under whose laws they have been 
created.40 In practice, there are two key jurisdictions which the Lender 
will be concerned with: that where the borrower and guarantors are 
incorporated; and that where the assets which are the subject of the 
security are situated (if they are tangibles) or whose law governs their 
creation (if they are intangibles).41 When determining which law will 
govern the effectiveness of the security in a cross-border case, one of 
the first issues that arises is how the court will classify (or characterize 
or categorize) the matter. Characterization is discussed in the 
following section. 
Characterization & Choice of Law 
1.15 The technique of conflict of laws makes much use of legal categories. 
This is because, before the correct connecting factors can be identified, 
we need to know into which legal category the facts of the case, or the 
particular issues are properly placed. Therefore, in essence: 
38
 See 1.27-1.43. 
39
 See Rome I, Art 3. 
40
 Calnan(n 14) 471-472, 13.5 
n
 Ibid. All, 13.7 
42
 Ibid. 472-473, 13.9 
12 
"Characterization is a process of refining English conflict rules by 
expressing them with greater precision."43 
1.16 The court's primary consideration, after civil/commercial jurisdiction 
has been established under Brussels I or Rome I, is characterization of 
the issue which wi l l ultimately decide which law wi l l govern it. In a 
secured financing, one may have to consider several significant matters 
such as: the debtor's capacity; the validity of the contract under which 
the security was created; the security's proprietary effects in relation to 
key collateral; or the impact of the insolvency proceedings on the 
security. These varying issues may be subject to different laws.44 
Generally, English conflict of laws rules distinguish between: capacity; 
authority and breach of fiduciary duty; formal validity; material validity 
(including the absence of real consent); the effect of the contract; and 
the effect of insolvency. 
1.17 English law does not characterize issues only on the basis of domestic 
English law concepts but gives broader consideration to the issues 
involved in any dispute. The first division in establishing categories is 
between personal and proprietary rights. Although this distinction 
appears obvious, problems have arisen in practice particularly in 
relation to intangible assets. It is nevertheless clear that different laws 
can govern the personal and the proprietary effects of a lending 
transaction.45 It is important for the Lender to consider the issues at the 
point the lending transaction is entered into and security granted and at 
the point of default and insolvency when the Lender wi l l need to 
enforce the security. 
1.18 Assuming that the English courts have jurisdiction, the question arises 
of which law or laws wi l l be applied to determine the validity and 
43
 See D & M (n 16) 2-036 - 2-038. Mance L . J also said in Raiffeisan Zentralbank Osterreich 
AG v Five Star General Trading LLC [2001] Q.B 825 (CA) [2001] Q.B 825 (CA) at [27] 
when dealing with the characterization of issues: "the overall aim is to identify the most 
appropriate law to govern a particular issue. The classes or categories of issue which the law 
recognizes at the first stage [i.e. for characterization] are man-made, not natural. They have no 
inherent value, beyond their purpose in assisting to select the most appropriate law." 
44
 Calnan(n 14) 472-473. 
45
 Ibid. 473. 
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priority of security rights. In order to answer this question it is 
necessary to distinguish between contractual (or in personam) validity 
and proprietary (or in rem) consequences.46 The proprietary effect of 
the security will be of paramount significance if the debtor is insolvent. 
However, contractual issues will be discussed first because of the 
impact they may have on the validity of the Lender's proprietary rights. 
If, for instance, it is held by the law governing a contract that nothing is 
owed then there is no need to consider the proprietary effects of any 
47 
security. 
1.19 In relation to contractual issues, several further questions must be 
addressed in order to analyse comprehensively the contract's legal 
validity under its governing law: did the debtor have capacity to enter 
the contract; were any formalities required as a pre-condition for its 
enforcement; do its terms mean what the Lender understood them to 
mean; is the contract vulnerable to being set aside because of some 
AQ 
vitiating factor such as operative mistake? These issues will be 
explored in detail in the following section. 
The personal / contractual issues involved in cross-
border security transactions 
1.20 The Lender's primary concern is how to structure the lending 
transaction and ensure that effective security is taken. This section 
46
 Further defined: a judgment 'in personam' can be defined as a judgment that defines 
positively claims against competing individuals in respect of a particular matter, or to compel 
the performance of a particular act, e.g. the discharge of a debt, payment of an award for 
damages for breach of contract, or requiring a particular aspect of a contract is performed; a 
judgment 'in rem', on the other hand, amounts to a determination of the status of a particular 
matter, but is conclusive not only between the competing parties but also against the world. 
Lord Hoffmann in Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors (of Navigator Holdings pic) [2007] 1 A.C. 508 summarized the position as follows in 
relation to 'in rem' and 'in personam' judgments: "judicial determinations of the existence of 
rights; in one case rights over property and in the other rights against a person." 
47
 R Stevens, 'The English Conflict of Laws Rules' in M Bridge and R Stevens (eds), Cross 
Border Security and Insolvency (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 205. 
48Calnan(nl4)474, 13.14. 
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discusses the measures that the Lender needs to take to ensure the 
enforceability of the transaction and validity of the security interest 
under the ordinary civil/commercial law outside of insolvency. 
1.21 Generally a creditor has three main concerns when taking security: is it 
effective in the debtor's insolvency?49 will it have priority over other 
proprietary interests in the same asset; and will it be enforceable on 
default by the debtor? 50 
1.22 When determining the validity and enforceability of the lending 
transaction as a matter of general law, the issue of the personal 
obligations of the debtor under the facility and security documentation 
needs to be considered. The most important personal obligation is the 
debtor's undertaking to pay the liabilities which are secured by the 
security documents. The security will be worthless if this obligation is 
ineffective.51 The issue of registration of the security documents will be 
discussed later in the chapter as it is directly relevant to whether the 
security will be enforceable in the event of insolvency. 
1.23 Whether the debtor is contractually bound to pay the secured 
obligations will depend firstly on whether the substantive and 
formalities requirements of the law of contract have been complied 
with. 
1.24 Whether the security taken by the creditor is effective also depends on 
whether the debtor has validly entered into the contract. This depends 
not only on the debtor's capacity to enter into agreement, but also on 
the authority of those who have entered into the documentation on the 
debtor's behalf. Thirdly, can the documents be set aside as a result of a 
vitiating factor? This depends on: the absence of any real consent by the 
party expressed to be bound (for instance, as a result of fraud, mistake, 
49
 On 'bankruptcy proofing' as regards the effects of insolvency proceedings see further 
1.115-1.119. The issues in relation to the taking of effective cross-border security as a matter 
of ordinary private law are separate from the issues once insolvency jurisdiction comes into 
play. 
50Calnan(nl4) 139. 
51
 Calnan(nl4)477. 
52
 See 1.110. 
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misrepresentation or undue influence); in the case of a company, the 
breach of directors' fiduciary duties; and the commencement of 
insolvency proceedings in relation to the debtor (and therefore the 
possibility of their constituting transactions at an undervalue or 
preferences).53 
Effective contracting 
1.25 The law governing a contract ascertains its meaning and effect. The 
ability to enforce a contract will be undermined if there is no clarity 
regarding the relevant applicable law and its content. Doubts about 
whether or not the contract is enforceable will have an impact on its 
value as an asset.54 
1.26 Before discussing the impact of these issues on a Lender it is important 
to consider the applicability of Rome I as in the E U it determines which 
state's law governs contractual matters.55 There are also a number of 
exceptions to Rome I that need to be considered, where domestic 
substantive law will apply. 
The effect of the Rome I Regulation 
1.27 The 1980 Rome Convention established uniform rules for choice of 
law between E U Member States. Since 1991 the UK's choice of law 
rules in contract have been based on the Rome Convention. The 
fundamental principles of the Convention are that parties are able to 
53 Calnan(n 14), 477-478. 
See <'Rome I- should th 
http://www.iustice.gov.uk/docs/cp0508.pdf> published 2 April 2008, para 5 
55
 The relevance of Bru 
chapter. See 1.10-1.15. 
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54
  '  I- s l  t e UK opt in?' Consultation Paper CP05/ 
55
  l   ssels I in relation to contractual matters is discussed earlier in this 
56
 See n 25 
choose the law they want to apply to their contract and that adequate 
legal certainty is provided to contracting parties regarding the law that 
will apply to their contract. Rome I originated as a proposal by the 
European Commission in 2005 to convert the 1980 Rome Convention 
into a European Community Regulation. This Regulation was formally 
adopted in the U K in 2008.58 
1.28 Rome I applies in situations involving a conflict of laws to contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters.59 Its principal aim is to 
identify the means of determining the law which governs the contract 
and determine which contractual issues will be decided according to 
that governing law.60 
1.29 In the context of the law of security, the most important exceptions to 
Rome I are that it does not apply to: questions concerning the status or 
legal capacity of companies or natural persons;61 questions involving 
the authority of persons entering into contracts on behalf of companies 
or natural persons;62 or other issues concerning company law, including 
the winding up of companies.63 In these circumstances domestic law 
will apply and therefore these issues will be considered in the next 
section relating to the formal validity of contracts under English 
substantive law. 
1.30 However, where Rome I does apply, the principle of party autonomy in 
relation to choice of law plays a central role. The terms of Article 3 of 
both the Rome Convention and Rome I are substantively the same. 
However, the latter provides two useful clarifications. The first 
clarification is that a choice of law by the parties need not be made only 
in express terms. It is now deemed sufficient if the choice is clearly 
57
 Rome Convention Art 3. 
58
 Rome I is broadly similar to the Rome Convention but the provisions have been improved 
and clarified in the light of experience.. Moreover the adoption of a Regulation better allows 
for amendment in the future as it is an EU legislative instrument rather than a multilateral 
treaty. See CP05/ 08 (n 55). 
59
 See Rome I Art 1(1). 
60Calnan(nl4), 479, 13.31 
61
 See Rome I Art l(2)(a) and (f). 
62
 See Rome I Art l(2)(f) and (g). 
63See Rome I Art 1(2) (f). Also see Calnan (n 14) 479. 
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demonstrated by the parties by reference to the terms of the contract or 
the circumstances of the case.64 By making clear that party choice can 
be express or implied, this amendment has removed the uncertainty that 
existed under the Rome Convention where Article 3 merely required 
that a choice be demonstrated with "reasonable certainty".65 
1.31 In the absence of an express or implied choice, it is presumed that66 the 
company's place of central administration which has given the 
characteristic performance governs the contract.67 As the Guiliano-
Lagarde Report68 on the Rome Convention refers to the 'provision of 
security' as being the characteristic performance in secured lending, the 
law of the place of the debtor's central administration will apply.69 
1.32 One needs to determine what is meant by the expression 'the 
performance which is characteristic of the contract'. With regard to a 
loan agreement, the characteristic performance is likely to be the 
making of the loan, and therefore refers to the location of the creditor. 
As discussed, in the case of security documents, it would refer to the 
granting of security, and therefore the location of the debtor is the likely 
location. Calnan suggests, and the writer agrees, that this would 
produce the somewhat odd conclusion that (unless the presumptions 
were ignored) the law of the creditor's location will govern the loan 
agreement and the law of the debtor's location will govern the security 
documents.70 In practice, as loan agreements and security documents 
invariably contain express choice of law clauses, the point is largely 
71 
academic. 
64
 See Rome I Art 3(1). 
65
 See Rome I Art 3(1). See also CP05/08 (n 48). 
66
 See Rome I Art 4(1). 
67
 Stevens (n 47) 205 
68
 The Report on the Rome Convention by Professor Mario Giuliano and Professor Paul 
Lagarde (OJ 1980 No C282 20) which the courts may use as an aid to the interpretation of the 
Rome Convention: see Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 s 3(3)(a). 
69
 Stevens (n 47) 205. 
70
 Calnan (n 14), 485-486, 13.62. 
71
 Ibid. See further 1.11 where the "place of performance" is discussed in relation to Brussels 
I. 
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1.33 Though the governing contract law does not determine every dispute 
relating to the contract, it does determine some of the most important 
issues, including the existence and effect of the contract and its material 
validity. It is rare to find a contract (whether it is a loan agreement, a 
security document or otherwise) which does not have an express choice 
of law clause. 
Formal validity of the contract 
1.34 English law imposes few formal requirements on the creation of 
contracts or of security. In certain cases, the documentation needs to be 
in writing, sometimes accompanied by the signature of the person to be 
79 
bound; and a deed is required to transfer land. Dispositions of land 
emphasize the most apparent necessity for formal requirements; 
however formalities are also needed for the disposition of equitable 
interests and in relation to guarantee obligations. Generally, however, 
apart from these formalities, security can be created informally. 
1.35 Other jurisdictions may impose more formal conditions for the creation 
of security. They may necessitate the involvement of a third party such 
as notary in addition to the requirement of being in writing or drafted as 
a deed. It is therefore essential to be clear about which law governs the 
formal validity of contracts creating security as non-compliance with 
74 
the relevant formalities may be fatal to enforceability. 
1.36 Rome I sets out the choice of law which will govern the formal validity 
of a contract. A contract concluded between persons who, or whose 
agents, are in the same country at the time of its conclusion is formally 
valid if is satisfies the formal requirements of the law which governs it 
72
 See Land Registration Act 2002 and Companies Act 2006 in relation to registration 
requirements. 
73Calnan(nl4)480, 13.39. 
74Calnan(nl4), 481, 13.40. 
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in substance under Rome I. The contract is also formally valid if it 
satisfies the law of either of the countries where either of the parties or 
their agent is present at the time of conclusion, or the law of the country 
where either of the parties had his habitual residence at that time. 
Furthermore a contract concluded between persons, or whose agents, 
are in different countries at the time of its conclusion is formally valid 
if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which governs it in 
substance under Rome I etc.76 If these requirements are complied with 
then a contract cannot be set aside on the basis of lack of formal 
validity. 
1.37 Where a contract is concluded by an agent, it is the country in which 
the agent acts which is the relevant country whose formal requirements 
need to be complied with. If the subject matter of the security is 
immovable property, the law of the country where the property is 
situated must be satisfied if those are imposed irrespective of the law 
governing the contract and those requirements cannot be derogated 
77 
from by agreement. 
Material validity of the contract 
1.38 More important in practice are the requirements which relate to the 
material validity of the contract. This refers to those matters, other than 
formalities, which are required in order to create a contract. These 
include: the requirements for the creation of a contract (such as, in 
English law, agreement and consideration); and those matters relating 
to contracts generally which can vitiate a contract such as mistake, 
misrepresentation, duress and undue influence. 
75
 Rome I, Art 11(1). Note that Rome I Art 11(1) and 11(2) also refer to the situation where a 
contract is concluded by an agent. On the habitual residence of companies see Art 19(1), (3). 
76
 Rome I, Art 11(1). 
77
 Rome I, Art 11(5). 
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1.39 Rome I provides that the existence and validity of a contract, or any 
term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern 
•JO 
it under the Regulation if the contract or term were valid. The 
governing law determines: how the contract is to be interpreted; how 
it is to be performed; when the contract is breached and its 
consequences including the assessment of damages; and discharge of 
the contract. Therefore, overall, the governing law of the contract 
establishes its material validity and effect; and a contract will be 
formally valid if it complies with the formalities imposed by the 
governing law. 
1.40 It needs to be noted that the application of the law of any country 
specified by Rome I may be refused only if such application is 
manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum. The 
wording makes it clear that the Lender need only be concerned in the 
most exceptional circumstances where it is absolutely clear that to 
enforce a foreign law would be contrary to public policy. It is difficult 
to envisage many such cases in the context of security law. As the 
existence of rules regarding conflict of laws is founded on the 
supposition that such differences do exist, it is not enough to solely 
establish that there is a conflict between the position under English law 
and that of a foreign law. One possible example of grounds for the 
public policy exception would be where a foreign law expropriated the 
Lender's rights under its security documentation; but, even in this case, 
one would have to demonstrate that such expropriation would not be 
01 
allowed under any reasonable system of law. 
78
 Rome I Art 10(1). 
79
 Rome 1, Art 12 and 12(l)(e). 
80Romel Art 21. 
81
 Calnan(nl4), 483, 13.53. 
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Capacity & Authority 
1.41 Lawyers acting for the Lender will consider a number of issues when 
establishing whether the transaction has been authorized by the debtor 
company: who the directors are; whether the board of directors have the 
authority to enter into the transaction; and whether the board of 
directors has properly exercised its authority to enter into the 
transaction. 
1.42 The authority of a company's directors to bind the company or of 
agents to bind their principal also falls outside the scope of Rome I. 
In accordance with the general law applicable to agents, whether a 
company's officer has actual authority should be determined by the law 
governing the relationship between the company and the officer . 
Whether a director has been validly appointed and who the officers 
authorized to deal on the corporation's behalf86 should be is determined 
by the law of the place of incorporation. 
1.43 The protection given to a lender dealing with a company acting without 
capacity may be contrasted with the situation where he deals with 
agents of the company who lack authority. Even if the persons who are 
purporting to act on behalf of the debtor company do not have actual 
authority to do so, the debtor will nevertheless be bound by their 
actions if it has conferred on them the apparent (or, as it is sometimes 
called, ostensible) authority to do so. This will be the case if the debtor 
8 2Calnan(nl4)pgl43. 
83Rome I, Art 1 (2)(g) excludes from its scope 'the question whether an agent is able to bind a 
principal, or an organ to bind a company or body corporate ....to a third party.' 
84
 In English law, the question of whether a company is bound by the acts of its directors or 
other agents is a matter of company law governed by the law of the place of incorporation. 
85
 Sierra Leone Telecommunications Co Ltd v Barclays Bank pic [ 1998] 2 A l l ER 821. 
86
 Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 A C 853. 
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has held out those who purport to enter into the transaction as having 
the authority to do so on its behalf. 
1.44 It is submitted that the fact that a principal may be bound by contracts 
entered into by someone who lacks actual authority but possesses 
ostensible authority is easily justifiable by the general rule that a party 
may be bound according to the objective appearance of the agreement 
that he has created. From the Lender's perspective, he will expect his 
rights to be determined by the law governing the contract he entered 
into. The law which should be applied to determine whether there is a 
contract between the principal and the Lender is that which would 
apply to determine the existence and the validity of a contract. Under 
Rome I this is determined by the putative governing law which is the 
law which would also govern the contract if the contract were valid. 
1.45 The authority of the board of directors depends on the company's 
articles of association which generally gives the board of directors 
extensive powers to manage the company's business. Sometimes, 
specific provisions limit the amount of borrowings. Whether the board 
of directors has appropriately exercised its authority to enter into the 
transaction depends on whether an acceptable board resolution has been 
passed by the necessary number of directors required by the company's 
articles of association. It may be that some of the directors are 
interested in the transaction,90in which case it should be established 
whether (and, if so, on what terms) interested directors can be counted 
in a quorum and vote on the resolution).91 
1.46 The other matter that can affect the authority of the board of directors is 
the commencement of insolvency proceedings. If the company goes 
87
 See e.g. Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E & B 327 and Freeman & Lockyer v 
Buckhurst Park Properties [1964] 2 QB 480. There is statutory recognition of this principle in 
s 40(1) Companies Act 2006. 
88
 Reynolds (1994) 110 L Q R 21. See Stevens (n 47) 208. 
89
 See Rome I, Art 10(1). 
90
 e.g. because they are directors of other companies in the group which are guaranteeing the 
transaction. See s 177 Companies Act 2006. 
91
 Calnan(nl4) 143,5.25. 
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into liquidation or administration, the authority of the board to bind the 
company is terminated and replaced by that of the relevant insolvency 
officer holder. In addition, i f a petition is presented for the 
compulsory winding up of a company, and a winding up order is 
ultimately made, the liquidation dates back to the date of the 
presentation of the petition, and any disposition of the company's 
property entered into in the meantime is void unless the court validates 
it. Where the debtor is incorporated outside England and Wales, 
advice wi l l be required on these issues from lawyers in the appropriate 
jurisdiction. 
Can the contract be set aside as a result of a vitiating factor? 
1.47 The debtor may seek to have the contract with the Lender set aside or 
otherwise challenge its validity in certain circumstances.94 In practice, 
however, the most likely circumstances in which a security transaction 
wi l l be set aside is where the security has been created by a company 
and the directors have acted in breach of fiduciary duty when entering 
into the transaction. However under the general principles of the law of 
contract, the security transaction is capable of being set aside in 
circumstances including mistake, misrepresentation, duress, fraud, 
undue influence and illegality. 
92 I A Act 1986, ss 91(2) and 103 and Sch B l , para 64. 
93
 Ibid, s 127. 
94The debtor may apply the protection afforded by Article 10(2), Rome I which allows a party 
to rely upon the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence to establish that he 
did not consent, if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to apply 
the putative governing law. However it is unclear where the habitual residence of a body 
corporate is and indeed whether it can have one at all. Article 19(1) clarifies that the habitual 
residence of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated, shall be the place of 
administration. 
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1.48 It is important to note that the governing law of the contract will 
determine most issues in relation to the effect of the contract.95 
However it is submitted that the question of whether or not there has 
been a breach of fiduciary duty is a matter for the law of the place of 
incorporation of the company concerned, not the governing law of the 
contract.96 
1.49 The likelihood of breach of fiduciary duty is most apparent in the case 
of the company guaranteeing the obligations of another company in the 
same group to the Lender, or taking a third party charge over its 
property. It is fundamental that the directors do not concentrate 
exclusively on the interests of the group as a whole. It must be 
established that the directors have acted in what a reasonable board of 
directors would consider to be in the best interests of their particular 
go 
company or the transaction is likely to be set aside. This situation is 
likely to occur where so-called upstream guarantees are given by 
subsidiaries to secure facilities to their ultimate parent company which 
acts as the group's banker.99. The board must demonstrate that they 
genuinely believed that they acted for the company's benefit and that 
they had reasonable grounds for their belief100 
1.50 The company is able to avoid the transaction and reclaim any benefits 
granted if it can be proved that the directors have acted in breach of 
their duties and the Lender has actual or constructive notice of this 
95
 See Rome I, Art 12. 
96
 See Calnan (n 14), 13.46, 482; Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin [2004] E W C A Civ 1316, 
[2005] 1 WLR1157. 
97
 Or an associated company. 
98
 Charterbridge Corporation v Lloyds Bank [1970] Ch 62 at 74. See now Companies Act 
2006, s.172; Calnan (n 14), 5.30, 145. 
99
 In contrast, if a subsidiary is guaranteeing fellow subsidiaries or if the guarantee is of a 
facility which will not be used for the purpose of funding the existing group, the directors 
might find it harder to demonstrate sufficient reasons why they believe that the giving of this 
guarantee is in the best interests of their company. Calnan (n 14) 145. 
100
 Calnan (n 14) 145, 5.31. See Colin Gwyer & Associates v London Wharf (Limehouse) 
[2002] E W H C 2748 (Ch), [2003] 2 B C L C 153 at [72] -[90]. 
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fact.101 Given the nature of the relationship between the Lender and the 
company, there is a strong possibility that the Lender will have enough 
information about the company to give him constructive notice of such 
an irregularity.102 
1.51 There are two ways of preventing this problem from occurring: by 
taking steps to make certain that directors do not commit a breach of 
duty; or by getting an affirmation from the company of any probable 
1 A l 
breach of duty by the directors. It is important for the Lender to 
ensure that the debtor's directors have good reasons for entering into 
the transaction and that they are properly documented in the company's 
board minutes.104 The debtor company105 will have to prove the 
following in order for the transaction to be set aside: it was not the 
honest belief of the directors that the transaction was in the company's 
best interests; or that no reasonable board of directors could have that 
• • 106 
opinion. 
Summary of the contractual issues involved in cross-border 
security arrangements 
1.52 Although personal issues in relation to security obligations are less 
important than proprietary issues, they are nevertheless of importance, 
not least because they establish the existence and extent of the secured 
obligations. A lender should be able to establish, with some degree of 
certainty, which laws will determine the contractual effect of the 
lending transaction. Proper execution of the documentation can be 
101
 Wrexham Association Football Club Ltd (in Administration) v Crucialmove Ltd [2006] 
E W C A Civ 237;[2008] 1 B C L C 508; Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltdv British Steel 
Corporation [1986] Ch 246; and Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E & B 327. 
102
 Calnan(nl4) 145,5.32. 
imIbid. 
104
 See the First Company Law Amendment Directive which came into force on the 1st January 
2007 and makes companies legally obliged to include specific information on their websites, 
business letters, notices etc. 
105
 acting normally through its liquidator or administrator. 
106Calnan(nl4) 145,5.31. 
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checked by reference to the place of incorporation of the debtor and the 
effectiveness of the contractual arrangements can be ensured by 
choosing an appropriate governing law. 
1.53 These rules only apply, however, where England is the forum for the 
dispute. Where the dispute is litigated abroad, it will be the courts of 
the forum concerned which will determine the conflict of law rules to 
be applied. However where the country concerned is a Member State, 
there should be a substantial degree of consistency of approach to those 
matters to which Rome I applies. Unfortunately there are still some 
areas of uncertainty in relation to matters which are not the subject of 
Rome I which will depend on the domestic law of the jurisdiction 
concerned. 
The proprietary issues involved in cross-border security 
arrangements 
1.54 In terms of proprietary issues, the Lender's fundamental concern, when 
taking security, is to ascertain that a valid proprietary interest is 
acquired in each and every asset that the security comprises of. It is 
crucial that a proprietary interest is obtained by the Lender that will bite 
effectively on all the assets involved in the cross-border transaction 
wherever these assets are situated. 
1.55 The complicated issues that arise in cross-border secured financings can 
be illustrated by an example given by Calnan109 but with slight 
modifications to reflect the focus of this thesis (which is on English-
incorporated lenders lending within the European Union. The debtor 
Calnan (n 14), 486, although these are not the only two laws which can affect the outcome, 
they are by far the most important in practice. 
108
 See Calnan (n 14) 486-487, 13.67. 
109
 Calnan (n 14) 487, 13.68. 
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creates security over goods situated in France and over a contract 
governed by the law of Italy. The security documents are expressed to 
be governed by English law, and are executed in Belgium. The goods 
are subsequently moved to Spain. 
1.56 Which laws may be relevant in this case? They are numerous. English 
law expressly governs the security documents. Belgian law is relevant 
to the creation of the security as the documents were executed in 
Belgium. Italian law governs the debtor's rights under the contract 
which forms part of the security package. French law is clearly in play 
because France was the lex situs of the goods when the security was 
created. However, the goods have now moved bringing Spanish law 
into play as the current lex situs of the goods.110 
1.57 The question that arises is which law will govern the proprietary effects 
of the security. This depends on the law of the forum {lex fori) and, if 
that is English law, then the answer will depend on the classification of 
the asset over which the security is taken. The problem lies in which 
classification should be used as different rules apply to different types 
of asset. It should also be noted that only in a situation of conflict will 
a court need to decide between two different systems of law. It may be 
that, upon further review, a conflict does not actually exist.111 
The distinction between movables and immovables 
1.58 Although for domestic purposes, English law distinguishes between 
real property and personal property, in English conflict of laws, the 
110Calnan(nl4)487, 13.69. 
111
 Calnan(nl4)488, 13.76. 
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more universal distinction between movables and immovables is 
119 
used. The following extract from Re Hoyles makes this clear: 
"In order to arrive at a common basis on which to determine questions 
between the inhabitants of two countries living under different systems 
of jurisprudence, our courts act on a division otherwise unknown to our 
1 1 Q 
law into movable and immovable." 
The distinction between movables and immovables must not be 
confused with the distinction between tangible and intangible things. 
Tangible things are either movable (e.g. goods) or immovable (e.g. 
land). In practical terms a distinction between movables and 
immovables is not suitable for intangible things such as debts, stocks 
and shares, patents, trademarks, copyright and goodwill since "a thing 
which cannot be touched obviously cannot be moved."114 
1.59 It is submitted that, logically, things should be classified as tangible 
things, which may be either movable or immovable, and intangibles.115 
This is despite the fact it is usual practice to classify all things as being 
movable or immovable for the purposes of conflict of laws, and to 
include intangible things in movables, and even to give an artificial 
situs to intangible things to allow them to come within the ambit of the 
rules of law expressed in the terms of the situs116 
1.60 Calnan argues that the categorization of assets as 'movable' or 
'immovable' is not particularly helpful in relation to commercial 
117 
transactions and what the courts actually do in practice. His 
U2ReHoyles [1911] 1 Ch 179 (CA); Re Berchtold [1923] 1 Ch 192; MacdonaldvMacdonald, 
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argument is that the terms 'movables' and 'immovables' cannot 
effectively be used in evaluating which law governs the proprietary 
effects in a specific transaction. This is based on studies of cases 
regarding the consensual transfers of certain assets including the 
1 1 0 
creation of security. 
1.61 The Lender will have to consider, however, that different systems of 
law may characterize things as movable and immovable in varying 
ways. In all systems, some physically movable things are so closely 
connected with land that, for legal purposes, they are characterized as 
immovables. There may, therefore, be a conflict between the lex fori 
and the lex situs as to whether a particular thing is movable or 
immovable. In such a situation it is well established that it is the lex 
situs that determines the characterization. 
1.62 The Lender will also need to be aware of the difficulties that might 
arise if there is a change in situs of things that are physically movable. 
For instance it is problematic if things that are physically movable are 
moved from a jurisdiction which regards them as legally immovable to 
a jurisdiction which regards them as legally movable. It has been 
established that the new lex situs should determine their character. 
The distinction between tangible/intangible 
1.63 The subdivision of movables/immovables into tangible and intangible 
assets appears to bear more relationship to the law as it is actually 
191 
applied by the courts in relation to commercial transactions. There 
are two basic principles which the court's decision will be based on 
regarding the law which governs the proprietary effects of a transaction. 
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In order to consider these principles it is convenient to divide tangible 
assets into the categories of land and goods and adopt a separate 
category for intangibles. 
1.64 Calnan expresses these two principles in the following terms: 
"The proprietary effect of a transaction in respect of a tangible asset is 
decided by the law of the place where the asset is located (ie the lex 
situs) at the time the transaction is effected. The proprietary effect of a 
transaction in respect of an intangible asset is decided by the law under 
which that intangible asset has been created. Where the asset 
concerned is created by contract, the relevant law will be the governing 
law of the contract." 
Taking security over land 
1.65 The general rule in English law, as in other systems, is that the lex situs 
is the governing law for proprietary issues relating to immovable 
property. Therefore when taking security over land, the proprietary 
effect of the documentation will be governed by the lex situs and, in 
practice, any security documentation should comply with, and be 
expressed to be governed by, that law. The justification usually 
given for the application of the lex situs is that any other rule would be 
ineffective, because in the last resort land can only be dealt with in a 
manner which the lex situs allows. 
1.66 Art 6(4) of Brussels I enables the court of the situs of immovable 
property to combine an action relating to a contract with an action 
(against the same defendant, one domiciled in a Member State) relating 
lzz
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to rights in rem in the property even if the court would not otherwise 
have jurisdiction over the contractual action. It follows from this that if 
the land in question is in England and Brussels I does not apply, the 
English court may take jurisdiction by allowing service out of the 
jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Rules on the basis that the whole 
1 9S 
subject matter of a claim relates to property within the jurisdiction. 
Where the land is in another part of the United Kingdom or another 
Member State, the jurisdiction of the English court will be excluded in 
accordance with Brussels I. However, i f the land (any immovable) is 
situated outside England then, as a general rule, English courts have no 
jurisdiction to entertain an action for the determination of the title to, or 
the right to possession of that particular land (immovable).126 There is 
no doubt, however, that it would be extremely unusual for a document 
creating or transferring an interest in land to be governed by any law 
other than the law of the jurisdiction in which the land is located. 
1.67 One potential difficulty for the Lender is that it may be necessary to 
ascertain the scope of application of a relevant foreign law. For 
example, an English company may give a charge over land in a 
European country (X) to the Lender. Confusion will arise if in X 
unregistered charges granted over land are void. The question then 
becomes the potentially difficult one of ascertaining whether X's law 
applies to charges over land situated in X or merely to charges created 
by companies incorporated in X. If the latter, it may be that a court in 
X will not have to apply registration requirements, in which case the 
English courts should do likewise. 
1.68 The Lender should note that the proprietary effect of the documentation 
will be governed by the lex situs and, in practice, any security 
documentation should comply with, and be expressed to be governed 
by, that law. The scope of application of registration requirements will 
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probably be discoverable by the mode of registration, whether in a land 
registry or a companies' register or both.129 
1.69 The Lender also needs to consider whether the lex situs or the lex fori 
will govern the order of priorities where there is more than one security 
interest created over foreign land. It is suggested that it is 'possible' 
that the priority of claims is governed by the lex situs}30 However it 
would be more convenient to apply the same system of law to 
determine both the validity and the priority of a security interest over 
1 Q 1 
land. There are strong justifications for applying the lex situs which 
is a single unchanging system of law. Although the application of the 
lex fori has the advantage that it may give a uniform result when 
applied to charges granted over assets in disparate jurisdictions, it may 
also encourage forum shopping. 
Taking security over goods 
1.70 In terms of proprietary issues, the Lender needs to be aware of the 
general doctrine that the lex situs at the time of the transaction governs 
the proprietary effects of a transaction. Any transaction regarding the 
creation or transfer of a proprietary interest in goods, whether legal or 
129
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equitable, by way of security or outright, and whether consensual or by 
operation of law are covered by this principle. However, general 
transfers of goods by operation of law, such as under the rules of 
succession on death or bankruptcy, are not included. The law of the 
domicile of the person concerned will govern the potential effects of 
such general transfers by operation of law. However, generally the lex 
situs of the goods at the relevant time governs the effectiveness of 
specific transfers.134 
1.71 Where the goods remain in one jurisdiction, this rule has great merit as 
it is certain and probably corresponds with reasonable expectations. 
Where, however, a charge is granted over movables in different 
jurisdictions, the situs of which change over time, the justification for 
applying the lex situs of each asset at the time that the charge is granted 
to determine validity is overwhelming. It can probably be argued that 
applying the lex situs of the assets at the time of the transaction is far 
less predictable than applying the lex fori. However the most important 
factor is what renders the most fair, just and practical solution 
according to practical examples and case law. 
1.72 The application of the rule is more easily understood in practice when 
looking at three specific cases. The subject matter of the first two cases 
was an outright transfer whereas the third case is concerned with a 
transfer by way of security. The case of Cammell v Sewell135 is 
important as laying down clearly the principle that the proprietary effect 
of a purported transfer of goods is governed by the lex situs of the 
goods at the time of transfer. The judgment of the majority of the court 
was given by Crompton J who held that:136 
passes title not just to the document but also the underlying intangible (examples of which 
include negotiable instruments and bearer securities). See Calnan (n 14), 490, 13.82. 
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" if personal property is disposed of in a manner binding according to 
the law of the country where it is, that disposition is binding 
everywhere." 
1.73 Relying principally on Cammell v Sewell, Slade J also followed the 
approach taken by Crompton J and applied it in Winckworth v Christie 
1 -in 
Manson and Woods. Artistic works were stolen from the claimant in 
England, transported to Italy and subsequently purchased by the 
defendant. The question that arose was which law governed the 
proprietary effects of the sale in Italy, English law or Italian law? It 
was decided that Italian law applied and hence this case emphasizes the 
extent of the principle that the lex situs at the time of the transfer 
governs the proprietary effects of the transfer. 
1.74 In Inglis v Robertson the House of Lords decided that the issue as to 
whether an individual had obtained effective security over goods stored 
in a warehouse in Scotland was a matter of Scots law. Lord Watson 
said:140 
"It would, in my opinion, be contrary to the elementary principles of 
international law, and so far as I know, without authority, to hold that 
the right of a Scottish creditor when so perfected can be defeated by a 
transaction between his debtor and the citizen of a foreign country 
which would be according to the laws of that country, but is not 
according to the law of Scotland, sufficient to create a real right in the 
goods." 
1.75 The three cases demonstrate the broad application of the principle.141 
They establish that the proprietary effect of a transaction is governed by 
the law of the jurisdiction where the goods are located at the time of the 
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transaction even if the goods were removed to that jurisdiction without 
1 A r\ 
the knowledge or consent of their owner and the goods are 
subsequently returned to the jurisdiction in which they were originally 
located. 
1.76 In Alcock v Smith143 it was held that the same principle is applicable in 
relation to documentary intangibles.144 In this case the asset was a 
negotiable instrument, but the principle is equally applicable to bearer 
securities and other similar transferable instruments. What matters is 
that the instrument can be transferred by delivery (and, if necessary, 
endorsement) and so, is in this respect, analogous to goods.145 
Exceptions to the principle 
1.77 There are exceptions to the principle that the proprietary effects of a 
transfer are governed by the lex situs. The principle will not be applied 
if to do so would be manifestly contrary to English public policy.146 
Although, in practice, English law is unlikely to refuse to apply the lex 
situs on these grounds, a jurisdiction that has more restrictive laws may 
not want to recognize security formed in the more liberal jurisdiction if 
the relevant asset is moved into its own jurisdiction and the security 
1 An 
fails to meet its requirements and formalities. 
1.78 English law, for instance, recognizes a broad concept of non-possessory 
security. It is unlikely to find that security created in accordance with 
a foreign law offends against the fundamental principles of the English 
law of security. However this will not always be the case in 
jurisdictions which have a more restrictive concept of non-possessory 
See especially Winckworth (n 135) where the assets were taken to Italy without the owner's 
consent. 
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security. For example, in Scotland, there is authority for the 
proposition that a security interest created in another jurisdiction in 
accordance with its laws is ineffective in Scotland if it does not comply 
with the more stringent requirements of Scots law as to the creation of 
security.148 
1.79 There are four other potential exceptions of which the Lender needs to 
be aware.149 The first is recognition that the lex situs principle applies 
to particular transfers of goods, not to general assignments of goods on 
bankruptcy or succession. The second suggested exception is 'where a 
purchaser claiming title has not acted bona fide'.150 The third exception 
is where 'a statute in force in the country which is the forum in which 
the case is heard obliges the court to apply the law of its own 
country'.151 Finally, ' i f a tangible movable is in transit, and its situs is 
casual or not known, a transfer which is valid and effective by its 
1 CO 
applicable law will (semble) be valid and effective in England.' 
However, in practice, most of these exceptions are only likely to occur 
in limited circumstances.153 
Priorities in Property Law 
1.80 One of the Lender's main concerns is to ensure that his security is 
effective against third parties who also obtain a proprietary interest in 
the tangible assets concerned. Whether or not his security is effective 
against them depends on the priority rules, which must now briefly be 
considered. The basic priority rule of English law is that priorities 
between two competing security interests in an asset depend on the time 
148
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of creation of each interest. The first in time prevails. There are, 
however, a number of exceptions to this basic principle, the five most 
important of which in practice are: the bona fide purchaser rule;155 the 
rule in Dearie v Hall (governing priorities in relation to dealings with 
choses of action such as receivables;156 registration;157 cases where 'the 
equities are unequal;158 and the 'purchase money security interest.159 
1.81 Another issue for consideration is whether there is a separate rule 
governing priorities in tangible movables. It was held that the lex situs 
principle does not apply to determine the priority of two security 
interests created over the same asset; and that priorities in movables are 
an issue for the lex fori160 Applying the lex fori to issues of priority, 
however, may encourage forum shopping, something which the English 
rules on jurisdiction will not necessarily prevent.161 It is argued, and 
the writer agrees, that there is not really a separate rule for priorities. 
The lex situs of the goods at the time of the transaction should also 
determine all issues regarding the priorities in a transaction relating to 
goods.162 
1.82 The reasoning behind the fact that there is no separate rule for priorities 
is based on case law that establishes that the lex situs governs the 
155
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proprietary effect of transfers of goods; 163and that it also governs the 
creation of proprietary interests by way of security.164 What 
distinguishes a proprietary right from a personal one is the ability of the 
owner of the proprietary right to enforce it against persons other than 
those by whom it was created.165 In principle, the lex situs at the time 
of the transaction should govern all issues relating to the proprietary 
effect of a transaction involving goods166 and hence there is no separate 
rule for priorities. If the lex situs principle governs the effect of the 
creation of a proprietary interest in goods, it should subsequently also 
resolve not only whether the transfer is effective between its immediate 
parties but also its impact on third parties.168 
1.83 The issue relating to priorities becomes problematic in situations where 
there is more than one transaction relating to the goods in question. In 
the absence of much instructive case-law, one of the major difficulties 
perceived is that the lex situs of tangible movables may change, unlike 
the lex situs of immovables or the law governing an intangible movable. 
The following example demonstrates the intricacies involved.169 The 
debtor company (A Ltd) grants a fixed charge over goods located in 
country X to the Lender (B). The goods are subsequently moved to 
country Y . A Ltd there sells the goods to C Ltd making representations 
that it possesses an unencumbered title. C Ltd takes the goods in good 
faith. The validity of B's charge will be determined by the law of X. 
The law of Y (where the goods were situated when A Ltd sells them to 
C Ltd) should establish the consequences of the second transaction. A 
Ltd is selling goods subject to a charge to a third party however, if by 
the law of Y , a bona fide purchaser acquired good title then C Ltd's title 
163
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would prevail against B. The question that arises is whether, under 
the law of the lex situs of the goods at the time of transaction, the third 
party is treated as a bona fide purchaser and takes the goods free of any 
171 
incumbrances. 
1.84 Questions of priority can lead to grave difficulties where more than two 
jurisdictions are involved. The problem is that, if the goods are 
transferred to a third state, Z, where a further security interest is created 
in favour of H bank, which law or laws are to determine priority? 
Again, assuming that all three charges have been validly created, one 
solution would be to determine whether E bank has priority over G 
bank according to the law of Y , and for the law of Z to determine the 
consequences of the third transaction. If by the law of Z, unregistered 
1 79 
charges, over movables are void as against other creditors, H bank's 
1 7^ 
charge should have priority. 
1.85 Difficulties may arise due to varying inconsistent approaches favoured 
by the different choices of law resulting in circularity problems. For 
instance, D bank having priority over E bank which has priority over F 
bank which in turn has priority over D bank. The difficulties are 
emphasized in the situation where a company grants successive charges 
over movables located in different jurisdictions. Over all, the 
complexities are obvious when working out the priorities with reference 
to the consequences of each successive transaction by the law of the 
situs of each asset at the relevant time. Although the negative 
implications have been discussed, it has been conversely argued that 
applying the lex fori may be simpler as it establishes a single system of 
law by which to rank the various claims, each of which may be 
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governed by different laws over assets which might be located in a 
1 nA 
number of jurisdictions which vary over time. 
Taking security over Intangibles 
1.86 When it comes to establishing the law which governs the proprietary 
effect of transactions involving intangible assets such as book debts, 
assignable contract rights and intellectual property rights, the Lender 
needs to be wary as the position is much less clear than it is in relation 
to tangible assets. One of the main reasons for the lack of clarity and 
complexity is due to the fact that there are not many decided cases 
regarding the proprietary aspects of transactions in relation to 
intangibles.176 
1.87 It is not easy to clearly state the choice of rules which govern the 
assignment or transfer of intangible property due to the fact that the 
category of intangible things encompasses a broad range of property 
and rights. This includes not only simple contractual debts and bank 
deposits but also shares in companies and the securities and other 
financial instruments whose issue and trading supports the majority of 
1 *7*7 
the capital markets of the developed world. 
1.88 Debts and securities are intangible property which is substantially 
contractual in origin. However, other intangibles, such as rights to sue 
a tortfeaser, rights arising under trusts, rights in intellectual property, 
etc, do not have an obviously contractual origin. It therefore appears 
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unrealistic for a single choice of law rule to govern all issues relating to 
the assignment of all such property. 
1.89 In relation to the assignment of intangible property the choice of law 
rules have to include quite a broad range of legal situations therefore 
necessitating caution to be exercised when stating and applying a rule 
to a factual context to which it has not formerly been held to extend, or 
in applying a rule in a context in which rights have arisen consensually 
(based on contract) to a context where rights have arisen by other 
180 
means. 
1.90 Today, some categories of intangible property may be represented by 
certificates or other pieces of paper which may themselves be taken to 
be the "thing" in respect of which the rules governing the assignment 
are to operate; this may mean that the choice of law rules for tangible 
1 O l 
movable property apply to them. 
1.91 Other examples of intangible assets may be recorded on a register 
which means that acting in accordance with the law of the place where 
the register is maintained may be key in deciding any issues of transfer, 
or of competing transfers, of rights. Furthermore, other types of 
intangible property may be held, traded and dealt with in computerized 
dealing and settlement systems, and in these cases a choice of law rule 
developed for the assignment of simple contractual debts may not be 
suitable. With regard to those intangibles which are not contractual in 
nature, a choice of law rule designed for the assignment of contractual 
rights will not be obviously justifiable. 
1.92 A proprietary right is a right which is available not just against the other 
contracting party (in this case, the assignor) but also against other 
persons (in this case, the debtor). Overall there appear to be two 
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possibilities for which law will govern the proprietary effect of 
transactions involving intangibles: 
"the law of the place where of the intangible asset is located (the lex 
situs) at the time of the transaction; and the law which governs the 
intangible (i.e., in the case of an intangible asset created by contract, the 
law which governs that contract)." 
The application of Rome I and whether Article 14 governs the 
proprietary effect of a transaction in relation to an intangible 
1 QC 
1.93 Article 14(1) of Rome I clarifies some uncertainties and simply 
expresses that the personal rights and obligations of the assignor and 
assignee are governed by the law of the contract between them. Article 
14(2) establishes that the law which governs the intangible concerned 
determines: whether the right is of a kind which can be assigned as a 
matter of general law and whether any contractual prohibition on 
assignment is effective; the relationship between the assignee and the 
debtor and the conditions and whether, as a result of the assignment, the 
assignee is entitled to recovery from the debtor; and the circumstances 
in which the debtor has to pay the assignee and will not obtain a good 
discharge by paying the assignor.186 
1.94 Controversy arises in establishing the extent to which Article 14 is 
determinative of the proprietary consequences of assignment. Article 
14(2) refers to 'assignments' and 'contractual subrogation' and Article 
14(3) includes within the ambit of the provision outright transfers of 
183This was the view initially favoured by D & M (n 16) and was subsequently adopted by a 
number of cases. Calnan argues that later D & M changed its mind, in favour of the law which 
governs the intangible asset concerned. See Calnan (n 14), 500, 13.130. 
184
 Calnan (n 14), 500. 
185
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claims, transfers of claims by way of security and pledges or other 
security rights over claims. This appears to extend to any consensual 
transaction by which proprietary rights are transferred or created, 
including by means of a charge. There are however some limits on its 
application. 
1.95 Firstly, it only applies where there has been 'a voluntary assignment of 
a right against another person'. It does not, therefore, have an impact 
on general assignments on bankruptcy or succession, in respect of 
which there are separate rules (in relation to both tangibles and 
intangibles) which refer to the law of the domicile of the person 
concerned. Secondly, it does not apply to transfers of all types of 
1 oo 
intangible. It does not extend to transfers of shares or to certain types 
of insurance contract, although these are relatively minor exceptions. 
There are also special rules for financial collateral.190 
1.96 Some commentators have taken the view that the proprietary 
consequences of assignment are outside the scope of Rome I.191 Some 
support for this contention may be derived from the Giuliano-Lagarde 
Report on the Rome Convention which states that, 'since the 
Convention is concerned only with the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, property rights are not governed by these provisions.' 
Article 14(1) is clearly concerned with the personal effect of the 
contract between the assignor and assignee. Article 14(2) is, however, 
different and does not deal with the relationship between assignor and 
187 Calnan(nl4), 501. 
188
 Rome I, Art l(2)(f). See Macmillan (n 128) regarding the governing law in relation to the 
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189
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reg 19. See also Calnan (n 14), 13.153, 506. 
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1 QQ 
assignee but with their relationship with the debtor, and therefore has 
a proprietary effect. 
1.97 The juxtaposition of Article 14(1) and (2) suggests clearly that a 
distinction is being drawn between the law which governs the 
relationship between the assignor and the assignee and the law which 
governs their relationship with the debtor. The latter is clearly 
concerned with the proprietary effects of the assignment. Where there 
is more than one assignment the law governing the right assigned 
determines to which of the assignees the right has been transferred. 
The law governing the right assigned should therefore determine 
194 
priority. 
1.98 Overall there will only be one law governing the right in question and, 
in the case of multiple assignments, in different locations, governed by 
different laws, it establishes a unilateral system which will determine 
the order of priority. Furthermore, the debtor and the original creditor 
may have expressly or impliedly chosen a system of law to govern the 
obligation. Where this is the case, the debtor will justifiably presume 
that the obligations he is under, including to whom they are owed, will 
be determined by the law governing the right chosen.195 
1.99 One potential disadvantage of the approach suggested is that, a creditor 
needs to be wary of making a global assignment of present and future 
debts, as different laws may apply to different debts. It would not 
therefore be possible for an assignee to refer to a single law to 
determine which debts are assignable and what is required in order to 
perfect the assignments and establish priority.196 However whilst this 
disadvantage is real enough, in practice, there are issues that help in 
alleviating risk. For instance, a supplier who wishes to assign the debts 
193 Calnan(nl4)501, 13.137. 
194
 See Stevens (n 47) 214. 
195
 See Stevens (n 47) 214. By way of example, if under the law chosen to govern, a right may 
not be assigned until notice is given to the debtor, it would be unsatisfactory to allow rights to 
be acquired against the debtor by applying a system of law which imposed no such 
requirement. 
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owed by purchasers may, if the contracts of sale were in a standard 
form, have stipulated that the same law was to apply to each sale. 
Furthermore, even where no law has expressly been stipulated for, the 
law of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic 
performance of the contract has his habitual residence would be 
presumed to apply to all the debts. 
1.100 It needs to be noted, however, that there is a substantial body of opinion 
that favours the application of the lex situs of the debt to determine 
1 g o 
proprietary issues. The main reason for this view is that Rome I is 
concerned with contractual matters and not with proprietary issues 
although we have discussed199 the weakness of this contention in this 
context. Furthermore, it makes little sense, in terms of global 
assignments of existing and future debts, as the places of residence of 
the various debtors may be unascertainable and multifarious.200 Some 
commentators who have supported the application of the lex situs have 
suggested that an exception should be made for global assignments and 
901 
the law of the assignor's place of residence applied. However, in 
relation to this contention, clarification is required regarding what is 
deemed to be a global assignment for these purposes and in terms of 
909 
two debts or more where the residence of the debtors is different. 
1.101 On the whole, it appears that confusion in understanding the principles 
applicable to the transfer of title to intangible property is caused by the 
90^ 
search for a lex situs. There is no doubt that, if necessary, it is 
possible to attribute a location to an intangible asset.204 There are, 
therefore, rules which can be applied for attributing a location to an 
197 Rome I, Art 4(2). See also Stevens (n 47) 215. 
198
 Seen 186. 
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 See 1.96-1.98. 
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 Application of the lex situs initially appears attractive as it conforms with the approach 
taken in relation to tangible property however any situs that intangible property may have is a 
metaphysical one that cannot be justified by appeals to the analogy of the application of the lex 
situs to tangible property. See Stevens (n 47) 215. 
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intangible. However there is equally no doubt that to do so involves a 
very artificial and imprecise exercise that does not always correspond 
90S 
with commercial reality and lacks certainty. 
1.102 In the absence of statutory clarity, the Lender should take note of recent 
case law. The leading English case on the application of Article 12 of 
' J A / ' 9/T7 
the Rome Convention is Raffeisen in which the Court of Appeal 
confirmed that the application of Article 12(2) of the Rome Convention 
has the effect that the rights of an assignee or chargee of most types of 
intangible asset are determined by the law governing that asset and not 
by the lex situs. 
1.103 In contrast with the application of the lex situs, the use of the governing 
law of the intangible has several benefits. It acknowledges the real 
differences between tangibles and intangibles and the fact that it is not 
possible simply to apply to intangible rules which were created for 
tangibles. It acknowledges that an intangible only exists because it has 
been created by a legal system and that it is therefore appropriate that 
its proprietary effects should be governed by that system. It is also 
consistent with the parties' reasonable expectation of what the rules 
should be.209 
1.104 The problem regarding 'global' assignments has been discussed earlier. 
However, if the lex situs did govern the proprietary effects of the 
transaction, there would be the same difficulties. The principle that the 
proprietary effects of security over intangibles is determined by the 
governing law allows the creditor a level of certainty in establishing the 
relevant applicable laws and a firm basis on which to make decisions as 
205Atkin L J in New York Life (n 202) at 119. See 1.95 & 1.105-1.107. 
206
 As mentioned this provision is superseded by Rome I, Art 14 (2) which has the same effect 
and wording as Art 12(2) apart for also applying to the relationship between assignor and 
assignee under a contractual subrogation of a claim against another person (the debtor). It is 
therefore safe to assume that Raffeisen (n 43) is still good law. 
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regards due diligence including the extent to which it is necessary to 
910 
take advice on their effect. 
Shares 
911 
1.105 It is clear that Rome I does not apply to the transfer of shares. The 
leading modern authority on the law applicable to validity and priority 
of proprietary rights in shares however is the Court of Appeal's 
919 
decision in Macmillan. Instead of alleviating the confusion that 
already existed, the members of the Court of Appeal did not speak with 
one voice. They were agreed that the lex situs should apply but there 
91^ 
was no unanimity as to where the lex situs of the shares actually is. 
1.106 Aldous LJ's view was that shares are situated at the place of 
incorporation. Staughton LJ agreed, unless the shares are negotiable 
instruments by English law, when, presumably, the lex situs would be 
the lex situs cartae. He also considered it arguable that the lex situs 
may, in certain cases, be the law of the place where the share register is 
kept. Auld LJ's opinion was that the lex situs will be the country where 
the share register is kept, normally but not always the place of 
incorporation, unless the shares are negotiable when the lex situs will be 
the lex situs cartae. It is submitted that, although Article 14(2) does 
not expressly apply to the transfer of shares, the logic behind Article 
91 S 
14(2) is also relevant to shares. The correct proposition is that: 
210Calnan(nl4), 507, 13.157. 
211
 Rome I, Art 1(2) (f). 
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 Which is that a transfer of an intangible should be governed by the law by which the 
intangible has been created. 
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"the creation of a proprietary interest in shares should be governed by 
the law of the place of incorporation of the company whose shares are 
in dispute because that is the law which governs the shares."216 
Summary 
1.107 At the inception of a security transaction, the Lender's main concern is 
ensuring the lending transaction and underlying security interest are 
valid and enforceable pre-bankruptcy. By considering the main issues 
in the appropriate legal systems concerned it is possible for the Lender 
to obtain some level of comfort and minimize potential risk factors. The 
Lender will need to be aware of the potential effects of Brussels I and 
Rome I, which form the network of provisions which regulate the 
assumption of jurisdiction and choice of law treatment of cases before 
U K and all other member state courts. 
1.108 In relation to the underlying security, the Lender will need to ascertain 
that the formalities regarding contract formation have been complied 
with; and the substantive and material issues ensuring there is a valid 
agreement in the first place. As discussed earlier, the parties can choose 
which law will govern the facility documentation, and most of the 
important personal effects of a contract will be determined by its 
governing law. The law of the place of incorporation of the debtor 
company will resolve issues such as: whether or not a debtor has duly 
executed the documentation it has entered into; and issues such as the 
debtor's capacity to enter into agreement and also the authority of those 
who have entered into the documentation on the debtor's behalf. 
1.109 The Lender will want to minimize, as far as possible, circumstances 
that might lead to the security documents being set aside as a result of a 
6
 Calnan (n 14), 505-506, 13.152. 
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vitiating factor. It has been identified that the most likely situation in 
which this will happen is where directors have acted in breach of their 
fiduciary duties when entering into the security transaction. Therefore 
the Lender should obtain from the debtor company an affirmation of 
any potential breach of duty by the directors and ensure that the 
directors had good reasons for entering into the security transaction and 
that they are properly documented in the company's board minutes. 
1.110 In terms of predictability for the Lender, it is safe to assume that both 
the governing law of the contracts and the law of the debtor's place of 
incorporation can be ascertained with certainty, and appropriate 
investigations can be made. Although these laws may not cover every 
issue which might arise in relation to the security documents, 
complying with them will help in ensuring that the main problems 
concerning the personal effect of the transaction have been resolved. 
Complying with the formal registration requirements in each country 
where assets are known to be located will also aid the Lender in 
ensuring effective enforceability of the lending transaction and the 
underlying security interest. 
1.111 As far as the proprietary effects of the transaction are concerned, the 
key distinction is between tangible and intangible assets. As discussed, 
in relation to taking security over land, the proprietary effect of the 
documentation will be governed by the lex situs and, in practice, any 
security documentation should comply with, and be expressed to be 
governed by, that law. In relation to tangible assets, the law is also 
reasonably clear. The proprietary effect of a transaction is determined 
by the lex situs of the asset concerned at the time of the transaction. In 
most cases this will not be difficult for the Lender to determine. There 
are exceptions to the lex situs principle however these are limited and 
overall not a great cause for concern. 
7
 See Calnan (n 14) 507, 13.159. 
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1.112 The position in relation to intangibles is less clear. However Article 
O 1 o 
14(2) of Rome I and the decision in Raiffeisan are helpful in 
clarifying what is likely to happen in respect of most types of intangible 
assets. They indicate that the law which governs the proprietary effect 
of a transaction in respect of most types of intangible is the law which 
governs the intangible concerned. The main exception to this rule is 
shares where the lex situs appears to be the determining factor. 
However, note that the lex situs will almost always be the law of the 
place of incorporation of the company whose shares are in dispute, and 
that will itself be the law which governs those shares. 
1.113 In practice, therefore, the most important determining factor in relation 
to intangibles and, which will normally be easy for the Lender to 
identify, is the law which governs the intangible. 
1.114 Therefore, when considering the proprietary effect of a transaction, the 
Lender will need to consider: the lex situs of the tangibles which form 
part of the security; and the governing law of the intangibles which 
form part of the security. Since the effectiveness of the proprietary 
elements of the security will be determined by these laws, it would be 
prudent for the security document to be governed by the law concerned. 
91 Q 
It is submitted, and the writer thinks it makes good sense, to insist 
that the security document is governed by the law which represents the 
majority of assets or the predominant assets in the case of widespread 
assets that are governed by the laws of more than one jurisdiction. 
8
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INSOLVENCY JURISDICTION AND INSOLVENCY 
EFFECTS 
Bankruptcy proofing at the inception of the lending 
transaction 
1.115 The logical preliminary consideration for the Lender, ex ante, before 
making any lending decisions is to conduct a risk assessment and take 
steps to ensure, in so far as possible, that realization of his security will 
take place subject to insolvency laws that do not erode the security in 
favour of other creditors. In this sense, the Lender will try and make 
990 
the transaction as 'bankruptcy proof as possible. 
1.116 If the Lender wants to make a transaction 'bankruptcy proof, he must 
consider the fact that the courts of a country may assert insolvency 
jurisdiction for different purposes in different circumstances. In the 
advent of insolvency proceedings the question arises of which regime 
provides the governing jurisdictional rules. The jurisdictional scope of 
the EIR can be identified by reference to the application of Brussels I, 
specifically Article l(2)(b), which indicates that Brussels I does not 
apply to "bankruptcy proceedings relating to the winding up of 
insolvent companies or other legal proceedings, judicial arrangements, 
991 
compositions and analogous proceedings". 
1.117 The first step will be to identify the jurisdictions in which insolvency 
proceedings might occur in order to assess the effects of the insolvency 
999 
laws of those jurisdictions upon the transaction in question. This 
220
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involves focusing on the contractual and proprietary issues faced by the 
Lender in each of those jurisdictions where insolvency proceedings 
might occur and discussing the traditional approach in English private 
international law and other countries. Generally, at the start of a 
security transaction, the Lender will assess risks in relation to 
enforceability of the transaction outside insolvency (such as when the 
company debtor defaults under the facility documentation) as well as 
analyzing the potential effects of insolvency. These issues were 
considered earlier in this chapter. 
1.118 The rest of the chapter focuses on the impact and effects of insolvency 
proceedings. As a starting point, and by way of context, it would be 
helpful for the Lender to consider the attitude of the different courts to 
the principles of Universalism and Territorialism. 
The attitude of different courts to Universalism and 
Territorialism 
1.119 National systems have responded to cases of insolvency containing 
international elements by developing their rules of private international 
law, employing traditional techniques and concepts, to determine 
jurisdiction, choice of law, and international recognition in accordance 
with locally accepted norms of decision. Due to the resulting diversity 
99^ 
of response, the quest for unifying principles has proved elusive. 
The historic struggle between opposing principles has, however, 
crystallized into two contrasting camps of opinion regarding the correct 
approach to be applied in questions of international insolvency. These 
are universalism and territorialism and generally they raise three main 
issues of debate: the issue of ex ante predictability to creditors of the 
bankruptcy laws applicable to the debtor's financial failure; the issue of 
IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, second edition, (2005, Oxford 
University Press), 11. 
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protection of local creditors and policies; and the issue of value 
maximization of insolvent transnational companies. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the overall concern is which theory will best protect 
994 
secured creditors and maximize the value of their security. 
1.120 The following account briefly summarizes the contrasting arguments. 
Universalists argue that there should logically be a unified process of 
administration of the estate in the event of insolvency ensuring equal 
treatment of all creditors. In theory, a single insolvency representative 
means reduced administrative costs and more efficient decisions 
maximizing security value for creditors. A single insolvency 
representative will also better facilitate the rescue/reorganization of a 
viable multinational enterprise by effectively coordinating the use of 
assets located in different countries and preserving going concern value. 
Also, the most important ex ante advantage would be the higher 
predictability to creditors, resulting in a reduction in transaction costs 
and a more accurate pricing of credit. In contrast, universalists argue 
that a territorial system hinders value-maximization as it presents a 
clear risk that asset grabbing by local creditors in countries where assets 
that are necessary for the continuation of the business are situated will 
lead to piecemeal dismembering of the company's business with a 
resulting loss of going concern value. Territorial ism would also 
adversely affect ex ante predictability to creditors by not guaranteeing 
foreign lenders exactly the same position as they have under their own 
99S 
home-country laws. 
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1.121 The Lender will therefore have to take into account the attitude of any 
given jurisdiction to these principles in assessing 'bankruptcy risk' in 
relation to security. The principles of unity and plurality operate in 
close connection with the aforementioned principles of territoriality and 
universality and also need to be discussed.226 
1.122 Bebchuk and Guzman assert that: 
"Universalism implies that the assets of an insolvent company should 
997 
be administered on a worldwide basis." 
In its purest form, universalism would have all bankruptcy claims 
settled within the debtor's 'home country' and would apply the 
99R 
substantive laws of that country. The territoriality principle applied in 
its strictest form entails that insolvency proceedings only affect assets 
situated in the State where the proceeding has been opened. In certain 
cases the scope of the domestic insolvency proceeding is restricted to 
99Q 
assets located in the State where the proceeding has been opened. 
Furthermore an insolvency proceeding that under the law of the State 
where the proceeding has been opened encompasses the assets of the 
debtor world-wide may not have any or only limited effects in States 
9^0 
that apply the territoriality principle. This would inevitably lead to 
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the opening of multiple parallel insolvency debtors in respect of the 
same debtor, in order to include the debtor's entire estate in the 
realization of the estate and the distribution of the proceedings among 
his creditors. 
1.123 Unity contrasts with plurality in that, in the event of insolvency, the 
affairs, business and property of the insolvent company should be 
subjected to a single procedure. Unity contrasts with general 
Universalist theories as the latter are compatible with the existence of 
secondary insolvency proceedings in jurisdictions where assets of the 
insolvent company are located. 
1.124 Overall these principles do not, of themselves, reduce the possibility of 
other proceedings in other jurisdictions. Their real significance lies in 
assessment of the prospective consequences for the secured creditor of 
proceedings commenced in the subject jurisdiction. Furthermore the 
possibility of secondary insolvency proceedings, based on a weakened 
9^9 
form of territorialism, emphasizes the need for lenders to inform 
themselves ex ante on the bankruptcy laws of each country in which the 
debtor has assets, so they can price the risk connected with such legal 
uncertainty. This leads to the issue of which laws will be applied to 
determine the validity and priority of security rights. 
231
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The significance of Insolvency Proceedings for the Lender 
1.125 As a general principle, under English law, the insolvency of the debtor 
does not affect the validity or enforceability of the Lender's security. 
However the Lender needs to be aware that there are exceptions from 
this principle that derive from insolvency legislation. Different 
jurisdictions display differing degrees of sympathy in relation to 
upholding secured creditors' rights despite the fact that the concept of 
security is quite well recognized universally. In assessing insolvency 
risk and trying to make a transaction 'bankruptcy proof, the Lender 
needs to take an informed view of the potential effects of the systems 
most likely to be encountered. 
1.126 The effects of insolvency proceedings on the Lender's security rights in 
different jurisdictions can be profound. The Lender potentially faces 
some of the following risks dependent on the attitude of the foreign 
country towards upholding secured creditors' rights: being subject to 
foreign avoidance law; the transaction being re-characterized; being 
subordinated to local preferred creditors; and being subject to a wide 
reaching automatic stay. The other issues which arise from the extra-
territorial application of insolvency laws, which the Lender will need to 
be aware of, include the effect on other proceedings in foreign 
jurisdictions and the scope of a stay or moratorium in reorganization 
proceedings.234 
1.127 An important concern for the Lender is whether the commencement of 
insolvency proceedings can lead to the re-characterization of 
transactions. For instance, a finance lease could be construed as a 
disguised security and invalidated due to not complying with the 
233
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necessary requirements and formalities.. Other examples include the 
subordination of security rights to special priorities such as tax and 
employment claims. The insolvency representative may also possess 
far-reaching powers to terminate onerous obligations.236 
1.128 If reorganization procedures are preferred in a particular jurisdiction, 
the remedies of the Lender are likely to be temporarily suspended and 
the insolvency representative may be able to enforce dealings with 
the subject matter of the security which are contrary to the wishes of the 
secured creditor. Given lack of predictability, the Lender will need to 
focus on the rules which address common issues in insolvency 
proceedings. 
1.129 These are: commencement; regulation of subsequent creditor activity; 
stays on individual creditor enforcement; clawback of antecedent 
transactions; set-off; and powers of collection, realization and 
distribution. This section therefore deals with the potential effects of 
insolvency procedures on a creditor's security. The three main ways 
in which security can be affected will be discussed as well as (albeit 
briefly by way of example) the effect of English administration on 
secured creditor rights. The Lender also needs to be aware that existing 
differences in the treatment of cross border insolvency cases may 
facilitate debtors to commit fraud especially by concealing assets or 
moving them to a jurisdiction that does not recognize the effects of a 
235
 This is a risk in particular where the assets are in a jurisdiction that treats title based security 
(e.g. a lease or a retention of title) as functional security and requires such interests to be 
protected by registration (e.g. see Article 9 relating to secured transactions, Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
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 See F & A (n 20) 260. 
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 It is common to find both terminal and reorganization procedures in a developed system of 
insolvency law. 
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 One important consideration is whether the jurisdiction in question requires the appointment 
of an insolvency representative to administer the process. If 'debtor in possession' insolvency 
proceedings are allowed, the interests of creditors may be overshadowed by the management's 
priorities. See F & A (n 20) 261. 
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foreign insolvency proceeding.240 This is due to the minimal 
941 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings in some countries. 
1.130 In many jurisdictions a distinction is made between domestic 
insolvency proceedings and foreign insolvency proceedings. Some 
jurisdictions will not recognize the cross border effects of foreign 
insolvency proceedings despite insisting on the unlimited 
extraterritorial effect for insolvency proceedings opened within its own 
jurisdiction. States that provide for the extension of effects of a foreign 
insolvency proceeding to assets situated within its jurisdiction do so in 
242 
varying manners. 
1.131 If there is a local presence or local assets within that jurisdiction then 
proceeding to enforce security elsewhere may attract adverse 
consequences. The Lender should be wary of concluding that 
insolvency proceedings occurring in a jurisdiction other than that where 
his security is located and with which he has no other dealings, can be 
disregarded. A decision to deliberately disregard the insolvency laws 
of any jurisdiction should take into account not only present 
connections but also the possibility of future connections or 
94-1 
involvement in other proceedings in the courts of that country. 
240
 These issues demonstrate there is a need for at least a minimum degree of harmonization of 
the approach to problems arising in cross border insolvencies (see Veder (n 227) 92) and the 
question arises as to how successful the EIR is in achieving this. 
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 See 2.60 - 2.71 regarding discussion of recognition provisions under the EIR. 
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 See Veder (n 227) 90. As a matter of domestic private international law (excluding for 
these purposes the directly applicable rules in the EIR), foreign insolvency proceedings are 
automatically recognised in Germany; this is to be contrasted with the position under Irish law. 
For the position in these and other jurisdictions see the PLC Cross-border Restructuring and 
Insolvency Handbook at: 
http://restructuringandinsolvency.practicallaw.com/crossborderhandbook6-500-0025. See also 
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Validity and Enforceability of the Security 
1.132 The validity of security, depending on when it was taken, may be 
affected by the ability under general insolvency law to set aside 
transactions which were entered into shortly before insolvency 
proceedings were started. An example is the setting aside of 
preferences which will be discussed later in this chapter. In addition, 
compliance with rules or legislation regarding the registration of 
charges and mortgages is of paramount importance to ensuring the 
validity and hence the enforceability of the security. If the security has 
been validly created, in the event of insolvency, a liquidator is unable to 
interfere with it provided that the security cannot be set aside under 
claw-back provisions. The 'claw-back' measures provided in 
insolvency legislation in relation to which the Lender will need to be 
wary are discussed in the section below. 
Claw-Back Provisions 
1.133 The Lender needs to be aware of the provisions of insolvency 
legislation which enable the court to set aside transactions which are 
intended to defraud or prejudice other creditors. Many jurisdictions 
have claw back provisions244 and, by way of example, English law will 
be referred to as a means of identifying the effect and extent of such 
provisions. Under English insolvency law, the wide scope of the IA 
1986 enables the court to set aside transactions, even if they were not 
made with the intention of defrauding creditors, if their effect is to 
prejudice the debtor's general body of creditors. Prejudice against 
244
 UNCITRAL 30th Session, 12-30 May 1997: Official Records of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, 52nd Session, Supplement No 17 (A152/17), Part II, 12- 225. Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law, 2004 which indicates that, in most countries, claw back provisions, 
are generic features of insolvency codes. 
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creditors can be inflicted by: reducing the value of the debtor's assets 
(e.g. a transaction at an undervalue); or by giving some creditors an 
advantage over the others (e.g. a preference). 
1.134 There are three main provisions of the IA 1986 under which 
transactions are capable of being set aside. These will be discussed 
94.S 
briefly and are as follows: transactions at undervalue; voidable 
preferences;246 and floating charges.247 
Transactions at an undervalue 
1.135 The Lender will need to be aware that, in the event of liquidation, 
administration or bankruptcy, transactions the Lender entered into with 
a debtor can potentially be set aside if they fall within the IA 1986, ss 
238, 240, 339 and 341. This would be the case if the liquidator249 was 
able to establish that the transaction did not benefit the debtor after 
considering the following: firstly, that the transaction occurred took 
within the requisite time frame prior to insolvency commencing and 
that the debtor was insolvent at that time or became insolvent due to the 
transaction; and secondly, that the debtor disposed of assets, either 
because the debtor received no consideration or received less than they 
were worth.250 
1.136 In practice, the setting aside of transactions at undervalue may not be of 
major concern to the Lender when dealing with a company debtor 
especially where security is given by the company to secure its own 
liabilities. It can be argued that the mere creation over a company's 
24
"lA1986s238. 
246Ibid., s239. 
247
 Ibid, s 245. 
248
 This refers mainly to recent transactions that occurred within a couple of years before the 
debtor was declared insolvent. 
249
 Or administrator or trustee in bankruptcy. 
250SeeCalnan(nl4), 328. 
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assets does not deplete them and does not come within s. 238(4) of the 
IA 1986.ZJ1 The Lender should be wary, however, that each case will 
turn on its particular circumstances and there is some room for 
unpredictability in relation to the court's decision. The Lender will 
usually be able to rely on the defence that: the debtor entered into the 
transaction in good faith and for the purpose of carrying on its business; 
and when it did so, there were reasonable grounds for believing the 
transaction would benefit the company. 
Preferences 
1.137 Many transactions carried out by the debtor in the period immediately 
before insolvency proceedings commence will have the effect of 
putting one creditor at an advantage. If the Lender finds himself in this 
position there is the risk that the transaction between the Lender and the 
debtor may be set aside as a preference. The liquidator will need to 
show that the debtor's actions put the Lender into a better position than 
he otherwise would have been in, and that the debtor either did it 
himself or (having the ability to stop it) allowed it to happen. 
1.138 Overall, the scope of transactions being set aside as a preference will be 
limited to situations where the debtor was influenced in giving the 
preference by a desire to put the Lender in a better position than he 
O C T 
would have been if the transaction had not been done. 
251
 See Re MC Bacon [1990] B C L C 324, Millett J's judgment at 340-341. However note Arden 
L. J's judgment in Hill v Spread Trustee Co Ltd [2006] E W C A Civ 542; [2007] 1 W L R 2404 
which suggests that MC Bacon may be ripe for reconsideration. In the light of the observations 
in Hill, it should not be assumed that MC Bacon necessarily remains good law. In some 
circumstances, the granting of security in respect of existing indebtedness may constitute a 
transaction at undervalue. 
252
 IA 1986: ss 239, 240, 340 and 341. 
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 If there is a connection between the debtor and the Lender, a desire to give the preference is 
normally presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
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1.139 If the Lender is a bank presumably there will be little connection 
between the Lender and the debtor company. The circumstances would 
therefore make it difficult for the liquidator to establish that the debtor 
had a subjective desire to prefer the Lender. For instance, the directors 
of the debtor company will not be seeking to put the bank in a better 
position if they have to give the bank a debenture in order for the bank 
to continue its facilities. 
1.140 Therefore, where one of the conditions for granting the facility is the 
creation of the security and this is created prior to the facility being 
made available, no question of a voidable preference arises in any 
event. The Lender who is making the facility does not become an 
actual creditor until after the money has been lent, by which time the 
security has already been put into place. In this case, as the Lender has 
not yet lent the money, he will not have attained a more beneficial 
position as a direct consequence of the granting of the security.256 
Floating Charges 
1.141 The Lender needs to be wary of s 245 of the IA 1986 which limits the 
effectiveness of certain floating charges in a liquidation or 
administration of the debtor. Therefore if the floating charge is created 
within the relevant time period before insolvency proceedings in order 
to secure existing indebtedness, it will be invalid. If it is created within 
the relevant period to secure finance made available after it was created 
it will be valid. If it is created within the relevant period to secure both 
See MC Bacon (n 249). In the words of Millett J, "it was the price he had to pay for the 
bank's continued support". 
255
 As will be the case with a secured creditor. 
256
 See Calnan (n 14), 331-332. 
63 
existing indebtedness and new money, it will secure only the new 
money, and not the existing indebtedness. 
The overall effect of claw-back provisions on the Lender 
1.142 Having reviewed all the potential pitfalls that might be faced in the 
event of the commencement of insolvency proceedings, what effect do 
these provisions have on the rights of secured creditors in practice? It is 
argued that they do not have any effect on what might be called a 
'normal financing transaction'. If the Lender takes security from the 
solvent debtor before the facility is made available, none of the claw-
back provisions will have an impact on the Lender's rights. Security 
given by the debtor to secure its own obligations are likely not to 
constitute a transaction at an undervalue however, in the light of new 
case law, this issue depends on the particular facts of the case. The 
floating charge, in this case, will be effective because it will be securing 
new money. Furthermore, the security will not amount to a preference 
as the beneficiary of the security will not have been a creditor at the 
time the security was entered into. Generally, the provisions only have 
effect if the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transaction as a 
result of it. Although the Lender should be aware of them, the claw-
back provisions are of little concern to a creditor in such a case. 
They will be more relevant to distressed lenders. The pattern in other 
jurisdictions is broadly similar. 
257 Ibid., 333. The rule in Clayton's case (1815 - 16) 1 Mer 572 can work to assist the creditor 
see Re Yeovil Glove Company [1965] Ch 148; Re Fairway Magazines [1992] BCC 924. 
258Calnan(nl4), 338. 
259Calnan(nl4), 338. 
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The potential effects of Administration on the Lender 
1.143 The effect of administration will be of particular concern for the 
Lender. If the debtor company goes into administration, a secured 
creditor may not enforce his security without the consent of the 
administrator or the court. Although the Lender will retain the security, 
he loses the flexibility to realize it at what he considers to be the best 
time. In addition, to the extent that his security consists of a floating 
charge, the assets concerned can be used by the administrator and the 
administrator can pay his expenses out of their proceeds. The secured 
creditor's main defence will be the ability to challenge what the 
administrator has done on the basis that it is improper or unreasonable. 
1.144 It is argued that the Lender would be prudent to take a debenture over 
all of the company's assets which will enable the Lender to appoint his 
own administrator. In contrast, a creditor who has security only over a 
specific asset or assets can have an administrator imposed upon him. 
Whilst they both owe the same duties, the creditor is likely to feel more 
comfortable with his own choice of administrator. 
The effects of a wide reaching stay 
1.145 One of the consequences of the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings may be a stay on further proceedings in the same 
jurisdiction where the insolvency proceedings have been opened. Such 
a rule exists in English law but is not treated by the English courts as 
260 The writer refers to administration proceedings, by way of example, in relation to the 
potential effects of similar reorganization procedures in other Member States and the impact on 
the Lender's rights. 
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being applicable to proceedings in a court outside the United 
Kingdom.261 
1.146 Where a stay on further proceedings is possible in a cross-border 
insolvency case, individual creditors can use proceedings in foreign 
jurisdictions to circumvent the insolvency process and to achieve a 
priority. However creditors need to be wary as there are various ways, 
besides attempting to control the conduct of litigation in foreign courts, 
by which a legal system can try and resolve this problem.262 
1.147 From a practical point of view, when the Lender is attempting to 
enforce security in a foreign jurisdiction, a worldwide stay becomes an 
issue of recognition. The Lender has to consider the steps which may 
be taken to give the stay local effect which includes, for example, 
orders in aid of secondary proceedings. Additionally, the Lender needs 
to be wary of the possible consequences within the jurisdiction in which 
the insolvency proceedings have been commenced. 
1.148 The extra-territorial effect of a stay on foreign proceedings and 
remedies raises more difficult policy issues when the stay in question 
forms part of a reorganization procedure. A terminal insolvency 
procedure respects the proprietary rights of secured creditors and is 
unlikely to seek to impose any obstacles on the enforcement of security 
abroad. However, a moratorium for the purposes of reorganization 
raises entirely different considerations.263 Principles of comity may be 
relied on more readily in achieving a stay if the procedure is to have 
any prospect of success. The first question is always whether the stay 
purports to be extra-territorial. The automatic stay in Chapter 11 
proceedings264 has worldwide effect and it has been assumed, but not 
261
 IA s 130; Re Oriental Inland Steam Co, ex parte Scinde Railway Co (1874) LR 9 Ch App 
557. See also Mazur Media Ltd v Mazur Media GmbH [2004] EWHC 1566 (Ch) (2004) 1 
WLR 2966, from para [53]. 
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 For instance a personal order could be made to restrain a creditor located within the 
jurisdiction in which insolvency proceedings have commenced from having recourse to foreign 
courts. Alternatively, a creditor who resorts to such proceedings may be treated as being in 
contempt of the insolvency proceedings. See F & A (n 20) 267-268. 
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yet decided, that the English courts would take a similar view of the 
effect of an administration order.265 
1.149 It is argued that rules requiring the Lender to bring receipts into account 
have little relevance where the receipts in question represent security 
realizations and the underlying purpose of the stay is to prevent 
realizations rather than to make distributions to creditors.266 
The Enforceability of Security 
1.150 Overall, the reason why a creditor takes security is to protect himself 
against the insolvency of the debtor and to ensure that he gets repaid 
even if the debtor becomes insolvent. Regardless of insolvency 
proceedings, a creditor can generally enforce his security in accordance 
with its terms and does not need the court's involvement to do so.267 
Failure to comply with registration requirements undermines the value 
of the security and, although it will not render the security void, the 
secured creditor will be put at a considerable disadvantage in a priority 
dispute against a third party. A prudent secured creditor should 
therefore make sure that registration requirements are complied with in 
all jurisdictions within which he has taken security. 
1.151 The Lender wants as much control as possible to minimize the erosion 
of his security rights. The question arises as to what measure of control 
can be exerted through banking covenants. This issue is explored in 
more detail in Chapter Three. It does not seem reasonable however to 
assume that that the courts of any country would refuse to accept 
jurisdiction, where it could otherwise be established, just because the 
265
 Banque Indosuez v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] B C L C 112. 
266
 See F & A (n 20) 268. 
267
 Calnan(n 14), p, 325-326. 
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circumstances bringing the debtor within its jurisdiction involves a 
breach of banking covenants.268 
To what extent can a secured creditor protect himself by relying on 
the set off rights in insolvency? 
1.152 In strict terms, set-off rights cannot be construed as security interests. 
However, as they amount to security in a more broader functional 
sense, the availability of the right to set-off is useful to a creditor when 
the debtor faces financial troubles.269 Set off is mandatory and 
automatic in England where a company goes into liquidation where 
there are mutual debts between a creditor and the company such as 
970 
loans and deposits on different accounts. 
1.153 The effect of this in an international context was determined in Re Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) which illustrates the 
971 
wide reaching impact on secured creditors. The English winding up 
was ancillary to the main proceedings in Luxembourg, where BCCI SA 
was incorporated. A judicially sanctioned agreement had authorized 
the transmission of funds collected elsewhere for distribution according 
to the law of Luxembourg. The rules of set off which would be applied 
268 F & A (n 20) 263. 
269
 There are different types of rights of set off which mainly consist of three categories: "those 
which are available outside insolvency proceedings; those which are available against 
assignees; and those which are available in insolvency proceedings". See Calnan (n 14) 427, 
12.7, and also 427-468. The three main statutory provisions governing set-off in insolvency are 
as follows: in liquidation, r 4.90 of the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925; in 
administration, r 2.85 of the Insolvency Rules 1986; in bankruptcy, s 323 of the Insolvency Act 
1986 This section is largely concerned with the rights of set off which are available in 
insolvency proceedings. In practice, these are the most important type of set off, for the 
obvious reason that creditors are most likely to need to rely on such rights when the debtor is 
insolvent. 
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in Luxembourg would be far more restrictive than those applied in 
England.272 
1.154 Scott V-C held that, even in an ancillary winding up, the English 
insolvency set-off provisions were mandatory and could not be 
disapplied, regardless of the law governing the claims or the place of 
residence of the creditors who had entered proofs in the English 
winding up. Before any assets were transferred to Luxembourg the 
English liquidators were required to retain sufficient funds to 
compensate those creditors who would be prejudiced by the application 
97^ 
of the Luxembourg rules of set-off. 
1.155 This case illustrates that identical claims will be treated differently in 
the principal and ancillary liquidations. Some claimants with no 
connection with England, whose debts and claims are not governed by 
English law and who may have no expectation that English law will 
apply, will be able to prove in an English winding-up and take the 
benefit of English law's extremely generous set-off provisions. This is 
due to the fact that set-off legislation is, on its face, subject to no 
territorial restriction and gives no guidance as to what criteria might be 
974 
applied to confine it. 
1.156 Insolvency set-off provisions will only apply where there is an English 
winding-up. However the English courts have a very wide jurisdiction 
to wind up companies. Any company registered in England may be 
wound up and any company incorporated outside the United Kingdom 
may be wound up if there is a 'sufficient connection' between the 
company and England, and there are persons who would benefit from 
97S 
the making of the order. 
272 Stevens (n 47) 221. 
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1.157 It therefore appears, as seen in the context of set-off, that in English 
insolvency proceedings the courts have consistently applied English 
insolvency law and ignored any foreign insolvency law. Where, for 
example, it is sought to recover a payment as having been a preference, 
the claim as it arises from English insolvency proceedings will be 
governed by English law.276 
1.158 Generally rights of set-off have always been of particular importance to 
banks and other creditors involved in financial transactions due to a 
number of advantages. A right of set-off gives the creditor effective 
security without the necessity to create (and in most cases, to register) a 
977 
security interest. It is easier to enforce than a security interest. The 
value of the right of set-off is certain because it is expressed as a 
monetary amount whilst the value of other assets held as security will 
fluctuate. There are also circumstances where a right of set-off can 
give the creditor greater rights than a charge. This applies, for instance, 
where the charge is found to be a floating charge, and therefore subject 
97R 
to the rights of third parties unlike a right of set-off. 
1.159 Overall the Lender can greatly strengthen his position prior to the 
debtor entering into insolvency proceedings by making contractual 
arrangements with the debtor. By documenting these arrangements, 
substantial benefits can be gained by the Lender in practice. It is 
argued that the additional benefit obtained by taking a charge is more 
minimal although there are cases where the flexibility of a charge (in 
contrast to the rigidity of insolvency set-off) can be an advantage in the 
97Q 
debtor's insolvency. The issues of recognition and comity are 
directly relevant to the enforceability of a security interest and are 
discussed in the section below. 
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Summary 
1.160 The potential destabilizing effects of insolvency proceedings on 
security rights has been discussed as well as the varying attitude of 
different courts in relation to recognition of foreign insolvency 
proceedings. As explained, the issue of recognition is of particular 
importance for the Lender as foreign insolvency proceedings have the 
effect of potentially suspending his powers of enforcement of security 
or of rendering the security wholly or partially voidable. Overall, the 
issues discussed in this chapter demonstrate the means by which it is 
possible for the Lender to obtain some assurance from the fact that he 
has considered the main issues in the appropriate legal systems 
concerned both at the pre-insolvency point of grant of security and the 
post-insolvency point of enforcement. 
1.161 As discussed, it is essential for the Lender, when structuring a cross-
border transaction involving the taking of security over moveable 
property, to investigate the different jurisdictions in which insolvency 
proceedings could possibly take place, and to consider the effect of 
such proceedings on his position as a secured creditor, especially taking 
into account that the security may comprise movable assets. This, 
undeniably, will be a complex assessment, involving the investigation 
of the insolvency laws, and private international law rules of a number 
of different countries which will not render a thoroughly conclusive 
result. The fact is that companies can end up in insolvency proceedings 
in unpredicted jurisdictions. 
1.162 In terms of assessing 'bankruptcy risk', the Lender will have to take a 
practical decision about the extent to which it is possible to investigate 
the laws of other jurisdictions which may be relevant. It is helpful, in 
this instance, for the Lender to take into account the attitude of the 
courts in those various jurisdictions to the principles of universalism 
F & A (n 20) 287. 
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and territorialism. Ultimately, however, it is impossible for the Lender 
to be certain that, regardless of these checks, the security will be 
effective in every jurisdiction which may be relevant due to the large 
volume of security being taken and the number of jurisdictions 
involved. As discussed, 'insolvency effects' can have a profound 
impact on the Lender depending on a number of factors such as the 
attitude of the courts and the applicable law. Chapter Two discusses the 
EIR in detail and focuses on some essential safeguards which are 
established to counter these 'insolvency effects' and protect the 
Lender's rights and underlying security interest. 
Calnan(nl4)507. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE EIR 
Introduction 
2.01 This chapter provides a detailed textual analysis of selected provisions 
of the EIR1 and, in doing so, focuses on the concerns of the Lender in 
relation to the potential effects of insolvency proceedings on cross 
border security and the associated risks that need to be addressed by the 
Lender in order to ensure, in as far as possible, that the realisation of his 
security will take place subject to insolvency laws that do not erode the 
security in favour of other creditors. The issue of insolvency effects 
and how these effects can be mitigated is of critical concern to the 
Lender and, by exploring the relationship between certain Articles 
under the EIR, the writer will focus in particular on how the EIR 
addresses the following: forum shopping; effective co-ordination of 
cross-border insolvency proceedings; the dissipation of assets; other 
consequences which might be detrimental to creditors and devalue 
security; and the issue of ascertainability as applicable insolvency law 
might end up having unanticipated effects on creditors. 
2.02 What are 'insolvency effects'? Under all national laws, insolvency 
proceedings may interfere with and disrupt the legal position of the 
debtors and creditors. The effects brought about by the lex concursus 
are linked to specific insolvency law policies. They encompass those 
legal consequences and legal variations which the procedural and the 
substantive rights of the debtor and the creditors must undergo in order 
1
 Due to the limited scope of this thesis it has not been possible to discuss each and every 
provision of the EIR in detail. 
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to achieve the objectives of the insolvency proceedings, as set forth by 
the lex concursus. From this perspective, the lex concursus displaces, 
in so far as insolvency policy requires, the general law governing the 
affected act or right itself. These insolvency policy-founded effects are 
'insolvency effects' which can be greater or lesser depending on the 
legislative policy decisions of each State. The type of system in place 
in a particular State is therefore of much importance to the Lender. For 
instance, there are systems which significantly alter the positions of the 
parties and there are others which respect those positions as far as 
possible. The concepts of universalism and territorialism (revisited 
later in this chapter) have a considerable influence on insolvency 
policies and which systems are more 'interventionist' than others. 
2.03 In terms of insolvency policies the EIR itself is neutral; it respects 
national diversity and leaves it to the national lex concursus to establish 
the degree to which the insolvency proceedings need to interfere in the 
rights and relationships of the debtor and creditor. The EIR establishes 
some safeguards against an excessive 'interventionism' by the lex 
concursus in the following ways: exceptions in favour of a different 
national law expressly established in Articles 5-15; the possibility of 
opening territorial proceedings, which would entail a different lex 
concursus being applied; and, in extreme cases, the public policy 
clause. However the current approach taken by the EIR reflects an 
evolution from the previous draft conventions.4 
2.04 Certain provisions of the EIR come to the forefront when exploring the 
standpoint of the Lender: the interrelationship between jurisdiction and 
applicable law; recognition of proceedings and the effects thereof in 
other Member States; and the 'carve out' provisions to the applicable 
2
 See M Virgos & F Garcimartin, The European Insolvency Regulation: Law & Practice, 
(Kluwer Law, 2004), 11-12. 
3
 See 1.120 -1.125 which indentifies the difference between these two principles. 
4
 A brief history of the EIR and discussion of the evolution of the text is contained in Appendix 
1. This is background information to enable the reader to fully understand why the EIR has 
evolved into the instrument that it is today. 
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law which are of such importance to the Lender.5 These Articles of the 
EIR will be focused on in detail, not in numerical chronology, but by 
using the best method to portray how the various Articles interact with 
one another and work in practice. The provisions considered are: 
Articles 3, 27, 16, 17 and 26 in relation to jurisdiction, types of 
proceedings and their effects in Member States; Articles 4 and 28 in 
relation to the applicable law; and then Articles 5, 6 and 13 which are 
'carve out' provisions in relation to Article 4. 
2.05 The key provisions of the EIR relate to jurisdiction and applicable law 
and because these Articles are integral to the functionality of the EIR, 
these are the provisions that form the starting point of my textual 
analysis. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, Article 3 lays down the 
general principle that "the courts of the Member State within the 
territory of which the centre of the debtor's main interests is situated 
shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings".6 For a 
company or legal person, the centre of its main interests is presumed to 
be the place of its registered office in the absence of proof to the 
•7 
contrary. In addition, the court of another Member State shall only 
o 
have jurisdiction to open 'secondary proceedings', if "the debtor 
possesses an establishment within the territory of that other Member 
State".9 These important provisions will be focused on in detail 
especially with reference to emerging interpretative case law. 
2.06 Chapter II of the EIR (articles 16-26) focuses on recognition of 
insolvency proceedings and operates in close connection with the 
application of Article 3 in terms of insolvency effects in other Member 
States. The principle of universality of main proceedings encompassing 
all the debtor's assets and in principle affecting all creditors, implies 
recognition of the proceedings and their effects in the other Member 
5
 Especially in terms of protecting the 'legitimate expectations and the certainty of 
transactions' as provided in Recital 24 to the EIR. 
6
 Article 3(1). 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 In order to discuss the opening of proceedings and applicable law in relation to secondary 
proceedings, Articles 27 and 28 will also be discussed. 
9
 Article 3(2). 
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States in which those assets or creditors are situated. Article 16 is an 
important provision for discussion as it is the means by which the EIR 
sets up a system of mandatory and automatic recognition in all the 
Member States (except Denmark) and guarantees the universality of 
main proceedings. This means that in any other Member State the same 
legal effects (both procedural and substantive) are immediately 
produced as under the law of the lex concursus without the need for any 
further formalities and cannot be challenged in other Member States.10 
A discussion of Article 26 is required as it is the only ground for 
opposing recognition. Article 26 provides that recognition can be 
refused only where the judgment handed down in a Member State 
would be 'manifestly contrary to that State's public policy, in particular 
its fundamental principles or the constitutional rights and liberties of the 
individual'. 
2.07 In terms of the uniform rules on conflict of laws replacing national rules 
of private international law, Article 4 lays down the basic rule on 
conflict of laws of the EIR, determining the law applicable to the 
insolvency proceedings, the product thereof and their effects. Unless 
otherwise stated by the EIR, the lex concursus is applicable. Article 4 
warrants careful inspection as the law of the lex concursus determines 
all the effects of the insolvency proceedings, both procedural and 
substantive, on the persons and legal relations concerned. The lex 
concursus governs all the conditions for the opening, conduct and 
closure of the insolvency proceedings, the admissibility of claims and 
the rules on distribution and priorities etc. Article 4 is of fundamental 
importance to the Lender as it provides that the lex concursus shall 
determine a range of issues including the following: the debtors against 
which insolvency proceedings can be commenced on account of their 
capacity; the assets which form part of the estate and the treatment of 
10
 Article 17(1) and 17(2) which relate to the 'effects of recognition'. 
11
 This rule also applies to secondary proceedings by virtue of Article 28. The effects of 
secondary proceedings referred are however restricted by Article 3(2) to the assets of the 
debtor situated in the territory of that other Member State. 
12
 Article 4(2)(a). 
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assets acquired by or devolving on the debtor after the opening of 
insolvency proceedings; the respective powers of the debtor and the 
liquidator;14 the conditions under which set-off may be invoked;15 the 
effects of insolvency proceedings brought by individual creditors;16 the 
1 n 
rules governing the lodging, verification and admission of claims; the 
1 o 
effects on proceedings by individual creditors; and other insolvency 
related items, like who is to bear the costs and expenses incurred in the 
insolvency proceedings;19 and the rules relating to the voidness, 
voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all the 
90 
creditors. Article 28 will be discussed briefly as it defines the law 
applicable in relation to secondary proceedings and clarifies that the 
applicable law in relation to this type of proceedings will be that of the 
Member State in which the secondary proceedings are opened. 
91 
2.08 To 'protect legitimate expectations and the certainty of transactions' 
in a Member State other than the State in which proceedings are 
opened, provisions have been made for a number of exceptions to the 
general rule provided in Article 4. These provisions are especially 
important to the Lender and will be discussed at some length. Article 5, 
for example, recognizes the rights of secured creditors with a valid 
claim to assets under the law of the place where the assets are situated. 
Creditors can acquire security by fulfilling the relevant conditions 
under this rule, safe in the knowledge that their secured status will not 
be disturbed by the commencement of insolvency proceedings in 
another E U State. Article 6 preserves certain set-off rights and provides 
that the opening of insolvency proceedings does not affect a creditor's 
13 
14 
Article 4(2)(b). 
Article 4(2)(c). 
15
 Article 4(2)(d). 
16
 i.e. stay of enforcement given its importance in the context of secured creditors. 
17
 Article 4(2)(h). 
18
 Article 4(2)(f). 
19
 Article 4(2)(1). 
20
 See Article 4(2)(m). See also B Wessels, 'The European Union Insolvency Regulation: An 
Overview with Trans-Atlantic Elaborations', 2003 Norton Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law, 
481-507. 
21
 Recital 24 of the EIR. 
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rights of set off where they are permitted under the law applicable to 
the debtor's claim. Whilst being highly relevant to lenders especially 
99 
banks, set-off is often referred to as a quasi-security as it is not strictly 
a security interest under English law. However it is significant as it is 
something the Lender can rely on at the moment of contracting or 
incurring the claim. With regard to the interaction between the 
different articles of the EIR, it should be noted that the recognition 
effects of Article 16 also encompass the exceptions to Article 4. The 
lex concursus of the one Member State is 'exported' to another Member 
State under the recognition provisions, therefore the same exceptions 
(Articles 5-15) apply. Article 13 is one of those exceptions and 
represents a defence against the application of the (foreign) law of the 
State of opening, when that law would lead to unenforceability because 
a legal act would be detrimental to all the creditors. These provisions 
(Articles 5, 6 and 13) will therefore be discussed in detail with regard to 
the importance of these provisions in relation to the 'insolvency effects' 
on secured creditors. 
2.09 Prior to proceeding with a detailed textual analysis of the provisions 
discussed above, an introduction to the history of the EIR and evolution 
of the various draft conventions is warranted to examine, from the 
Lender's standpoint, why the EIR's current approach of allowing 
multiple proceedings within the European Union in relation to the same 
debtor is more beneficial to the secured creditor than the position 
adopted in previous draft conventions. The theory behind modified 
universalism is that insolvency proceedings with pan-European extra-
territorial effects will produce better returns for creditors than an 
agglomeration of separate national proceedings.23 The counter-
argument is whether it would be more cost effective and beneficial for 
22
 Particular significance for banks arises where there are loans (assets) and deposits 
(liabilities) on several accounts with the same bank. 
23
 See JL Westbrook, "Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum" (1991) 65 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 457 at 465 " A universalist 
rule would so increase values available for all local claimants in all general defaults as to offset 
by far the losses that particular local claimants might suffer in some cases. That assertion is 
persuasive because the preservation of going concern values and the maximizing of liquidation 
values by integrated sales will likely increase returns to creditors greatly". 
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creditors if insolvencies were administered on a national territorial basis 
alongside measures designed to encourage cooperation with courts in 
other countries. The concepts of universalism and territorialism are at 
the heart of international insolvency and practice and are also referred 
to in Appendix 1 when discussing the various drafts that comprise the 
evolution of the EIR. When critically evaluating the successes and 
weaknesses of the EIR, from a lender standpoint, it will be helpful to 
explore which alternative concepts were used in the previous draft 
conventions and why they were not popular or workable in practice. 
Universality, territoriality, unity and plurality 
2.10 As discussed in Chapter One cross-border aspects of insolvency 
proceedings are generally approached from the principles of 
universality and territoriality. It is arguable that English insolvency law 
has long been committed to a universalist vision. Traditionally an 
English liquidation has universal effect and applies to all assets of the 
9S 
company irrespective of location, though, of course, there can be 
practical difficulties in securing the recognition of the winding up in the 
relevant foreign jurisdiction where assets happen to be situated. The 
Privy Council in Cambridge Gas underscored the universal 
97 9R 
application of insolvency proceedings. In HIH Lord Hoffmann was 
prepared to give free rein to the principle of universalism holding that 
See 1.119- 1.125. See also A.5-A. 10 regarding the extreme universalist approach adopted 
in the Phase 1 draft conventions. See A. 11 -A. 15 in relation to the more flexible approach 
adopted by the Istanbul Convention. See A. 16, A. 19 - A.20 regarding 'modified universalism'. 
25
 See the comments of Wynn-Parry J in Re Azoff-Don Commercial Bank [1954] Ch 315, 333 
and Browne-Wilkinson VC in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 2) 
[1992] B C L C 570, 577. 
26
 Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (of 
Navigator Holdings pic) [2007] 1 AC 508. 
27
 [2007] 1 A.C. 508 at [16], Lord Hoffmann stated that: "There should be a single bankruptcy 
in which all creditors are entitled and required to prove. No one should have advantage 
because he happens to live in a jurisdiction where more of the assets or fewer of the creditors 
are situated". 
28
 Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR852; on appeal from [2007] 1 
A l l ER 177. 
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"surplus" assets in an English ancillary liquidation could be transferred 
to a foreign main liquidator despite the fact that the basis of distribution 
in the foreign main proceedings was different from that in the English 
proceedings. The remission of assets could be ordered at common law 
on the basis that the foreign main proceedings in the country of 
incorporation should, prima facie, be allowed to have universal effect. 
Given the current attitude of the courts and the position adopted by the 
EIR regarding universalism, it may be useful to consider earlier 
developments regarding the workability in practice of extreme forms of 
universalism and territorialism. 
2.11 The principles of unity and plurality operate in close connection with 
the aforementioned principles of territoriality and universality. 
Plurality of insolvency proceedings means that the debtor might be 
subject to more than one insolvency proceeding. In the concept of 
unity of insolvency proceedings the debtor's insolvency is dealt with in 
one single proceeding. Unity of bankruptcy contemplates an idealized 
state of affairs under which, for any given debtor, there would be only 
one legitimate forum for the opening of insolvency proceedings. 
However, as shown by the EIR, the idea of unity has to concede to 
demands of reality and political willingness to give up jurisdiction and 
the application of a State's own law. It follows from these models 
that, depending on what approach insolvency legislation takes, the 
degree to which they alter the position of creditors in terms of 
'insolvency effects' and are 'interventionist' varies considerably. A 
brief synopsis is provided in Appendix I in relation to the history of the 
texts prior to the EIR and the general lay out of each of those 
conventions. The following section contains an analysis of the articles 
29 Other members of the House of Lords were more conservative and decided the case by 
reference to the statutory jurisdiction to aid the courts of designated territories in Insolvency 
Act 1986 (IA) s 426. Article 21(2) of the U N C I T R A L Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
(brought into force in Great Britain by the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 SI 
2006/1030) gives the English courts a statutory discretion to turn over assets to a foreign 
insolvency representative. See McCormack G, (2009), "Jurisdictional competition and forum 
shopping in insolvency proceedings", C.L.J. , 68(1), 169-197, F N 11. 
30
 Territoriality necessarily leads to the plurality of insolvency proceedings. 
31
 M Veder, Cross Border Insolvency Proceedings and Security Rights (Kluwer, 2004) 88. 
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of the EIR in force today. However the relevant paragraphs of 
Appendix I are referred to so the reader can: compare the current 
provisions with the articles in these early drafts; understand the gradual 
recognition over the years (as reflected in transition between draft 
conventions) that the concept of universality is not exclusively 
dependent on that of unity; determine to what extent the Lender's 
concerns have been addressed in the culminating EIR; and draw some 
conclusions regarding the scope for reform. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency 
proceedings (29th May 2000)32 
Article 3 of the EIR: International jurisdiction 
2.12 The EIR applies a "limited universalist approach" which lies between 
the principles of universalism and territorialism and has been 
acknowledged as the most suitable means of co-ordinating the 
different substantial provisions contained in the legislation in force in 
each Member State, such as those on security interests and preferential 
rights. Accordingly under Articles 3(1) and 3(2) of the EIR, a main 
insolvency proceeding is opened where the COMI of the insolvent 
debtor is situated, but subsequently one or more secondary proceedings 
may also be opened in countries where the debtor has an 
establishment.34 Therefore Article 3 is of fundamental importance to 
32
 The text of the EIR is largely based on the European Union Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings (EU Convention) which opened for signature, Nov 23, 1995, 35 I . L . M 1223 
(1996). SeeA.15-A.22. 
33
 See Recital 11 of the EIR. 
34
 Secondary proceedings may only be opened after the opening of the main insolvency 
proceeding. Beforehand 'territorial proceedings' may be opened in defined circumstances: see 
Article 3(4) of the EIR. For examples of the previous unsuccessful draft conventions prior to 
the EIR, which influenced the adoption by the EIR of a more workable 'limited universalist 
approach', see: A.5 - A.7; A.8 - A.10; A.16; A.19 - A.20. 
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the Lender as it sets out the fundamental principles in relation to the 
allocation of international jurisdiction in respect of insolvency 
proceedings where the debtor's circumstances place it within the ambit 
of the EIR. Particular attention will be paid to the specific wording of 
Article 3 especially in light of whether creditors' expectations are being 
met regarding jurisdiction and in corresponding with their legitimate 
interests regarding the location of insolvency proceedings. 
2.13 Contrary to the initial impression generated by the use of the words 
'shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings', the 
jurisdictional rules in Article 3 operate in an exclusive manner by 
generating main proceedings which in principle have universal scope 
and encompass all of the debtor's assets wherever located within the 
European Union. Thus Article 3(1) does not merely generate an 
additional basis of jurisdiction to operate in parallel with national 
rules.36 The EIR does not deal with the allocation of jurisdiction within 
a Member State. This is left to national rules. Furthermore it does not 
-in 
set out the criteria for exercising jurisdiction under domestic law. 
2.14 The direct rules of jurisdiction, which must be respected and applied 
throughout the Member States as a matter of obligation generated by 
EC law, are unfortunately drafted in obscure terms that do not express 
the intended scope or effect clearly. For instance it is only in paragraph 
14 of the Recitals to the EIR that there is a clear statement that: 'This 
Regulation applies only to proceedings where the debtor's centre of 
main interests is located in the Community'. 
35
 With the exception of Denmark: see Recital 33 of the EIR. 
36
 It is submitted that this essential principle would be more clearly conveyed if Article 3(1) 
had been drafted so as to declare 'subject to this Regulation, only the courts of the Member 
State within the territory of which the centre of main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction 
to open insolvency proceedings...' See IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law 
(2nd ed OUP, Oxford 2005) 356, F N 70. 
37
 Article 4(2) of the EIR. 
38
 Although assets and interested parties may be situated within the European Union in many 
cases, the EIR only applies to those cases where the debtor's centre of main interests is in the 
E U . See further G Moss, I Fletcher and S Isaacs, The EC Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings, A Commentary and Annotated Guide, (2nd ed OUP, Oxford 2009) (M, F & I) 45, 
para 3.10. 
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What is COMI and why is it so important to the Lender? 
2.15 The debtor's COMI is the pivot around which the whole structure of the 
EIR is based as its location determines where main proceedings may be 
opened and the fact that the office holder in the main proceedings will 
generally be entitled to deal with all of the company's assets across the 
jurisdictions of the European Union. There can be significant 
differences in the outcome for the Lender depending on which 
country's law applies. 
2.16 Given the vital role played by the concept of the COMI, it is surprising 
that there is no definition contained in the main text of the EIR and 
instead there is a sentence within the Recitals40 which has since, rather 
inaccurately, been referred to as a "definition".41 The wording of 
Recital 13 is a concise description or statement of fact rather than a 
definition which is supported by the fact that the wording is taken from 
the Virgos-Schmit Report. 
For example, UK law is traditionally creditor-friendly and is reasonably well-understood. 
French insolvency law tends to favour employees, while in Germany fairly onerous 
requirements are placed on an insolvent company's directors to file for insolvency within a set 
time period. See K. Stones, 'The quest for COMI', Euro Law 2006, 62, 16. See A.7 outlining 
how 'centre of administration' as first conceived in the Phase 1 draft conventions. See A. 12 -
A. 13 for the development of the concept of COMI as it is known under the EIR. See A. 18 
regarding use of COMI under the EU Convention and the ambiguity behind the COMI concept 
which is an issue that remains unaddressed under the EIR. 
40
 Recital 13: The 'centre of main interests' should correspond to the place where the debtor 
conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by 
third parties. 
41
 See G Moss, 'Group Insolvency - Choice of Forum and Law: the European Experience 
under the Influence of English Pragmatism', (2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 
1005, 1007. The author agrees that Recital 13 merely expands on the nature and purpose of 
Article 3 and submits that if it were meant to be read as a definition then the draftsmen of the 
EIR would have inserted the wording as a definition in Article 2. 
42
 The Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, prepared by Professor M Virgos 
and ME Schmit (hereafter referred to as 'Virgos-Schmit'), para 75. The rationale of this 
wording is explained in terms of insolvency being a foreseeable risk. It is important that 
international jurisdiction be based on a place known to the debtor's potential creditors. This 
enables the legal risks, which would have to be assumed in the case of insolvency, to be 
calculated. 
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2.17 The ECJ in Eurofooa used the word 'definition' in relation to Recital 
13, however, as a definition, Recital 13 leaves several key questions 
unresolved, for example, the elements which constitute the process of 
'administration', 'regular basis' and the sense in which the term 
'interests' is to be understood. Overall Recital 13 seems to indicate that 
the COMI connecting factor is aimed at providing: 
"[A] test in which attributes of transparency and objective 
ascertainability are dominant factors. This should enable secured 
creditors who have dealings with a debtor to base their expectations on 
the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from systematic conduct and 
arrangements for which the debtor is responsible".44 
2.18 Some scholars45 consider that, in addition to the wording of Recital 13, 
the use of the generic term "interests" serves as evidence of the 
Community legislator's purpose of allowing any Member State's courts 
to use a certain degree of discretion in construing the meaning of 
COMI. These authors conclude that the national judge should 
determine the COMI exclusively through the application of bankruptcy 
provisions set out in the legislation of the Member State in which the 
insolvency proceeding had been opened. Therefore, the provisions of 
the lex concursus would establish the meaning of the debtor's COMI 
and consequently its location. Under this school of thought, which the 
writer considers confusing and risky from the standpoint of the Lender, 
the COMI would not have a meaning per se, but it would potentially 
assume different meanings depending on the provisions of the internal 
legislation.46 Accordingly, there would potentially be as many COMIs 
as proceedings opened which would lead to the difficulty of the Lender 
43
 C-341/04 Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd (2006) ECR 1-3813, [2006] BCC 639 ECJ [511], 33 
44
 See M , F & I (n 38), 45-46, para 3.11. Para 75 does not restrict the relevant third parties to 
creditors. It will be open to a court to take into account what would be objectively 
ascertainable and so a court could presumably take into account what would be ascertainable to 
other third parties such as employees. 
45
 See, for example,, Luigi Fumagalli, "II Regolamento Comunitario sulle Procedure di 
Insolvenza" in Rivista di Diritto Processuale (Padua: C E D A M , 2001), p.688, F N 29 cited in 
Simona Di Sano, 'COMI: the sun around which cross-border insolvency proceedings revolve: 
Part 1', JIBLR2009, 24(2), 88-101, 94, F N 36. 
46
 See Di Sano (n 45) 94. 
84 
needing to be aware and perhaps seek legal advice in relation to the law 
in all the jurisdictions where collateral is situated. 
2.19 The more sensible view, in the writer's opinion, is that there is only one 
COMI, whose meaning has to be construed by the national judge on a 
case-by-case basis in the light of criteria derived from the content of the 
AQ 
EIR as interpreted by the EC J. The lack of definition of COMI in the 
EIR is therefore an expression of the Community legislator's intention 
to leave some scope for judicial discretion and common sense to be 
exercised after consideration of the circumstances encountered in each 
case.49 Therefore in practice case law demonstrates the problems faced 
by creditors in relation to the concept of COMI. 
2.20 When reviewing case law, the important issue to consider is whether 
the lack of a comprehensive definition of COMI creates problems for 
the Lender in practice. The first issue to consider is the wording of 
Article 3(1) regarding the case of a company or a 'legal person' where 
the place of the registered office is presumed to be the COMI unless 
there is proof to the contrary. It is argued that there is no proper 
clarification regarding the nature or degree of proof needed to rebut this 
presumption. The burden of proof lies with the party that contests the 
outcome regarding the location of the COMI of a legal person that 
would otherwise follow from the application of Article 3(1).50 It is there 
not enough for secured creditors to investigate the law of the state of 
incorporation of the debtor company when trying to assess the impact 
of insolvency law upon their rights and interests and calculate the 
extent of their commercial or financial risk.51 The second issue to 
consider, if it is not so apparent that the COMI is the registered office 
and this is contested, is where exactly the debtor conducts the 
47
 This view appears to be based on the reasoning that the EIR recognizes and upholds the 
substantial differences among the internal legislations of the Member States, each of them 
aimed at safeguarding its own autonomy. See Recitals 11 and 15 of the EIR. See also Di Sano 
(n 45), 94, FN 39. 
48
 This view is held by many legal scholars. See Di Sano (n 45) 94. 
49
 Fletcher (n 36) 457. 
5 0 M,F&I(n38) , 46, para 3.13 
51
 SeeM,F&I(n38)46,para3.13. 
'administration of his interests' on a regular basis which is therefore 
'ascertainable by third parties'. 
2.21 This seems to suggest that, in determining COMI, functional realities 
are capable of displacing the effects of such formal criteria as the place 
of registration, or state of incorporation, for the purpose of determining 
the EIR's application, and also for the purpose of deciding questions of 
jurisdiction. In practice it is therefore essential to conduct a thorough 
investigation into the possible locations where a company's interests 
are being administered from and take any necessary precautions if it 
appears that the administration of a debtor company's interests are 
regularly being carried out from another Member State. This issue 
was considered by the ECJ in Eurofood54 which is a clear example of a 
problematic situation that arose due to the lack of a clear definition of 
COMI and the possibility of different interpretations. 
2.22 In relation to COMI, the ECJ was asked the following question: where 
an E U Member State opens insolvency proceedings in respect of a 
company, but the registered office is not situated in that Member State 
and the company does not conduct the administration of its interests on 
a regular basis in a manner ascertainable to third parties in that Member 
State, does that Member State have jurisdiction to open main 
proceedings?55 In response, the ECJ ruled that the 'simple presumption' 
laid down by Article 3(1) in favour of the registered office of the 
company as to the whereabouts of the COMI 'can be rebutted only if 
factors which are both objective and ascertainable by third parties 
enable it to be established that an actual situation exists which is 
52
 Recital 13. See the criticism of the wording of this Recital in 2.16-2.19. 
53
 Which might create the possibility of the Article 3(1) presumption being rebutted. See M , F 
& I (n 38) 46, para 3.12-3.13. 
54
 Eurofood (n 43). 
55
 From the point of view of creating useful guidance, it is disappointing that the Irish Supreme 
Court framed its question to the ECJ regarding COMI in the way that it did. The ECJ was 
asked to assume that Eurofood conducted the administration of its interests in Ireland. For this 
reason, there is no detailed analysis by the ECJ of what is meant by "the administration of its 
interests". There is however guidance provided in the Advocate General's Opinion. See 
Eurofood (n 43). See also J. Marshall and M . Haywood, Allen & Overy L L P and % South 
Square, Case Law on the EIR, European Cross Border Insolvency R4, Sweet & Maxwell, 
(September 2006), section 2.1. 
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different from that which locating it at that registered office is deemed 
to reflect'.56 Furthermore, where a company carries on its business in 
the territory of the Member State where its registered office is situated, 
en 
the mere fact that its economic choices are or can be controlled by a 
parent company in another Member State is not enough to rebut the 
registered office presumption. 
2.23 One test that has emerged as a principled basis for rebutting the 
presumption is the 'head office functions test', The final sub-paragraph 
of paragraph 75 of the Virgos-Schmit Report states that: 
"[w]here companies and legal persons are concerned, the Convention 
presumes, unless proved to the contrary, that the debtor's centre of 
main interests is the place of his registered office. This place normally 
corresponds to the debtor's head office." 
To understand the import of this statement, one has to recall that 
domestic law in Europe has two different approaches. In the U.K the 
historic approach was based on the place of registration. According to 
this approach, if there were to be proceedings in more than one country, 
the main proceedings would take place in the jurisdiction of the place of 
registration, and proceedings in other jurisdictions would be ancillary to 
the main proceeding. In Europe (excluding Scandanavia), however, the 
approach was to focus on the "seat" of the company. Overall it appears 
that the "seat approach" has taken precedence over the "place of 
registration". Article 3 seems to take a balanced approach between the 
two theories by introducing a rebuttable presumption that the COMI is 
C O 
in the place of registration. Paragraph 75 tactfully glosses over the 
56
 An example would be a "letterbox" company which does not carry out any business in the 
territory of the Member State in which its registered office is situated. See Eurofood (n 43), 
para 34. 
57
 It is unclear from Eurofood (n 43) what "economic choices" are in this context and why the 
ECJ focused on such choices. Therefore several questions are left unanswered. For further 
discussion, see Marshall & Haywood (n 55), section 2.1 . 
58
 See Moss (n 41) 2006-2007, 1008. 
87 
conflict and simply states that the registered office is normally the 
debtor's "head office".59 
2.24 Does the 'head office functions test' overcome the difficulty for the 
Lender in relation to the unclear definition of COMI in the EIR? Does 
the test overcome the problem of determining COMI in relation to 
group insolvencies? In practice, in the case of legal persons, the place 
where "a debtor conducts his interests on a regular basis and [which] is 
therefore ascertainable by third parties"60 has been equated with the 
place where the 'head office functions' of the debtor are carried out.61 
There was progression pre-Eurofood in relation to use of the 'head 
office functions test'. 
2.25 For instance, the head office functions test has been developed in the 
following case law: Re Enron Directo SA; Re BRAC Rent-A-Car 
International Inc., Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd. The test has also been 
followed in various other cases both in the U.K 6 5 and in other E U 
states.66 
59Ibid.. See also M . Christina di Luigi, 'The European Insolvency Regulation: A Criticism of 
the Jurisdiction Paradigm', International Corporate Rescue, Volume 3, Issue 6, 2006 Kluwer 
law International, p.344. 
60
 EIR recital (13). 
61
 SeeM,F&I(n38)255,para8.81. 
62
 Lightman J, 4 July 2002, no judgment given. A summary of the decision is available on the 
website of the International Insolvency Institute at http://www.iiiglobal.org/ under 'European 
Union-Articles'. 
63[2003] E W C H (Ch) 128; [2003] 1 W L R 1421. This is also a notable decision regarding the 
scope of the EIR. It established the EIR may apply to companies incorporated or registered in 
any country, whether a member of the E U or not, provided the company has its COMI in the 
E U . A number of commentators have queried whether the EIR was intended to have such 
broad effect. See Marshall & Haywood (n 55), section 2.10. 
64
 2003 W L 21353254; [2003] BCC 562; [2004] BPIR 30. The court took into account that 
the most significant third parties in relation to the operation of Recital 13 were potential 
creditors and mainly based its decision on the fact that a large number of the creditors were 
aware that the majority of key functions of the German and French subsidiaries were carried 
out in Bradford. The decision in relation to COMI was mainly influenced by the following 
factors: the location where contracts with main suppliers were administered and negotiated; 
and where the arrangements regarding finance were made. These issues carried more weight 
than the location where the services to customers were actually carried out. See Chris 
Lawrence, "Restructuring and Insolvency Briefing": < http://www.macfarlanes.com>. 
65
 To name but a few, Re Aim Underwriting Agencies (Ireland) Ltd [2004] E W H C 2114 (Ch); 
Re Ci4net.com Inc [2004] E W H C 1941 (Ch), [2005] BCC 277; Re TXU German Finance BV 
[2005] BCC 90, [2005] BPIR 209; Re Collins & Aikman [2005] E W C H 1754 (Ch); [2006] 
BCC 606. 
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 For example, in France, Re MPOTEC GmbH [2006] BCC 681, Tribunal de Commerce de 
Nanterre; and Re Eurotunnel Finance Ltd (Paris Commercial Court, 2 August 2006). In 
2.26 Based on Eurofood, however, it is not clear whether the administration 
orders made in Daisytek and similar cases (where the managerial and 
administrative control exercised by a parent company over its 
subsidiaries has been used as the grounds for submitting that the C O M I 
of each of the subsidiaries is in the same jurisdiction as the parent) 
would have been made had the application come before the court 
following the E C J decision in Eurofood. 
2.27 One of the cases that followed the head office functions test but which 
came after the Eurofood decision is that of Eurotunnel Pic.6 8 Seventeen 
companies in the Eurotunnel group69 requested that the Paris Tribunal 
70 
de Commerce open safeguard proceedings on the grounds that they 
would permit the long-term continuation of the Eurotunnel's business. 
The Tribunal de Commerce focused on the fact that the strategic and 
operational management of the companies was run by a single 
committee based in Paris and that the financial management was also 
carried out there. Safeguard proceedings were therefore opened as 
main proceedings under the E I R in respect of all 17 companies. Having 
considered Article 3 and Recital 13 of the EIR, the Tribunal de 
Commerce, in accordance with European case law, relied upon 
objective elements which were verifiable by third parties to rebut the 
71 
registered office presumption. 
2.28 It should be noted that the Tribunal de Commerce did not refer outright 
to the Eurofood decision but seems to have referred to the main aspect 
of the ECJ ' s guidance on C O M I when holding that factors that were 
Germany, Re Hettlage-Austria (Amtsgericht, Munich,4 May 2004), see <http://www.eir-
database.com>. In Hungary, Re Parmalat Slovakia (Municipal Court of Fejer/Szekesfehervar, 
14 June 2004). For more detailed references see M , F & I (n 38) 256, FN 110, 111 and 112. 
67
 Depending on the evidence put before the court. See Marshall & Haywood (n 55), section 
4.14 
68
 Tribunal de commerce de Paris, August 2, 2006 (17 decisions). 
69
 Whose registered offices were situated in different Member States across the EU, including 
France, the UK, Germany and Belgium. 
70
 Broadly this is a debtor in possession, Chapter 11 style proceeding and can be opened prior 
to the actual cash-flow insolvency of the debtor. See chapter on 'French Jurisdiction' in 
Marshall & Haywood (n 55). 
71
 For instance, the Tribunal de Commerce considered factors such as where the strategic and 
operational management of the various Eurotunnel entities were carried out, the location of the 
registered offices and the location of where the group's financial management was conducted. 
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objective and ascertainable by third parties established that the actual 
situation regarding the COMIs of the Eurotunnel companies varied 
from that which the registered office presumption would imply. No 
detail was however provided in the written judgments regarding how 
the factors used to rebut the registered office presumption were 
objectively ascertainable to third parties and which third parties these 
were. Furthermore, in Eurofood, as discussed earlier, the ECJ stated 
that just thefact that its economic choices are or can be controlled by a 
parent company in another Member State is not sufficient to rebut the 
presumption laid down by the EIR. The Tribunal de Commerce does 
not appear to have considered this part of the Eurofood decision.. 
However it is significant to note that the ECJ did not consider the actual 
meaning of "the administration of the debtor's interests on a regular 
basis" as referred to in Recital 13 . This leaves the factors which can be 
used to rebut the registered office presumption and their relative 
79 
importance unclear. 
2.29 Furthermore it is also unclear from the Eurofood judgment which 
choices controlled by a parent company in another Member State will 
be construed as 'economic choices'. Following the ECJ's decision in 
Eurofood, it appears that establishingthat a parent company can or does 
control a subsidiary's economic choices will be insufficient to rebut the 
registered office presumption; something more needs to be 
demonstrated. The "something more" relied on by the Tribunal de 
Commerce in Eurotunnel was that the major part of Eurotunnel's 
business was in France, various aspects of administration were carried 
out in France and restructuring negotiations had taken place in France. 
It is also not clear whether a debtor's COMI should be determined on a 
74 
snapshot basis or whether historical factors can also be referred to. 
72
 See Marshall & Haywood (n 55), section 4.38. 
73
 Ibid., section 4.38. 
74
 One respected practitioner states that this is the first case she is aware of in which the 
location of restructuring negotiations has been used as a factor in the assessment of a 
company's COMI. She argues that the restructuring of a company's debts could be seen as 
part of 'administering its interests' but questions the practical implications of whether this 
takes place on a 'regular basis'. See Marshall & Haywood (n 55), section 4.38. 
90 
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2.30 In Shierson v Vlieland-Boddy the Court of Appeal held that historical 
factors can be taken into account when assessing a debtor's COMI, and 
that a court should be slow to accept that an established COMI has been 
changed by activities that may turn out to be temporary or transitory. 
Prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal however there were two 
conflicting High Court decisions in England regarding the relevance of 
historical factors. The High Court held in the Shierson case that only 
factors that exist at the date of the hearing to open insolvency 
proceedings should be considered. This conflicted with the High 
Court's approach in Ci4NET.com16 where it was held that the 
ascertainment of COMI by the court should be achieved by a close 
analysis of the recent history and present situation of a company. It 
77 
should be noted however that the ECJ in Staubitz-Schreiber held that 
the test has to be applied at the time when the application to commence 
insolvency proceedings is filed which supports the contention that a 
•JO 
snapshot approach should be taken by applyingthe facts at that time. 
2.31 If a snapshot basis is to be preferred, the presence of restructuring 
negotiations in a particular place at the time an application for 
insolvency proceedings is filed may carry more weight than where the 
company conducted its business prior to such negotiations. However 
this could lead to problems if particular groups of creditors refuse to 
travel to the place of negotiations for fear of influencing the location of 
the debtor's COMI. If historical factors can be taken into account, the 
business activities of the company prior to such negotiations may be 
7Q 
more significant factors in rebutting the registered office presumption. 
75
 [2005] EWCA Civ 974, [2005] 1 WLR 3966, the Court of Appeal held that historical factors 
can be taken into account when assessing a debtor's COMI, and that a court should be slow to 
accept that an established COMI has been changed by activities that may turn out to be 
temporary or transitory. 
76
 See n 65. 
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 Case C-l/04 [2006] ECR1-701. 
78
 See Marshall & Haywood (n 55), section 4.22. 
79Ibid., section 4.37. 
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2.32 The 'head office functions test' was endorsed by the Advocate General 
in Eurofood as 'sensible and convincing': 
"...Dr Bondi and the Italian Government submit that if it is to be 
demonstrated that the centre of main interests is somewhere other than 
the State where a company's registered office is located, it 
consequently needs to be shown that the 'head office' type of functions 
are performed elsewhere. The focus must be on the head office 
functions rather than the location of the head office because a 'head 
office' can be just as nominal as a registered office is head office 
functions are not carried out there. In transnational business the 
registered office is often chosen for tax or regulatory reasons and has no 
real connection with the place where the head office functions are 
actually carried out. That is particularly so in the case of groups of 
companies, where the head office functions for the subsidiary are often 
carried out at the place where the head office functions of the parent of 
the group are carried out". 
2.33 It appears in practice that the 'lack of a comprehensive definition of 
COMI' has been overcome to some degree by the example set by the 
'head office functions test' whereby the registered office presumption is 
only seen to be rebutted if there is 'something more' than the fact that a 
parent company can be shown to control a subsidiary's economic 
choices which is shown especially by the location where the main 
0 1 
aspects of administration are carried out. Therefore any evidence 
designed to show that the COMI is in a Member State other than that in 
which the registered office is located, must demonstrate that the head 
office functions were carried out in that other state. Start here 
S0Eurofood (n 43), paras 111-112. 
81
 See 2.26 above for a discussion regarding the presence of restructuring negotiations as a 
means of assessing COMI. Also, following the decisions in Eurofood (n 43) and Re Sendo 
[2005] EWHC 1604, Chancery Division, 29 June 2005, the jurisdiction in which a company 
pays its taxes is becoming a factor that the courts will take into account in assessing the 
location of a company's COMI. 
82
 In practice the registered office of a company is not always the debtor's 'head office' 
however importance is placed on where the head office functions are carried out rather than on 
the location of the head office. 
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2.34 One commentator however questions this interpretation and states that 
the relevant part of paragraph 75 of the Virgos-Schmit Report only 
explains the logic of the choice of presumption and does not present an 
independent criterion for determining C O M ! He argues that a 
'contact with creditors' approach better reflects the description of 
COMI given in Recital 13 and that despite no definition being provided 
for "head office functions" it is suggested that the place in which 
"head office functions" will be carried out will be the place where 
activities such as strategic, executive and administrative decisions 
regarding accounting, IT, corporate marketing, branding etc are 
performed. There remains a shortfall in the approach in that it does not 
take into account the second part of Recital 13 's requirement that 
COMI should be "ascertainable by third parties". As third party 
creditors are generally not involved in the integral functions of the 
debtor company, they will not have the necessary awareness of the 
majority of the aforementioned head office functions.86 Therefore it is 
argued that the head office functions theory does not follow from the 
interpretation of the text, the history and the system of the EIR. The 
head office functions theory goes against the principles stated in 
Virgos-Schmit, paragraph 75, that, in every system of insolvency law, 
third parties should always be able to assess their risks. Third parties 
will have to investigate the group structure of a debtor company if it is 
established that they need to be aware of the operational and managerial 
structure of the group as well as contract and corporate law issues. It is 
argued that, if the group's management decide to move its place of 
83
 "...the debtor's centre of main interests is the place of the registered office. This place 
normally corresponds to the debtor's head office". 
84
 See B Wessels, 'The place of the registered office of a company: a cornerstone in the 
application of the EC Insolvency Regulation'(2006) 3 European Company Law 187. 
85
 See M,F & I (n 38) 255, para 8.81. See also Re_Stanford International Bank Ltd (In 
Receivership)[2009] E W H C 1441 (Ch), [2009] BPIR 1157; [2010] E W C A Civ 137. 
86
 See Wessels (n 84) 187. There are a number of advantages in connection with the "the head 
office functions test." For instance, there are less procedural costs and, because there is access 
to all of the group's documents, there is a transparent means of tracing assets. This strengthens 
the possibility of selling those parts of the business which may function as economic units even 
though they are operated by various legal entities. See Wessels (n 84) 189. 
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control, then the 'head office functions' approach could be viewed as an 
invitation for forum shopping. 
2.35 In light of the above arguments, it is left for Member States to 
determine whether provisions should be incorporated into the EIR in 
order to specifically address the insolvency of corporate groups.88 The 
author agrees that, in ascertaining the COMI of a company, particular 
attention needs to be given to the issue regarding which factors are both 
objective and ascertainable by third parties (particularly creditors) in 
order to demonstrate that reality can conflict with legal form (the 
location of the registered office). This view was taken in Re Daisytek 
where the English court found that this requirement in Recital 13 of the 
EIR is of great importance as, if there are to be insolvency proceedings, 
the creditors need to know where to go to contact the debtor and what 
legal risks they are incurring in dealing with the debtor. The reliability 
of the "head office functions test" has been called into question by 
Lewison J. in Stanford Bank, a decision upheld by the Court of 
Appeal.90 Furthermore there needs to be more definitive guidance as to 
whether a 'snapshot' approach or a 'historic approach' should be 
adopted in determining the location of a company's COMI. 
2.36 In the absence of further clarification from the ECJ there is a continuing 
risk that local Member State courts may consider different objective 
factors when ascertaining COMI and afford them different weightings 
in terms of importance. Furthermore the continuing uncertainty may 
also have the consequence that different courts would find that a 
company's COMI is in more than one Member State at the same point 
in time. This leaves the unsatisfactory situation of a possible race to 
court by competing creditors to try and establish jurisdiction. 
2.37 Analysing the impact on the Lender of Article 3 and the lack of a 
comprehensive definition of COMI is not complete, however, without 
87
 See Wessels (n 84) 189-190. 
88
 See Wessels (n 84) 190. 
89
 See Wessels (n 84)190. 
90
 See 3.25-3.27 for further discussion. 
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considering problematic issues such as what constitutes the opening of 
proceedings under Article 2(f) of the EIR; the 'mobile COMF 
phenomenon; and possibility of forum shopping by debtors. Analysing 
the effects of Article 3 on the Lender also warrants a discussion of the 
lack of special provisions dealing with group companies which is 
detrimental to the efficiency and effectiveness of cross border 
insolvency proceedings. 
Uncertainty as to the location of the debtor's COMI and the impact 
on the Lender 
2.38 Uncertainty in relation to a debtor's COMI causes difficulties for 
creditors as their risk and remedies might be different in a different 
Member State. This issue is of particular importance to banks and other 
secured lenders as the COMI of the debtor may effect both on their 
ability to enforce and the effectiveness of their security. It is also 
possible that different creditors may perceive COMI to be in a number 
of different Member States in cases where the debtor has wide spread 
operations. One of the issues that directly relates to ascertaining the 
location of a debtor's COMI by a secured creditor is determining the 
time of "opening" a reorganization or insolvency proceeding. 
2.39 Ascertaining the time at which COMI is assessed or the 'opening' of 
insolvency proceedings is a key factor that creditors or other parties 
will need to take into account when assessing the risks of entering into 
business transactions. Being the first to open can have great strategic 
advantages;91 it is also the precise point of opening that is critical in 
order to be able to judge the date at which the "effects" of the 
"opening" occur and are exported to other jurisdictions by the 
automatic recognition provisions of Articles 16 -18; and it is also at 
Eurofood (n 43). 
With the exception of Denmark. 
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the point of opening that jurisdiction must exist. The concept of 
'opening' is central to Article 3 and determining the COMI however the 
word is not defined in the EIR. As discussed in the paragraph below, 
under Article 2(f) of the EIR, the definition of the 'time of the opening 
of proceedings' only helps in a very limited way. 
2.40 Article 2(f) states that 'the time of the opening of proceedings' shall 
mean the time at which the judgment opening proceedings becomes 
effective, whether it is a final judgment or not.94 It is suggested that 
two points are being made here: First, if the judgment is stayed or if its 
effectiveness depends on some other step such as registration, filing or 
advertising, those factors affect the time at which the opening takes 
place; Secondly, the decision does not need to be final: the order 
opening a proceeding can be provisional in the sense that it is subject to 
review.95 Other than this clarification, Article 2(f) does not provide 
much of a definition and it is case law that we have to turn to for some 
interpretative guidance.96 
2.41 The automatic recognition provisions of Article 16 add to the 
importance of being able to clearly identify when proceedings are 
'opened' for the purposes of the EIR by the courts of a Member State. 
Given the above issues, it is apparent that an amendment to the EIR 
would be welcomed, in the interests of transparency, for greater clarity 
to the meaning of the expression "the opening of insolvency 
However the ECJ held that the jurisdiction stays in the court where jurisdiction is established 
at the time of filing. See Staubitz (n 77). It should be noted, in addition, that Article 43 only 
allows the provisions of the EIR to take effect once insolvency proceedings have been 
commenced. There could subsequently be further conflicts of law if there is any confusion as 
to when insolvency proceedings are opened due to the potential impact on the application of 
Articles 5-15. See 'Evaluation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
Insolvency Proceedings', Response form for Evaluation Questionnaire completed by The 
Insolvency Law Committee of the City of London Law Society: 
<http://citysolicitors.org/Default.aspx?sID=920&HD=0> accessed April 2010. 
94
 In relation to a CVL, a question arises as to whether the proceedings are opened when the 
meeting of members passes a resolution for the company to be wound up (at which point the 
company goes into liquidation under English law: Insolvency Act 1986 s 247(2)) or when there 
is subsequent court confirmation of the liquidation (as required by Annex A of the EIR). For 
competing views see M , F & I(n 38) 238, para 8.27, FN 46 and 304, para 8.260. 
95
 See G Moss, 'When is a Proceeding Opened?' (2008) 21 Insolvency Intelligence 33. 
96
 See Staubitz (n 77), BenQ Mobile Holding BV [2008] BCC 489 and see generally Moss (n 
92). 
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proceedings". However due to the differences in national laws as to 
when the various proceedings are opened this may be a challenge. 
2.42 Another issue that needs to be considered by the Lender in relation to 
the uncertainty of the location of COMI is the possibility of forum 
shopping inherent in the COMI concept. It was established earlier 
through cases such as Staubitz-Schreiber that debtors can move their 
COMI provided they do so before the request for opening proceedings 
is filed. This gives debtors a window to shift their COMI away from 
the place where its creditors are located or where relevant debts were 
incurred. However, any attempt to shift COMI after proceedings are 
lodged will be ineffective. 
COMI Migration 
2.43 COMI migration involves the movement of a company's COMI from 
one jurisdiction to another to make use of a favourable restructuring 
regime in the new jurisdiction. There are a number of reasons why the 
insolvency regime of a given jurisdiction may be attractive to a Lender, 
especially when restructuring a large group of companies based in 
various locations. A particular insolvency regime may: have a more 
transparent, flexible and efficient restructuring environment; be more 
familiar to the Lender; allow the imposition of a restructuring on other 
dissenting secured or unsecured creditors either by class or as a whole; 
allow more pre-planning than the regimes of certain jurisdictions; 
go 
give the Lender some say in who is appointed as officeholder; require 
less court involvement; and enhance employee protection." 
97
 The U K allows pre-pack administrations whereby a company may be placed into 
administration and immediately sell all or part of its business or assets on terms negotiated by 
the insolvency practitioner before his appointment as administrator. 
98
 In certain jurisdictions, office holders are appointed by the court on a panel basis with no 
input from the appointer, which can cause particular problems where industry knowledge is 
required; in others, the office holder may be a lawyer with limited resources to manage a large-
scale financial restructuring. Further, where different regional courts may have jurisdiction 
97 
2.44 Ironically, although one of the EIR's main aims is to eradicate forum 
shopping, it appears instead to have encouraged it, and migration is the 
most current mechanism for forum shopping.100 It is argued however 
that nevertheless, one should contrast "good" and "bad" forum 
shopping and emerging case law demonstrates that courts are generally 
keen to distinguish between the two.101 The former is where a 
jurisdiction is selected based on the interests of all the stakeholders 
involved, whereas the latter is where a certain stakeholder chooses a 
jurisdiction solely to promote his own best interests. In Staubitz-
Schreiber 103 the ECJ held that COMI is "frozen" at the time of the 
request to open insolvency proceedings.104 COMI shifts that occur after 
that point in time do not affect the allocation of jurisdiction under the 
EIR.105 However, apart from the anti-forum shopping sentiment in 
Recital 4, there is nothing in the text of the EIR that prevents COMI 
shifts on the eve of insolvency before the debtor files a request to open 
proceedings. 
2.45 The Lender's first concern is whether, in the first step to legitimate 
forum shopping, there has been a genuine shift in COMI. It will be 
necessary to ensure that enough is done within the migration process so 
that COMI can really be established in the new location. As discussed 
over different entities, it may not be possible to have a sole office holder even if the entities are 
incorporated in the same jurisdiction. See L Webb and M Butter, 'Insolvency proceedings, 
shopping for the best forum': www.practicallaw.com/8-500-7219 published 26 November 
2009. 
99
 For further explanation of reasons for COMI-shifting see Webb & Butter (n 98). 
100
 S Moore, 'COMI migration: the future', Insolv. Int. 2009, 22(2), 25-28, 25 
101
 Moore (nlOO) 25. The Advocate General discussed forum shopping in his opinion in 
Staubitz (n 77): 'Forum shopping is merely the optimization of procedural possibilities and it 
results from the existence of more than one available forum, which is in no way unlawful. 
However, where forum shopping leads to unjustified inequality between the parties to a dispute 
with regard to the defence of their respective interests, the practice must be considered and its 
eradication is a legitimate legislative objective'. 
102
 Moore (nlOO) 25. 
103
 See Staubitz (n 77). 
104
 If one were to acknowledge a COMI shift after an insolvency petition has already been 
filed, insolvency proceedings would be much less efficient. This is especially in light of costs 
being spent in the first proceedings and temporary measures already taken such as appointing 
an administrator. All these measures would be thwarted if a COMI shift after the insolvency 
petition resulted in the courts of another Member State acquiring jurisdiction for main 
insolvency proceedings. See H Eidenmuller, 'Abuse of law in the context of European 
Insolvency Law', April 2009. European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 1. 
Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396623> 17. 
W5Ibid. 17-18. 
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earlier, in order to open main proceedings in the destination 
jurisdiction, there will need to be sufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption in the EIR, which as has been discussed, is often rebutted 
based on the "head office functions test". Following the European 
Court's judgment in Eurofood1®6 there was some concern that filings 
based on the location of a group head office would become far more 
difficult however there have been a number of examples of COMI-
based filings post-Eurofood around the European Union. 
2.46 Schefenacker, Deutsche Nickel and Hans Brochier are examples of 
German companies who have tried (and in one case, failed) to move 
their COMI from Germany to England to take advantage of English 
insolvency laws. The reason driving this migration was that, as a 
matter of German corporate law, companies could not have their 
administrative headquarters in a different place from their registered 
office.109 An attempt to shift COMI may be made in one of the 
following ways: by changing registered office; through migration of 
assets and liabilities; and through a factual relocation of COMI.110 The 
most likely way of achieving a successful COMI migration becomes 
apparent when discussing the above-mentioned cases. 
2.47 In Hans Brochier, a German construction company attempted to 
transfer its registered address to England. Although the company was 
at first successful in appointing English administrators out-of-court, it 
106
 The High Court followed Eurofood ( n 43) in Stanford (n 85) and held that a company's 
COMI is presumed to be at the location of its registered office, unless there are objective 
factors that are ascertainable to third parties that would lead them to conclude that the head 
office functions of the company were being carried out elsewhere. For these purposes, what is 
ascertainable to a third party is what is in the public domain and what a typical party would 
learn in the ordinary course of business with the company. See Macfarlanes (n 64) 1. 
107
 Both unreported. On the Schefenacker case, see G Quenby, 'Moving with the times' (24 
September 2007) , www.thelawver.com (accessed 28 March 2008); A Tashiro and V 
Beissenhirtz, 'German companies heading towards England for their rescue' (2007) 4 Intl 
Corporate Rescue 171, 174. See on the Deutsche Nickel case, R Hickmott, 'Forum shopping is 
dead: long live migration!' (2007) 5 J of Intl Banking and Financial L 272. 
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 Hans Brochier Holdings LtdvExner (2006) E W H C 2594; [2007] BCC 127. 
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 A rule that has now changed: see Moore (n 98) 27; R Spedding, 'COMI migration: history 
and future', (2008) 6 CRI 183. 
110
 See Webb & Butter (n 98). 
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was subsequently decided by the administrators that the COMI 
remained in Germany and so they made an application to the English 
court for directions. The judge held that the company's COMI was in 
Germany. m This case demonstrates that it is important for directors to 
consider seriously whether the company's COMI has been relocated, 
and not simply assume that it will be located in the jurisdiction of the 
new registered office. It can be concluded that just relocating the 
jurisdiction of a company's incorporation is insufficient to transfer the 
company's COMI and satisfy the court that there has been legitimate 
attempt to move the company's head office functions. The company 
has to produce enough evidence to rebut the presumption in Article 3(1) 
119 
that the company's COMI is the jurisdiction of its incorporation. 
2.48 The more likely way to achieve a successful COMI migration seems to 
be through a transfer of assets and liabilities. This depends on whether 
the transfer is valid under the laws of both the original and new 
jurisdictions and the new legal entity does in fact have its COMI in the 
new jurisdiction. This is what happened in the landmark cases of 
1 1 Q 
Schefenacker and Deutsche Nickel. It has also been demonstrated 
that COMI migration can be attained without the need to refer to 
particular domestic legislation as was illustrated by the Damovo 
restructuring.114 
2.49 In the Schefenacker case, the group was held through a German parent 
company and ran its business through subsidiaries located in a number 
of jurisdictions, including England, the United States, Korea, Hungary, 
Australia, Germany and Slovenia. It experienced financial difficulties 
and the main interested parties considered potential restructuring 
solutions and determined that an English corporate voluntary 
111
 Spedding(nl09)184. 
112Spedding(nl09) 184. 
113
 Only one of these cases will be discussed as an example as similar restructuring strategies 
were followed in both cases. 
114Spedding (n 109) 184. See also James Quinn, 'Damovo failure to be "first of many", Daily 
Telegraph (London), Dec 23, 2006 at 25 available at: http ://www. tele graph, co 
.uk/finance/2952830/D amovo-white-flag-to-be-first-of-many.html 
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arrangement (CVA) would provide the best result. Therefore the 
COMI was to be transferred to England so that, afterwards, main 
proceedings could be opened in England for the purpose of the EIR 
which would then be recognized throughout Europe. The transfer of 
COMI was achieved through a number of steps115 which ultimately 
resulted in the German company's business being transferred to an 
English company. In this case the successful migration of COMI from 
Germany to the U K was vital to the survival of the group and, arguably 
a legitimate attempt to act in the best interest of all stakeholders. There 
was a genuine shift of head office functions in contrast to Hans 
Brochier. 
2.50 The Damovo restructuring is an example of a factual relocation of 
COMI.116 An IT company moved its COMI from Luxemburg to 
London prior to effecting a pre-packaged administration by (amongst 
other things) moving its head office functions to England, telling all 
suppliers, creditors and counterparties of the move, setting up bank 
accounts in England and holding board meetings in England. Al l these 
steps were disclosed to the English court on the application to appoint 
administrators and the court was willing to make the appointment, 
which allowed the pre-pack to proceed. This approach may be of more 
general application and therefore more instructive for the future 
regarding COMI migrations. However there are a number of legal and 
commercial issues that will need to be addressed. To a large extent, 
these issues will depend on the individual facts, however the most 
apparent issues that need consideration include those of directors' 
duties when facing insolvency, the tax regimes, and regulatory and 
117 
licensing issues. This directly links to the issue of potential risks that 
115 Moore (n 100) 26. 
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 Where the other two methods of COMI migration are not possible (e.g. because of the 
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secured creditors should be aware of when contemplating supporting a 
COMI migration. 
2.51 Overall, for bank creditors, the process involved in effecting corporate 
migrations is very likely to trigger banking covenants. Thus, in 
practice, major creditors will need to be in agreement if the migration is 
to succeed. The potential risks that the Lender should be aware of in 
relation to a COMI migration include: the costs of considering and 
1 1 0 
implementing the migration which are likely to be significant; while 
there may be shortcomings in the insolvency regime of a given 
jurisdiction, such jurisdictions may have advantages that would be lost 
following a shift in COMI;119 A COMI shift that takes place on 
migration could constitute a shift in residency or domicile for tax 
purposes; and, once COMI has been shifted and insolvency proceedings 
have been commenced, it is important, particularly in the case of a 
multinational corporate group, that the insolvency proceedings are 
recognized as effective in all countries where the operating company, 
its guarantors and affiliates in the case of a group insolvency, have 
businesses or assets.120 
2.52 Furthermore, in certain countries, local law may restrict the ability of a 
191 
debtor to migrate its COMI. The effect of secondary proceedings 
also needs to be considered as a COMI migration will not prevent these 
from opening. The effect of secondary proceedings is discussed in the 
118
 e.g. the total advisory costs in the Schefenacker restructuring exceeded 40 million euros. A 
company in financial difficulty may not have the time or funds available to facilitate a shift in 
COMI. See Webb & Butter (n 98). 
119
 In Hans Brochier (n 108), despite the company's failure to commence proceedings in 
England, under German insolvency law the insolvency practitioner received state funding to 
pay three months' salary for the company's 800 employees. See Webb & Butter (n 98). 
120
 A prior judicial determination of COMI, such as a judgment from the relevant E U court 
which opened the main proceedings, would be of assistance. See Webb & Butter (n 98). 
121
 See Case-C210/06 Cartesio Okato es Szolgaltato bt [2009] 1 C M L R 50. The Advocate 
General's opinion stated that preventing a company from transferring its administrative centre 
from one member state to another amounted to a restriction on the right of freedom of 
establishment and movement. If the ECJ had followed the Advocate General's Opinion, the 
case could have had real ramifications for those E U jurisdictions which have attempted to 
confine the ability of a company to relocate its COMI, whether at all or prior to a restructuring. 
However the ECJ took the contrary view and so this issue remains a risk for companies seeking 
to migrate COMI between certain jurisdictions. 
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following section. The main concern for the Lender is the fact that the 
assets in that jurisdiction may effectively be carved out of the main 
proceedings and will be subject to the insolvency law of the secondary 
jurisdiction. The issue of forum shopping and predictions regarding 
future COMI migrations are discussed further in Chapter 3. 
Secondary Insolvency Proceedings under Article 3(2), the definition 
of 'establishment' and the impact on the Lender 
2.53 As outlined earlier, in addition to the main insolvency proceedings, 
Article 3(2) gives the courts of a Member State in which the debtor 
does not have his COMI but has an 'establishment' jurisdiction to open 
insolvency proceedings in relation to that debtor. The effect of Article 
3(2), however, is not universal and is restricted to the assets of the 
debtor situated in the territory of the particular Member State. The 
definition of 'establishment' is clearly crucial as without the finding of 
an 'establishment', secondary proceedings cannot be commenced. 
2.54 Article 2(h) defines 'establishment' as any place of operations where 
the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human 
means and goods. The effect of this is that it is insufficient for a debtor 
to have assets within a Member State; there must be a place of 
operations within the state in order for the courts of that state to have 
jurisdiction to open territorial proceedings. One issue that arises is 
whether the definition of 'establishment' should be extended to include 
services so that companies operating solely in the provision of 
services will fall within the ambit. Furthermore it is not clear why the 
test for 'establishment' does not include a requirement for factors to be 
As per the definition in the UNCITRAL Model Law and implemented in the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Regulations 2006. 
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"ascertainable by third parties" as is the case when determining 
COMI.123 
2.55 In contrast to COMI there is little case law on the meaning of 
'establishment' and this matter has not been considered by the ECJ. 
One difficulty that has been identified concerns the phrase "human 
means" especially as regards self-employed traders. The definition of 
establishment needs clarifying because, from the Lender's perspective, 
it will not be clear at the stage of analysing risk assessment, whether 
secondary proceedings can actually be opened. In addition, whether 
historical factors can be taken into account by a court when assessing 
whether the debtor possesses an 'establishment' in the jurisdiction is 
also something that would benefit from clarification. 
2.56 Another consideration for the Lender, not dissimilar to COMI 
migration, is the issue of whether it is possible for a debtor to disband 
or freely re-locate an establishment if, at the time of dealing with the 
debtor through that particular establishment, there were resulting 
1 9S 
outstanding debts and liabilities. It is submitted that if it can be 
shown that the creditor will be "substantially prejudiced" due to the 
move or disbandment of the establishment, then use of an "an estoppel-
like doctrine" will enable the relevant parties to apply for the opening 
of proceedings in the state in which the establishment formerly 
operated, and to seek invalidation of any acts where the debtor tried to 
move assets from that jurisdiction during the period preceding the 
disbanding of the former establishment.126 It is important to note that 
the decision of the ECJ in Staubitz-Schreiber in relation to COMI 
and the policy of the EIR against forum shopping demonstrates that a 
123
 See Recital 13 of the EIR. Generally see A. 7 for discussion on how the concept of an 
'establishment' was introduced in the Phase I draft conventions. See A. 12 for further 
developments under the Istanbul Convention and the introduction of the possibility of 
territorial or secondary proceedings. See A. 14 for early criticism of the possibility of opening 
secondary proceedings. 
124
 Courts in Belgium, Estonia and Sweden have reached differing conclusions on whether past 
business activity can give rise to an establishment. 
125
 See M , F & I (n 38) 274, para 8.144. 
126
 See M , F & I (n 38) 274, para 8.144. 
127
 Staubitz (n77). 
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debtor cannot discontinue an establishment after a request to open 
insolvency proceedings in order to escape the jurisdiction of the courts 
in the Member State in which the request has been filed. However 
there is still a time frame in which the debtor can move or discontinue 
an establishment prior to the making of a request to open 
proceedings.129 
2.57 In addition to the concept of 'establishment' the ability to open 
secondary proceedings in Member States generally, regardless of the 
fact that main proceedings have already been opened in the Member 
State where the debtor has its COMI, may cause difficulties in practice 
for the Lender. There is also the issue that secondary proceedings 
are restricted to winding-up proceedings. In particular, where main 
proceedings have been opened in relation to a number of group 
companies in one jurisdiction, the opening of secondary proceedings in 
relation to the group company may impact on the ability to rescue the 
companies within the group in a coordinated and effective manner. 
Accordingly it may often be in the interests of the creditors of all 
individual group companies that secondary proceedings are not opened. 
Not only will the opening of secondary proceedings make the rescue of 
the company concerned more difficult, it will also result in the 
1 Q 1 
duplication of expenses and work carried out by office holders. 
Article 16 of the EIR: Recognition of Insolvency 
Proceedings 
2.58 Having discussed Article 3 and jurisdiction criteria, the requirement of 
recognition in all Member States is emphasized as these important 
128
 See M , F & I (n 38) 274, para 8.143. 
129
 This is consistent with the principle of freedom of establishment however the migration of 
an establishment could be problematic for creditors as discussed above. 
130
 See M , F & I (n 38), 275, 8.149 
131
 Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 93), Question 11. 
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elements would not be workable in practice without the principle of 
mutual trust. Because the EIR operates a system of automatic 
recognition, any concerns that creditors might have had about the 
impact of Articles 3 and 4 on their assets are made all the more 
prominent due to the application of Article 16. 
2.59 Once insolvency proceedings have been commenced in one Member 
State then the opening of insolvency proceedings and their effects are 
immediately recognized in all other Member States without the need for 
any further formalities. This rule of automatic recognition reflects the 
principle that these proceedings are to have universal effect over all of 
the debtor's assets wherever situated within the European Union 
(except Denmark). 
2.60 The removal of any lapse of time between the proceedings becoming 
legally effective in the State of opening and their being recognized 
throughout the other Member States, and hence having the same 
authority in all of them as they have in their State of origin, reduces the 
risk of foreign creditors engaging in a 'race of diligence' during the 
period between the commencement of insolvency proceedings in the 
debtor's 'home' country and the moment when the liquidator can 
succeed, country by country, in obtaining a judicial order granting 
powers of enforcement over such assets as are located within each 
jurisdiction. 
2.61 In Eurofood the ECJ held that the first sentence of Article 16(1) can 
be more accurately interpreted as portraying the fact that the courts of 
other Member States are required to recognize main insolvency 
proceedings opened by a Member State without those courts being able 
to review the jurisdiction of the court of the opening state. Article 
16(1) establishes a rule of priority that is based on the principle of 
132
 Although it is clear that Denmark is not a 'Member State' for the purposes of Article 16, 
questions have arisen concerning Denmark's obligations under the EIR: see M , F & I (n 38) 
305, para 8.262. 
133
 Fletcher (n 36) 421. It should be noted however that Article 16 does not prevent the 
opening of secondary proceedings. 
134
 Eurofood (n 43). 
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"mutual trust." This has facilitated the creation of a mandatory system 
of jurisdiction that has allowed Member State to adopt a more simple 
means for the recognition and enforcement of decisions within 
insolvency proceedings as opposed to applying their internal rules of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. If an interested 
party has the opinion that COMI is located in a Member State that 
differs to that in which main insolvency proceedings have been opened 
and wants to dispute the jurisdiction adopted by the court which opened 
those proceedings, it can make use, before the courts of the Member 
State in which main proceedings were opened, of the remedies 
stipulated by the national law of that Member State against the opening 
decision.136 
2.62 It should be noted however that only the insolvency proceedings within 
the scope of the EIR benefit from the system of recognition provided. 
Proceedings not listed in the Annexes are not eligible for recognition 
under the EIR nor can they prevent the recognition of proceedings 
1 -in 
provided for in the EIR even though they were opened earlier. 
2.63 Where secondary insolvency proceedings are opened, or where 
independent, territorial proceedings are opened under the circumstances 
specified in Article 3(4), these too are encompassed by the basic 
principle of automatic recognition stipulated in Article 16(1), which 
does not distinguish between main and secondary or independent 
territorial proceedings for this purpose. The effects of secondary and 
territorial proceedings are restricted to assets of the debtor located in 
the territory of the State of opening, but the liquidator may have to 
engage in some actions in other Member States during the course of his 
administration, especially where assets which properly comprise part of 
135
 This is subject to Article 26 [See 2.77-2.87], the public policy exception, which is one of the 
limited exceptions as outlined in Recital 22 of the EIR: "...to that end, grounds for non-
recognition should be reduced to the minimum necessary." Also see Article 17 in relation to 
the 'effects of recognition' [See 2.69 - 2.76]. 
136
 See Eurofood (n 43), paras 39-40, 43, operative part 2. 
137
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 145. 
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the secondary estate are found to have been re-located. 
2.64 The second paragraph of Article 16(1) confirms that the rule of 
recognition shall also apply where, on account of the debtor's capacity, 
insolvency proceedings cannot be brought against the debtor in other 
Member States. Therefore, the fact that a debtor is not considered to be 
insolvent according to the relevant test under the law of another 
Member State, or that he is there regarded as belonging to a category of 
debtor, who is excluded from the operation of insolvency law, cannot 
be a reason for refusal of recognition to insolvency proceedings opened 
in the first State.139 
2.65 As there is no time limit for the opening of secondary proceedings, the 
secured creditor faces the risks at all times that important assets may be 
taken over by secondary proceedings. In order to avoid this, the 
creditor's concern is that the liquidator in the main proceedings moves 
all assets to his own country as soon as possible. Despite his choice of 
action however, the liquidator will find it difficult to negotiate the sale 
of a whole enterprise, with establishments and assets in several member 
140 
states as a going concern. 
2.66 The effect of Article 16 on creditors is compounded by the definition 
supplied in Article 2(f), whereby 'the time of the opening of 
proceedings' is declared to mean 'the time at which the judgment 
opening proceedings becomes effective, whether it is a final judgment 
or not'. There are difficulties in ascertaining precisely when 
recognition bites in the case of insolvency proceedings that are initiated 
out of court under national law.141 
2.67 Overall, a judgment opening proceedings does not need to be a final 
138
 Fletcher (n 36) 424. 
139
 For example, the laws of some states do not provide for insolvency proceedings to be 
brought against an individual who is not a trader; however, if such proceedings are opened in 
another Member State then those proceedings must be recognized regardless of the fact that it 
would not have been possible to have commenced those proceedings under domestic law. See 
M,F&I(n38) 194, para 8.134. 
140
 See M , F & I (n 38) 196, para 8.142. 
141
 See Virgos-Schmit (n 42), 52 & 68. 
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judgment (meaning one not subject to further appeal) in order to enjoy 
recognition provided that its effects have not been stayed by the court 
1 A r\ 
which granted it. Such judgment whether final or provisional shall 
have effect in the whole territory covered by the EIR as long as it is 
effective in the State of the opening of proceedings.143 If a judgment 
opening proceedings is discharged on rehearing or on appeal144 then the 
obligation of other Member States to recognize the judgment must 
come to an end. In the period after the judgment ceases to have 
effect,145 a judgment of a court of another Member State, having 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3, may open insolvency proceedings and 
its judgment must be recognized by all other Member States including 
the state in which the earlier (but discharged) judgment was given.146 
2.68 One issue that is unclear however is what happens, under English law 
for instance, where there is a company voluntary arrangement 
1 An 
( 'CVA') ; or creditors' voluntary liquidation ( 'CVL'). In the case of 
the former, a decision by meetings of a company's members and 
creditors to place the company into a C V A would attract automatic 
1 AQ 
recognition under the EIR. In the case of the C V L the position is 
complicated by the fact that Annex A to the EIR expressly states that 
the insolvency proceeding is 'creditors' voluntary -winding up (with 
confirmation by the court)'.149 This suggests that court confirmation is a 
necessary element of the proceeding governed by the EIR and therefore it is the court confirmation that opens the proceedings 150 
142
 Fletcher (n 36) 421. 
143
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 147 : The EIR is based on the principle of Community trust and 
the 'favor recognitionis', so that national borders are no obstacle to the efficient administration 
of international insolvency proceedings throughout the Community. 
144
 For example on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. 
145
 for example pending a further hearing or appeal. 
146
 See M , F & I (n 38) 196, para 8.143. 
147
 Under IA 1986, Part I. 
148
 A CVA comes within the phrase 'Voluntary arrangements under insolvency legislation' in 
Annex A even though there is no court judgment (in an English law sense) opening the 
proceedings. 
149
 See Insolvency Rules 1986, r 7.62 (inserted by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2002), 
which sets out the procedure in England for an application for confirmation. See also M , F & I 
(n 38), para 8.22, FN 36. 
150
 In relation to a CVL, see n 94. 
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Article 17 of the EIR: Effects of Recognition 
2.69 Article 17(1) describes the effects of automatic recognition set out in 
Article 16 in relation to main insolvency proceedings and Article 3(2) 
proceedings. 'Automatic recognition' means immediate recognition by 
virtue of the EIR without any need to resort to preliminary proceedings 
to declare it effective.151 Recognition has its effects under Article 17 
'with no further formalities'. This means that creditors are subjected to 
such effects without any need to issue local proceedings or carry out 
any other measures. The 'effects' are not further defined and depend 
on the law of the proceedings, the lex concursus}52 
2.70 'The judgment' opening Article 3(1) proceedings is to have the same 
effects in all the Member States as under the lex concursus. This means 
that, in practice, the judgment may have more far reaching effects on 
creditors than proceedings in their own Member States would have had. 
Moss, Fletcher & Isaacs submit that the following seem to be included 
within the 'effects' of a judgment opening proceedings: the appointing 
of a liquidator; the divestment of the debtor; the restriction of individual 
executions; the estate encompassing all of the debtor's assets in the 
estate; and the important requirement that each creditor has to return 
what they have received following the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings..153 
However, it should be noted that the applicability of the lex concursus 
is subject to the various exceptions stated in Articles 5 to 15. 
2.71 Therefore, the automatic recognition of the effects of a judgment 
commencing main proceedings is subject to two specific types of 
exceptions: where the EIR provides otherwise (for example the 
exceptions relating to the rights in rem of third parties (Article 5), the 
151
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 152. 
152
 See Recital (23). 
153
 See M , F & I (n 38), 306, 8.266 and Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 154. 
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set-off of mutual debts (Article 6), and to retention of title (Article 7);154 
and where Article 3(2) proceedings have been commenced in a Member 
State.155 
2.72 Article 17(2) provides for the recognition of Article 3(2) proceedings 
and gives the Lender some protection. The second sentence deals 
primarily with two types of situations: the first is where the Article 3(2) 
proceedings have produced a stay of creditors' remedies;156 and the 
second is where Article 3(2) proceedings are concluded by creditors 
agreeing to discharge the debtor, for example, by a compromise of their 
claims against the debtor. 
2.73 Without the relevant consent from the creditor, Article 17(2) clarifies 
that a discharge will only effect the debtor's assets which are located in 
the Member State in which the territorial proceedings were 
commenced. The creditor can therefore seek the rest of his claim 
1 en 
against the debtor's assets in other Member States. It is not clear 
though whether 'consent' in this case can apply, where court approval 
is given, to a consent binding a minority through getting the requisite 
majority vote or whether 'consent' only refers to individual consents. It 
is argued that it would make little sense in having the consent exception 
unless a "locally acceptable means of majority voting so as to bind a 
1 C O 
minority could supply the necessary consent." 
2.74 Virgos-Schmit however adopts a more cautious approach in protecting 
creditor rights by stating that consent means individual consent so that 
the restriction provided can only be relied on against creditors who 
have accepted it individually and not by majority vote.159 Creditors' 
consent can therefore not be replaced by a decision of the court. 
154
 Ibid. 
155
 In addition, Article 26 might give rise to an exception where recognition of the insolvency 
proceeding is opposed by a Member State on the grounds of public policy. See M , F & I (n 38) 
306, para 8.267. 
156
 That stay cannot extend beyond the member state where those proceedings have been 
opened save in respect of creditors outside who have consented. 
157
 See M , F & I (n 38) 307, para 8.272. 
158
 Ibid.30S, para 8.273. 
159
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 157. 
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2.75 Although the liquidation of assets can be organized quite easily on a 
territorial basis, this is not true of the discharge of liabilities as 
liabilities are assignable to the capital as a whole, not to specific assets. 
It should be noted that the laws of Member States vary significantly 
with respect to the question of discharge. It has been suggested that a 
distinction is necessary between a discharge that results from a 
composition or insolvency plan160 and the availability of a 'fresh start'161 
for debtors who are natural persons by means of a discharge of residual 
claims. 
2.76 As referred to in the discussion regarding Article 16, Eurofood 
emphasizes the application of the principle of mutual recognition.162 
Subject to the public policy exception, as discussed in the next section, 
once a decision has been made to open proceedings in one Member 
State, courts in other Member States must respect the decision and 
cannot generally question it on substantive or procedural grounds. If 
follows that any challenges to the first court's assumption of 
jurisdiction will ordinarily have to be made in that Member State. 
Article 26: Public Policy 
2.77 The EIR is based on the principle of mutual trust and the general legal 
presumption that the judgment handed down in another Member State 
is valid. This is the reason why the only ground for opposing 
recognition is that the judgment handed down in another Member State 
is contrary to the public policy of the requested State.163 This provision 
160
 Under a composition or insolvency plan, all affected claims, regardless of whether or not 
they were lodged by their holders and whether or not they accepted the plan, may be 
discharged and replaced by the obligation provided by the plan. There may be a potential 
problem in ensuring coordination between the main and the secondary proceedings. See V & 
G(n2) 180, para 337. 
161
 A 'fresh start' represents a distinct insolvency policy that is unrelated to the collective 
action problem that gives insolvency law its general shape. See V & G (n 2) 180, para 336. 
162
 Eurofood (n 43). 
163
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 202. 
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should only take effect in exceptional circumstances which is reflected 
in the wording 'manifestly' contrary to public policy.164 However, the 
Lender needs to be aware of this exception to Article 16 as it could 
have an unanticipated turn of events against the Lender's expectations. 
2.78 In practice, case law demonstrates that a restricted approach is 
predominantly taken in the application of Article 26 which means that, 
in practice, the position of the Lender after insolvency effects have been 
determined, will remain relatively unaltered. However there is always 
the possibility that in the future, case law may interpret Article 26 less 
rigidly and the application of this provision will then be of greater 
concern to the Lender. 
2.79 The restricted application of Article 26 is apparent in cases such as Re 
Stojevic and in Eurofood. It was held in Re Stojevic by the 
Austrian Supreme Court, confirming the decision of the Higher 
Regional of Vienna (Court of Appeal), that it was not possible to refuse 
recognition under Article 26 if the only reason for the refusal was 
because it was believed that the court that first opened main 
proceedings had taken jurisdiction without any sufficient grounds. The 
point was clear enough not to be referred to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling.167 
2.80 Non-recognition of insolvency proceedings should solely be means of 
last resort. This is because Recital 22 requires that that the grounds for 
non-recognition of insolvency proceedings commenced in other 
Member States should be kept to the minimum necessary. The only 
real justification for using non-recognition under Article 26 would be if 
was a gross violation of fundamental legal principles and, especially, 
procedural principles. In this case it was not 'manifestly contrary' to 
Austria's public policy that the judgment of the High Court in England 
did not particularize the grounds for the basis of the English court's 
164Ibid, para 204. The limited scope of the public policy exception was considered by the ECJ 
in Eurofood (n 43). 
165
 (Austrian Supreme Court, 17 March 2005), 8 Ob 135/04t. 
166
 Eurofood (n 43). 
167
 See M , F & I (n 38) 324, para 8.332. 
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jurisdiction to commence the insolvency proceedings. It is argued 
that the Austrian Supreme Court's ruling is to be welcomed and 
correspond with the view of the EC J in the Eurofood decision.169 
2.81 In Eurofood, both the Advocate General and the EC J referred to the 
restricted scope of Article 26. The Advocate General referred to 
Recital 22 and stated that it was clear that the public policy 
exemption was intended to be of limited scope. This is emphasised by 
Virgos-Schmit, which states: 'The public policy exception ought to 
operate in exceptional cases'. 
2.82 The ECJ held that these exceptional cases will only occur where 
recognition or enforcement of a judgment delivered in another Member 
State is at variance to an "unacceptable degree" with the legal order of 
the Member State in which enforcement is sought. This will happen, 
for instance, where recognition or enforcement will infringe 
fundamental rights. Any infringement will have to constitute a 
manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order 
of the Member State in which enforcement is sought or of a right 
recognized as being fundamental within that legal order. In particular a 
Member State may refuse to recognize insolvency proceedings opened 
in another Member State where the decision to open the insolvency 
proceedings 'was taken in flagrant breach of the fundamental right to be 
171 
heard'. Importantly, however, the ECJ pointed out that the Irish 
court in that case could not hold that there was a breach of this 
fundamental right simply because there was no fair oral hearing, even 
though that might be fundamental to Irish notions of a fair hearing, if in 
179 1 7^ 
all the circumstances there was a fair hearing. 
This was because of the lack of a written judgment giving reasons for the finding that the 
COMI was in England. 
169
 See Marshall & Haywood (n 55), section 9.2. 
170
 Seen43, para 131. 
171
 Ibid, para 67 of the judgment. 
172
 i.e. the ability to file written submissions. 
Eurofood (n 43), para 68. See also Daisytek (n 62), Public Prosecutor v Segard (as 
Administrator for Rover France SAS) Versailles Court of Appeal, (15 December 2005) (MG 
Rover) and Re Muscle Tech Research and Development Inc [2006] OJ No 3300 Ont SCJ. See 
M , F & I ( n 3 8 ) 324, 8.333 
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2.83 This and subsequent authorities are helpful as they indicate that the 
Lender can, according to the present approach adopted by courts in the 
E U and internationally, rely to a certain extent on the predictability that 
the court will defer to the judicial decisions made in a foreign main 
proceeding as long as it is satisfied that due process protections are in 
place and in such cases, comity will override any reliance on public 
policy. On the whole it also appears that courts recognize creditor 
interests and the need for certainty in terms of the creditors' reliance on 
the COMI of the debtor and the insolvency effects rendered by the lex 
concursus. 
2.84 It is important however to bear in mind that the approach in relation to 
Article 26 might become more relaxed in the future and that there have 
been instances where Article 26 has been applied. In Hans Brochier, 
administrators were appointed out of court in England in respect of a 
Germany company on the basis of an assertion by the directors that 
COMI was in the United Kingdom. The German court refused to 
recognize the opening in the U K on the grounds COMI was in 
Germany, the U K opening was fraudulent and that Article 26 applied. 
Subsequently, the U K administrators obtained a declaration from the 
English court that, in light of further information from Germany, COMI 
was in Germany. It followed that the opening of main proceedings 
had been invalid. 
2.85 As public policy derives from national law, the concept does not have a 
uniform standard throughout the Community. Public policy will differ 
according to the individual State's fundamental principles of the law 
including constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. It is important 
to remember this although Article 26 minimizes the risk of being too 
broad by excluding unreasonably wide interpretations of public 
policy.176 Furthermore public policy is interpreted as encompassing the 
essential procedure guarantees such as the adequate opportunity to be 
174
 Amtsgericht Nurnberg, ZIP 2/2007 81. 
175
 Hans Brochier (n 108). 
176
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 205. Also see para 208: judgments affecting personal freedom or 
postal secrecy from the obligation of recogntion and enforcement are also excluded. 
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heard and the rights of participation in the proceedings. It does not 
involve a general control of the correctness of the procedure followed 
in another Member State.178 
2.86 Moreover, the public policy exception, where capable of being invoked, 
need not result in the total rejection of the judgment emanating from the 
other Member State. It may be possible to refuse recognition or 
enforcement of specific portions of the judgment, while allowing other 
parts to enjoy effect.179 The extent to which this may be possible will 
depend on the exact circumstances of the individual case. 
2.87 It has been suggested by Dr Gerald Masch,180 that if jurisdiction to open 
main proceedings has been taken on the basis of a move of COMI 
designed to avoid creditors then this may not be recognized in other 
Member States on the basis of Article 26.181 The writer questions 
whether Article 26 can be used as a means of attacking bad forum 
shopping however submits that each case would have to be assessed 
on an individual basis and it may be difficult to prove the reason for a 
move of COMI was specifically to avoid creditors. It will be 
interesting to see whether the application of Article 26 in future case 
law will gradually adopt this approach in the interests of protecting the 
security rights of creditors. 
Article 4: Law applicable 
2.88 The general rule given effect to by Article 4(1) is that the law 
applicable to insolvency proceedings is that of the state where the 
proceedings are commenced (the lex concursus). This rule applies to 
These rights have a crucial role in plans to reorganise businesses or compositions. 
178
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 206. 
179/fe/.,para209. 
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181
 See also See M , F & I (n 38) 325, para 8.335. 
182
 See paras: 2.44; 2.170; 3.7; and 3.14 for analysis of what amounts to 'good' and 'bad' 
forum shopping. 
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1 OQ 
main and secondary proceedings. It presupposes that the court has 
jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings according to the EIR, 
which means that the rules of international jurisdiction end up 
fulfilling a double function: they determine the competent jurisdiction 
directly and the applicable law indirectly. Article 4(1) contains a very 
broad and general description which includes both the opening, conduct 
and closure of the insolvency proceedings as well as their effects, both 
procedural and substantive,186on the rights and obligations of all the 
concerned parties. 
2.89 There are a number of reasons why Article 4(1) is important to the 
Lender. Firstly, in a world of sovereign states with different insolvency 
policies, it allows a single set of insolvency policies to be pursued. 
Insolvency proceedings are collective proceedings and in order for 
collective proceedings to function effectively it is necessary for there to 
be clear legal positions. It would therefore appear that the efficient 
conducting of cross-border insolvency proceedings depends on whether 
the recognition of the relevant states is not limited to just recognition of 
the jurisdiction in which main proceedings were commenced but also 
extends to the effect of any judgments given by the courts in those 
proceedings and the powers of the liquidators in those proceedings. 
This wi l l only occur i f there are harmonized rules on conflict of laws 
that guarantee some certainty that, in the event of insolvency, rights 
created or granted in insolvency proceedings wi l l be recognized 
throughout the Member States. 
2.90 Article 4(1) enables the Lender and other parties to readily identify 
their rights and obligations, and consequently to bargain " in the shadow 
183
 See Recital 23 and Article 28 of the EIR. Article 28 specifically deals with the position in 
relation to secondary proceedings. However, since Article 4(1) is stated as a general rule it 
must be taken as applying to independent territorial proceedings. See also Virgos-Schmit (n 
42) para 89 
184
 Articles 3(1) and 3(2). 
185SeeV&G(n2)72,parall8. 
186
 The fact that both types of effects are subject to the same law reduces the difficulties of 
legal application because it eliminates problems of characterization and adjustment. See V & G 
(n 2) 73, 119. See also Virgos-Schmit (n 42) para 90. 
187
 See M , F & I (n 38) 279, para 8.161. 
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o f a single legal system. Secondly, it facilitates the administration of 
the proceedings as there is one applicable forum which thereby avoids 
the costs associated with the application of foreign law (problems of 
legal adjustment, information on foreign law, etc). This argument is 
particularly strong in those proceedings, such as insolvency 
proceedings, where the procedural aspects and the substantive aspects 
are closely linked. Finally, it ensures, from the conflict of laws 
perspective, that all of the creditors of the same insolvent debtor are 
1 oo 
subject to the same proceedings and to the same legal system. 
2.91 The Lender will be concerned about the specific wording of Article 
4(1) and in particular the interpretation of what insolvency 'effects' are 
subject to the lex concursus. Under all national laws, insolvency 
proceedings may interfere and bring about abrupt changes in the legal 
position of the debtor and the creditors. These changes encompass the 
legal consequences and variations which the procedural and substantive 
rights of the debtor and the creditors must undergo in order to achieve 
the objectives of the insolvency proceedings, as set forth by the lex 
concursus. From this perspective, the lex concursus displaces, in so far 
as insolvency policy requires, the law governing the affected act or 
right itself. The Lender will need to be aware that these insolvency 
policy-based effects may be greater or lesser depending on the 
legislative policy decisions of each State especially at the initial stage 
of bankruptcy proofing a transaction. Generally there are systems 
which significantly alter the positions of the parties and there are others 
which respect those positions as far as possible and which are less 
'interventionist' than others. 
2.92 It is submitted that, in terms of insolvency policies, the EIR is itself 
neutral. It respects national diversity and admits in its Annexes, 
insolvency proceedings with a very different degree of 
"interventionism". In accordance with Article 4, it is the task of the lex 
188
 See V & G (n 2) 89-90, para 135. 
189
 Ibid. 73, para 119. See also 1.119 -1.125 in relation to the principles of universalism and 
territorialism. 
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concursus to establish the degree to which the insolvency proceedings 
need to interfere in the rights and relationships of the parties190 which 
are necessary for the insolvency to achieve its collective objectives.191 
2.93 The Lender will therefore be concerned with the unanticipated effects 
that the intervention of the lex concursus might cause. It is important to 
note, however, that the lex concursus may only interfere with the law 
governing the act or right itself for insolvency law reasons. It 
determines the impact of the insolvency proceedings on those acts or 
rights; but it must only apply to the extent required by insolvency law 
policies. The lex causae continues to apply to other civil law 
consequences not connected with insolvency policies. On many 
occasions, the application of this criterion requires the decision as to 
whether or not a given effect is founded on insolvency law policies to 
be inferred from the 'sense and purpose' of the rule which establishes 
it. If this is the case, the lex concursus takes precedence over the lex 
causae; if not, then the latter continues to apply.192 
2.94 In practice, the application of domestic insolvency law under Article 4 
may not be so straightforward. For instance, in some special 
circumstances, it could indirectly lead to the application of the law of 
another Member State. From the point of the Lender, it is a risk that 
could not have been anticipated. However, it could also be 
advantageous. One example of this is the case of Collins v Aikman 
Europe SA.193 The English court had opened main proceedings in 
respect of a number of companies incorporated in other Member States. 
The English court considered the fact that promises had been made by 
the administrators to local creditors to the effect that local law priorities 
would be respected if they did not cause secondary proceedings to be 
190
 i.e. the modifications, restrictions or redistributions. 
191
 SeeV&G(n2)73,parall9. 
192
 In any case the EIR establishes some safeguards against an excessive 'interventionism' by 
the lex concursus: (i) the exceptions in favour of a different national law expressly established 
in Articles 5-15;(ii) the possibility of opening territorial proceedings, which will result in a 
different lex concursus being applied;(iii) and in extreme cases, the public policy clause, 
Article 26. See V & G (n 2) 73, para 119. 
193
 [2006] EWCH 1343 (Ch); [2006] BCC 861. 
119 
opened. This resulted in the English court directing that, according to 
English law principles of justice, the local law priorities to the claims of 
the creditors of each company should be applied in the main 
proceedings.194 This enables the possibility of having a single main 
proceeding in relation to a debtor, without requiring secondary 
proceedings, whilst also simultaneously respecting the substantive 
rights which local creditors would possess in secondary proceedings 
under the relevant local law.195 As discussed in the paragraph above, the 
national law applied under Article 4 should be interpreted purposively 
and in such a way as to give effect to the purpose of the EIR. 
Article 4(2): non-exhaustive matters governed by the /ex concursus 
2.95 Article 4(2) contains a list of specific matters which are subject to the 
lex concursus. This list is not exclusive and its function is to facilitate 
the interpretation of the general rule in Article 4(1) and to resolve any 
problems of characterization or doubts which may arise with regard to 
its application. The analysis of Article 4(2) will focus on only a few of 
the matters contained in Article 4(2) as paragraphs (a) to (m) are largely 
self-explanatory. 
Article 4(2)(a) 
2.96 Article 4(2)(a) states that the lex concursus shall determine against 
which debtors insolvency proceedings may be brought on account of 
194
 It is suggested that this decision illustrates that the English Insolvency Act is not a 
compulsory code which necessitates the application of English substantive law in all 
circumstances. See M , F & I (n 38) 280, para 8.165. 
195
 See M , F & I (n 38) 280, para 8.165. 
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their capacity. It is particularly significant when considering the wide 
diversity between the insolvency laws of the 26 participating E U 
Member States concerning the types of debtors to which the different 
kinds of insolvency proceedings are applicable.196 With regard to this 
issue, it is important to bear in mind Article 3(4) which permits a 
territorial insolvency to be opened precisely in those cases in which the 
law of the State where the debtor has its COMI does not permit it; and 
Article 16(1), whereby the fact that according to the law of the State 
where the recognition of the insolvency proceedings is requested the 
debtor, on account of his capacity, cannot be subject to insolvency 
proceedings is not admissible as a reason for refusing to recognize 
those proceedings.197 
Article 4(2)(e) 
2.97 This covers matters such as the termination of such contracts as a result 
of the opening of the proceedings and for these purposes the law which 
1 g o 
would otherwise be applicable to the contract may be displaced. The 
first question that comes to mind is exactly what is included within the 
definition of 'current contracts'? Article 8 (contracts relating to 
immovable property), Article 9 (payment systems and financial 
markets), and Article 10 (contracts of employment) must be taken into 
account, as they establish exceptions to this rule. The term 'current 
contracts' has been held by the English Commercial Court to include 
arbitration clauses.199 
196
 Under the laws of Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, 
respectively, insolvency proceedings cannot take place in relation to the debtors who are not 
classified as traders (commercants). In the case of Italy, Article 2083 of the Civil Code also 
excludes small-scale traders (piccoli imprenditori) from the operation of the bankruptcy law. 
See M , F & I (n 38) 58, para 4.07 & FN 11. 
197SeeV&G(n2)74,paral21. 
198
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42) para 91(e). 
199
 Elektrim v Vivendi [2008] EWHC 2155 (Comm) and on appeal [2009] EWCA Civ 677. 
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2.98 It is submitted that the lex concursus governs the effects on current 
contracts regardless of whether such effects are invoked by the 
administrator (for example in order to escape some of the debtor's 
contractual obligations) or by the other party to the contract (for 
example a seller refusing to deliver goods because of anticipated non-
payment). The latter effect would be more appropriately governed by 
the law applicable to the contract in question, but that seems to be 
incompatible with the wording of Article 4(2)(e).200 
Article 4(2)(f) 
2.99 The effects on individual enforcement actions, both pending and future, 
901 
are always determined by the lex concursus, including preservation 
measures. A stay on the normal methods of enforcement against the 
debtor and his assets is common to all Member States. Where such a 
stay on action against the debtor arises under the law of the state where 
main proceedings were opened, then such stay will have automatic 
effect across all Member States pursuant to Article 17 of the EIR so as 
to preclude actions against the debtor otherwise than in accordance with 
909 
the terms of that stay. 
200
 See M , F & I (n 38) 281, para 8.171. 
201
 See Virgos-Schmit (n 42) paras 91 and 142. In English terminology, 'execution' refers only 
to a process after judgment whereas here processes before and after judgment are intended. See 
M , F & I (n 38) 282, para 8.174, F N 210. 
202
 See, for example, Merrill Lynch International Bank Ltd v Winterthur Swiss Insurance Co: 
Re Eurotunnel Finance Ltd (HCJ, 30 November 2006) concerning the application of the stay 
under a French insolvency procedure in the United Kingdom. See M , F & I (n 38) 282, para 
8.173. 
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2.100 The effects of insolvency proceedings on provisional and protective 
measures adopted in favour of a creditor may give rise to doubts. The 
most reasonable course of action would be for these proceedings to 
follow the same regime as enforcement actions because, although they 
do not lead directly to the realization of the asset, they do not 'insulate' 
it thus making it more difficult for it to be included in the insolvent 
estate and be administered by the liquidator which may be prejudicial to 
the successful conclusion of the insolvency proceedings. 
2.101 The exception in Article 4(2)(f) for 'lawsuits pending' appears to 
contain an implied cross-reference to Article 15 and presumably covers 
the same ground as Article 15. As mentioned in relation to Article 
4(2)(e) arbitration proceedings have been held to be covered by the 
expression 'lawsuits pending'. 
Article 4(2)(m) 
2.102 It is argued that a literal reading of the phrase 'all the creditors', as 
translated in the English version of the EIR, would lead to an absurd 
result. It is suggested instead that in the context it means 'creditors as a 
whole' or 'general body of creditors'. This approach may be supported 
by the French and German versions which use the terms 'ensemble' and 
'Gesamtheit' respectively.204 
2.103 A literal reading of 4(2)(m) would require proof that the act in question 
was detrimental to every single creditor which is impossible to obtain. 
This is emphasized by the fact that the act will clearly not be 
detrimental to the creditor who gets the relevant benefit. It is submitted 
that are also a number of situations which are intended to be covered by 
SeeV&G(n2)77,paral21(i). 
See M , F & I (n 38) 283-284, para 8.179. 
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the provision which do not involve every creditor other than the 
90S 
benefited creditor receiving a detriment. 
2.104 For example, if the debtor gives the Lender security in the nature of a 
right in rem which ranks in priority behind another secured creditor, 
this may well not be detrimental to the prior security holder, but it is 
detrimental to creditors generally. Likewise, if there are sufficient 
assets to pay preferential creditors in full, a voidable payment or 
security given to one creditor may not have a detrimental effect on 
preferential creditors but will again be detrimental to the general body 
of creditors.206 
Exceptions to the Lex Concursus 
2.105 Articles 5-15 of the EIR establish a series of exceptions to the 
application of the lex concursus and there is a twofold reason for their 
existence. Firstly, they enable the preservation of rights or interests of 
the Lender which are specially protected by the laws of Member States 
from the uncertainties or inconsistencies in policy that may result from 
the application of a foreign lex concursus201 Secondly, they respond to 
the need to reduce the overall complexity of the insolvency 
i - 208 
proceedings. 
205/fe/.,284,para8.180. 
206
 Ibid. 
207
 See V & G (n 2) 89, para 135. 
208
 Recital 1 lof the EIR acknowledges the fact that as a result of widely differing substantive 
law it is not practical to introduce insolvency proceedings with universal scope in the entire 
Community. Without exceptions to the lex concursus difficulties would arise, for example, in 
relation the widely differing laws on security interests in the Community. 
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2.106 The application solely of the lex concursus, without exception, may 
affect the legal framework for secured lending and cause instability209 
resulting in an increase in the domestic cost of finance or extra costs in 
910 
commercial dealings in other States Furthermore the value of a 
security right may be seriously impaired if foreign proceedings intrude 
upon such local security rights even when the lex situs does not permit 
such a result. A simple transfer of the debtor's COMI to a different 
911 
State can cause a radical change in the secured party's position. 
2.107 The extent to which such extensive exceptions to the controlling effect 
of the lex concur sus have proved necessary under certain circumstances 
of diversity, even among the laws of the Member States, demonstrates 
the need for extreme caution when attempting to take future steps in 
designing a scheme of choice of law rules for application on a wider 
global canvas. One commentator contends that it would be "politically 
naive" to assume that Sovereign States would be willing, at any time in 
the future, to abandon all possibility of maintaining the benefits of 
localized rules under which creditors may have based their expectations 
in dealing with a debtor, by relinquishing complete and supreme control 
to the provisions of some foreign insolvency law under which the 
919 
debtor's global estate comes to be administered. 
2.108 Recital 25 emphasizes the particular need for an exception in relation to 
rights in rem in the EIR as such rights 'are of considerable importance 
for the granting of credit' and because the laws on security interests, 
and in particular on the creation, validity and scope of security interests, 
91^ 
differ widely across Member States. Article 5 therefore provides that 
209
 There are areas of the law that function to ensure legal certainty as to the holder of a right 
over an asset (hence the rules regarding property registers) or to provide certainty and liquidity 
to their exchange (hence the rules regarding securities markets). These functions require the 
legal regime to be both stable and uniform without unpredictability. 
210
 The application of the law under which the security right in question was created is 
generally less costly to inform oneself about and more difficult for the debtor to manipulate ex 
post than the application of his centre of main interest. 
211
 See V & G (n 2) 89-90, para 135. 
212
 IF Fletcher, 'Challenge and Opportunity: the ALWII Global Principles Project, INSOL 
International Academics' Group, Cape Town Conference', 17-18 March 2007, 9. The 
abandonment of the Phase I drafts is a clear indication of this. 
213
 Recital 11. 
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rights in rem shall not be affected by the effects of the insolvency 
proceedings under this law and was clearly intended to reinforce the 
position of a secured creditor who needs to enforce his security against 
collateral located in a Member State or States other than the one in 
which insolvency proceedings were opened. 
Article 5: Third parties' rights in rem 
2.109 When it comes to relying on Article 5, the Lender needs to be clear 
about what is included in the definition of the term "rights in rem". 
Rights in rem provide the Lender with an efficient instrument for 
reducing or eliminating the risk of the insolvency of the debtor and 
fulfils an important function by promoting the availability of low-cost 
914 
credit both in personal and business financing. In practice, the 'right 
in rem' "enables the secured party to have direct recourse to the 
collateral in the event that the debtor does not pay or perform, and 
91 S 
especially where this occurs due to the debtor's insolvency." For this 
to be achieved, it is important that, i f the law of the situs of the 
collateral recognizes the right in rem as valid, then all relevant 
jurisdictions also recognize the right in rem's enforceability and 
validity especially in the event of the debtor's insolvency.216 
2.110 In a cross-border case the location of the collateral, either at the time of 
the opening of proceedings or at some other material time, may be in a 
different state from that in which insolvency proceedings are opened. 
Due to variations between national laws concerning real security and 
the impact of insolvency upon such arrangements, there is a possibility 
that different conclusions as to the Lender's rights may be reached 
214See V & G (n 2) 92, para 139. See also Virgos-Schmit (n 42) para 97: rights in rem are 
important with regard to credit and the mobilization of wealth because they safeguard their 
holders against the risk of insolvency of the debtor and the interference of third parties; and 
allow credit to be obtained under conditions that would not be possible without this type of 
guarantee. 
215Fletcher (n 36) 7.087 
216
 See M , F & I (n 38) 60, para 4.11 which refers to the content of Recital 25 to the Regulation 
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under the lex concursus and the lex situs. It is submitted that this 
uncertainty has severe consequences in relation to the stability and costs 
917 
of transactions involved in a cross-border case. The Lender will be 
concerned with the extent to which, even if the right in rem is 
recognized, its enforcement or realization may be affected in some way 
O 1 o 
which might cause its economic value to deteriorate. 
2.111 In accordance with the policy followed by the draftsmen of the former 
Convention text of 1995, the EIR does not impose its own definition of 
a right in rem as this may have an impact on the classification of assets 
resulting in conflict with the approach followed by the law of the 
91 Q 
situs. Although the interpretation of a 'right in rem' is generally a 
matter to be determined by national law, it appears, from the general 
scheme of the EIR, that an "unreasonably wide" definition of rights in 
rem should not be adopted since the effect of this would be to majorly 
disrupt the fundamental principle behind the EIR (that the main 
insolvency proceedings have universal scope). It is submitted that, in 
these circumstances, it is probable that 'rights in rem' are to be 
construed narrowly.220 
2.112 To clarify the meaning of "rights in rem", in the context of how Article 
991 
5 applies, three ideas are taken into account. These ideas rule out 
Article 5 being any of the following: a rule which attributes new rights; 
a "blank cheque" rule of recognition; and a rule that confers more 
powers upon the holder of a right in rem than those he would have 
according to non-insolvency law. Article 5 is a rule of recognition of 
999 99^ 
rights; it only recognises authentic rights in rem; and does not 
217
 See M , F & I (n 38) 60-61, para 4.11. 
218e.g. through the application of a comprehensive stay and moratorium during a reorganization 
procedure. See M , F & I (n 38) 60-61, para 4.11. 
219
 The intention behind this is the necessity not to impose a definition of a right in rem due to 
the risk of describing as rights in rem legal positions which the lex sitae (where the assets are 
located) does not consider to be rights in rem, or of not encompassing rights in rem which do 
not fulfill the conditions of that definition. Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 100. See also A . l l -
A.22 and M , F & I (n 38) 64, para 4.17. 
220
 See M , F & I (n 38) 287, para 8.189. 
221
 See V & G (n 2) 94 -100, paras 144 - 157. 
222
 A right in rem is created according to the national law where the asset is located and 
attributes of this right are determined by that national law. It will be the lex situs which tells 
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confer more powers on the holder of a right in rem than those he would 
enjoy in a non-insolvency situation.224 
2.113 Article 5 only protects pre-existing rights which were created before the 
99S 
insolvency proceedings were opened. Therefore the precedence 
enjoyed by proprietary over personal and contractual claims under 
general law is replicated under the regime of insolvency law, with the 
consequence that security rights and other rights in rem which have 
been created prior to the commencement of insolvency remain intact, 
and are permitted to accomplish their intended purpose of insulating the 
Lender from full exposure to risk of loss in the event of the debtor's 
default. Conversely creditors who have not succeeded in perfecting 
their right to be treated as secured under the law of the lex situs before 
the time of the opening of proceedings in another member state are 
subject to the effects of the lex concursus in accordance with the basic 
principle of Article 4.226 One of the issues that arises, however, is 
whether the Lender needs to meet the onerous requirement of perfecting 
or registering any security over the asset in question in the jurisdiction 
997 
in which the asset is situated according to Article 2(g). It is argued 
that this would result in rigorous due diligence requirements such as the 
necessity of perfecting the security in accordance with both where it is 
one whether or not the holder has a right in rem and the scope thereof. Only if the holder has a 
right in rem under the lex sitae applicable will his position be protected by Article 5 in the 
event of insolvency. 
223
 Article 5 only covers rights in rem in the strict sense of the concept. Member States are free 
to determine according to their own laws when a right is a right in rem however the EIR 
determines the limits within which Member States may have recourse to that concept for the 
purposes of Article 5. This is deduced from Article 5(2) and Virgos-Schmit (n 42), paral03. 
224
 Article 5 respects the separate right of enforcement which the holder of a right in rem may 
have over the asset affected but does not alter the regime of priorities which governs this right 
outside the insolvency. The law governing the right in rem (i.e the security interest) will 
determine the priorities of payment between the secured creditor and any preferential creditors; 
if there are liens or privileges which have precedence over the security right in non-insolvency 
situations, they continue to apply in normal terms. See V & G (n 2) 98 - 99, para 154. 
225
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 96. 
226
 For instance, creditors who have commenced such processes as distress or execution which 
are incomplete at the time of the opening of insolvency. See Insolvency Act 1986, ss 130(2), 
183, 184, 346 & 347. See M , F & I (n 38) 64, para 4.17. 
'"Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 93) 8. 
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located on traditional conflict of law principles as well as on the basis 
99R 
of the definitions in Article 2(g). 
2.114 Overall the practical effect of Article 5(1) is that although the law of 
state of the opening of main proceedings may claim local assets as part 
of the debtor's estate in those proceedings, the rights in rem of any third 
parties in relation to those assets are preserved in accordance with local 
99Q 
law. Therefore the holder of a security right can enforce that security 
over the debtor's local assets (in accordance with local law) regardless 
of whether or not the law governing the main insolvency proceedings 
permits this. However, because the local assets themselves (as opposed 
to the rights in rem over them) remain subject to the universal scope of 
the main proceedings, then any surplus remaining after the exercise of 
rights in rem will be subject to the law and scope of the main 
9^0 
proceedings. It is submitted that protection given to rights in rem is 
9-11 
not limited to the mere 'opening' of insolvency proceedings. In 
addition, Article 5(1) does not prevent secondary proceedings being 
commenced in respect of local assets which may prevent the 
enforcement of rights in rem over local assets (according to the local 
9^9 
law applicable to secondary proceedings). 
2.115 It is argued that, in theory, three solutions may be provided to the 
insolvency treatment of rights in rem in respect of assets belonging to 
the debtor, which are situated in the territory of a State other than the 
lex concursus. It is clear, however, that only one of the solutions, 
228
 Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 93) 8. 
229
 Although the lex concursus stipulates that all assets are part of the estate, the holder of the 
right in rem retains all his rights in respect of the assets in question. He can exercise the right 
to separate the security from the estate or to realize the asset individually to satisfy the claim. 
Even if in possession of the asset, the liquidator needs the consent of the holder of the right in 
rem before he can make a decision on the asset. See Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 95. 
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 See M , F & I (n 38) 286-287, paras 8.187-8.189 
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 This contention is supported by two examples. The lex concursus may decide that, 
following a bankruptcy made by the court, there is an automatic stay against all creditor 
actions, as well as secured creditors, which therefore brings it within the scope of Article 5(1). 
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submitted to the general body of creditors, the court may order a temporary stay of 
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undue hardship to the secured creditor. See P Smart, 'Rights in Rem, Article 5 and the EC 
Insolvency Regulation: An English Perspective', Int. Insolv. Rev, Vol. 15: 17-55 (2006) 23. 
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reflected in Article 5, addresses the issue by establishing a rule of non-
alteration of the rights in rem of creditors or third parties in respect of 
those assets. Two of the solutions clearly do not suffice to address the 
problem Article 5 aims to address for a number of reasons. One of the 
solutions would be to maintain the principle of universality in its 
strictest terms and subject the treatment of these rights in rem in 
insolvency to the lex concursus. The difficulty that arises is that the 
application of the lex concursus may result in gaps in protection which 
does not fully accord with the security function that these rights are 
required to provide according to their national applicable law. This will 
occur, for example, when the lex concursus imposes restrictions on the 
enforcement of rights in rem or gives priority over the collateral to the 
claims of another party which do not exist in the lex situs. The second 
solution would be to let the lex sitae which governs the right in rem also 
determine the treatment thereof in the event of the insolvency of the 
debtor. This means that the lex situs would determine not only the 
creation of the right in rem and general validity but also its 
effectiveness in the case of the opening of insolvency proceedings. The 
problem is that this alternative may have a greater impact on the 
administrative costs of the proceedings. This is because of the 
complexity arising from the fact that the effects of the same insolvency 
proceedings would be governed by different national laws of the 
countries where the debtor's assets are located. 
2.116 Article 5(1) does not apply where the assets are situated in a state that is 
not a Member State under the EIR. In such cases the lex concursus, 
including its rules of private international law, will primarily determine 
the rights of any parties which fall under the jurisdiction of the lex 
concursus. According to standard conflict of laws principles, the lex 
situs may be consulted to determine the validity of the security interest 
as at the time of its creation and also for assessing the effects of the 
insolvency proceedings on the rights of the secured party. The rights 
See V & G (n 2) 92-93, paral41. 
See Chapter One regarding the lex situs determining the validity of the security interest. 
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of any parties that are not so subject to the authority of the lex 
concursus will in practice be determined by the extent to which the lex 
situs is prepared to recognize and give effect to the foreign insolvency 
proceedings. If the rights of the Lender are held to prevail over the 
claims of the liquidator appointed in the foreign proceedings, the 
Lender may be able to retain the full extent of the security rights 
previously bargained for unless it proves necessary to participate in the 
insolvency process in respect of any unsecured balance of claim. In 
these circumstances the duty to account for the assets or collateral 
obtained through enforcement of security will arise in accordance with 
the principle of 'hotch pot'. 
2.117 The relevant time at which the location of an asset is to be determined 
according to the terms of Article 5(1) is the opening of insolvency 
proceedings. One of the problems that arises is if an asset is movable in 
nature and its location has changed between the time at which the right 
in rem was created and the time when proceedings are opened. This 
means that the Lender may not be fully secured if the asset happens to 
be located at the relevant time in a jurisdiction whose law does not give 
protection to the security interest in question. Conversely the relocation 
of a movable asset will be a cause for concern for unsecured parties if 
the asset has been removed from the territory over which the lex 
concursus is applicable with the consequence that the rights of the 
secured creditor may be less susceptible to impeachment than they 
would otherwise have been. However Article 5(4) ensures that the 
actions for avoidance of antecedent transactions that form part of the 
lex concursus are still applicable. 
2.118 Overall, the Lender when taking security over movable property on the 
basis that the law of its current situs gives satisfactory protection in the 
event of the debtor's insolvency, must consider the possibility that the 
asset may be moved to another Member State, or to some non-Member 
State, and thereby become subject to a different legal regime at the 
Article 20 of the EIR. Also See M , F & I (n 38) 63, para 4.16. 
See M , F & I (n 38) 62, para 4.15. 
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relevant time. To minimize the consequent risks of such relocation the 
Lender will have to, if possible, structure the terms of the transaction in 
such a way and place restrictions on certain asset classes insofar as 
9^7 
practicable. However it should be noted how widely the terms of 
Article 5(1) are drawn in relation to the types of assets to which it can 
have application. Al l types of property are capable of being affected 
including commercially important items like book debts and other 
receivables and assets that are of a future character at the time the 
security interest is created but which have come into existence by the 
time the insolvency proceedings are opened. 
9^Q 
2.119 However in the case of an intangible asset, there may also be 
difficulties in determining the lex situs of the assets for the purposes of 
determining whether or not it is located in the Member State in which 
the insolvency proceedings have been commenced240or whether the 
asset is located in another Member State. The EIR does not set out 
which court should determine this issue but Article 2(g) gives limited 
assistance in this respect by defining where certain assets are located 
for the purposes of Article 5. 
2.120 A cursory glance at the wording of Article 5(1) reveals a number of 
relevant points. Of particular relevance in the English law context, the 
expression 'both specific assets and collections of indefinite assets as a 
941 
whole which change from time to time' makes it clear that the 
floating charge is included as a right in rem. Once the Lender complies 
with all perfection requirements in accordance with the applicable law, 
the security interest is brought into being and may be described as 
949 
"present security". 
237
 Ibid. 
238
 M , F & I (n 38) para 4.13. 
239
 e.g. interest in a bank account or a contractual claim. 
240
 In which case Article 5 would not apply to the security interests. 
241
 This particular wording was not contained in the text of the 1995 Convention, but the issue 
is addressed in Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 104 which states "security rights such as the 
'floating charge' recognized in United Kingdom and Irish law can, therefore, be characterized 
as a right in rem for the purposes of the Convention". 
242
 Article 5's wording assumes that there are assets at the time of the opening of proceedings. 
The contrast between existing and future assets may create problems. It is argued that: 
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2.121 Under a floating charge, the security right is attached, in the first 
instance, to a shifting fund of assets, even though it is only in the end 
that it crystallizes and fastens on specific assets. No new security 
interest is created by crystallization. One view is that the nature of a 
floating charge leaves no room for arguing that there is only a right in 
rem upon cystallization (although it is likely that a properly drafted 
floating charge will have crystallized before the opening of insolvency 
proceedings). In contrast, it has been argued that the position of 
whether a floating charge can be recognized as a right in rem before 
crystallization has occurred remains doubtful until there is a 
preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice under Article 267 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The writer 
favours Smart's view as there is little doubt that the holder of a floating 
charge has an equitable interest in the assets within the scope of the 
charge from the moment when the assets fall within the terms of the 
charge. A purposive reading of Article 5 suggests that the inclusion 
"in principle, present property is considered to include potential property (property not yet in 
existence but growing out of property which is in existence). This concept of potential 
property applies to both tangibles (growing crops on a piece of land) and intangibles (the right 
to receive sums payable in the future under existing contracts)." 
This distinction emphasizes important thing about this distinction that the grant of security 
over the potential property will be considered as a present assignment of existing property. For 
further detail on this see V & G (n 2)101, para 157. 
243
 Smart argues that the reference in Article 5(1) to collections of indefinite assets changing 
'from time to time' (wording specifically introduced with a floating charge in mind) would 
make little sense if a right in rem only arose upon crystallization. The right in rem must exist 
at the time relevant insolvency proceedings are opened as rights coming into existence only 
after the opening of insolvency proceedings will not fall within Article 5(1) and will be 
governed by the general rule of Article 4. See Smart (n 231) 21. 
244
 (Formerly Article 234 of the European Union Treaty) Buetter submits that it is difficult to 
see how a floating charge can, before crystallization, be a right in rem according to the criteria 
set out in Virgos-Schmit (n 42) para 103 which describes the features of a right thus: 'it has a 
direct immediate relationship with the asset it covers; ... .its creation involves an absolute 
alienation to the acquirer of the right, which enables the holder to resist the alienation of the 
asset to which it relates to a third party; and to resist individual enforcement by third parties'. 
A floating charge does not have these properties before crystallization occurs and it is difficult 
to accept that it creates a 'direct and immediate relationship' with the asset it covers. It is of 
the essence of a floating charge that it does not, of itself, prevent the alienation of those assets 
to third parties. See Michael Buetter, 'Cross-Border Insolvency under English and German 
Law', (2002), Oxford University Comparative Law Forum: 
<http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/buetter.shtml> , 41-42. 
245
 See RC Nolan, 'Property in a Fund', (2004) (120) L Q R 108. Nolan defines a floating 
charge as a charge over a fund of assets, in a sense that the chargee has an immediate security 
interest in identified assets owned by the charger and in addition will almost invariably have 
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of the wording "collections of indefinite assets as a whole which 
change from time to time" was specifically included to protect the 
floating charge. 
2.122 There are a few issues regarding Article 5 that need further 
clarification. One question relates to the word "affect". One analysis is 
that a stay on the enforcement of security does not "affect", or derogate 
from the underlying security interest, it just postpones the right of 
enforcement for a certain period of time. Although there is no case law 
on this issue yet, it would be reasonable to presume that Article 5 will 
protect security over assets in another Member State from any 
moratorium which may arise following insolvency proceedings but 
until this issue has been decided by the courts, the position remains 
uncertain.246 
2.123 The question also arises as to whether a liquidator can simply 'pay off 
the Lender, thereby gaining control of the charged asset. Can it be 
argued that this action would 'affect' the right in rem and run contrary 
to Article 5(1)? In certain jurisdictions the domestic insolvency 
legislation may provide the liquidator with the power to pay an 
equivalent amount representing the fair market value of the asset that is 
947 
subject to the right in rem. Wessels submits that a literal reading of 
Article 5 allows the Lender to maximize his rights, but one could argue 
that the equivalent payment provision does not materially 'affect' the 
rights in rem of the holder. Virgos-Schmit states that if the value of 
security exceeds the value of the claim guaranteed by the right in rem 
then the creditor will be obliged to surrender to the estate any surplus of 
the proceeds of sale. The liquidator can also decide on the immediate 
payment of the claim guaranteed (without affecting the economic value 
security in identifiable future assets if and when acquired by the charger. He refers to the case 
of Evans v Rival Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB979 at 999 and the well known dictum of 
Buckley LJ. 
246
 G Stewart & J Marshall, Overview of the EIR, Allen & Overy LLP, para 77. Sweet & 
Maxwell, (September 2006) 
247
 e.g. in the Netherlands the liquidator has a 'lossingsrecht', a power to release. See M , F & I 
(n 38) 288, para 8.193. 
248
 See M , F & I (n 38) 288, para 8.193. 
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of the right or its immediate realizability) and avoid the loss in value 
that certain assets could suffer when they are realized separately.249 It is 
submitted that it is not clear whether the liquidator can decide to make a 
payment in all situations or only those where the value of the security 
9S0 
exceeds the debt owed to the Lender. 
2.124 There is a crucial distinction that needs to be drawn between the fully-
9S1 9S9 
secured creditor and the under-secured creditor. In the case of the 
former, the creditor's rights in rem will not be 'affected' where the 
liquidator proposes to pay the creditor off in full and at once however 
the situation may be quite different where the creditor is under-secured. 
Immediately paying the secured creditor the current value of the 
collateral (the current value of the charged property) which is less than 
the debt may affect his rights in rem. Depending upon the particular 
rights given under the charge, Article 5 may tie the hands of the 
liquidator when dealing with an under-secured creditor who is 
unwilling to accept immediate payment of the current value of the 
collateral.253 
2.125 One of the key considerations for the Lender is whether the protection 
granted by Article 5 extends to the secured debt as well as the security 
interest per se. The commencement of insolvency proceedings in a 
number of Member States can subsequently result in a compromise or 
discharge of claims (including secured claims) depending on whether a 
9S4 
sufficient majority of creditors vote in favour of the compromise. If, 
for example, the Lender's claim is reduced (by 10% or even 99%) as a 
result of a main insolvency proceeding, the question arises as to 
whether the Lender can rely on Article 5 to enforce its security over 
assets in another Member State in respect of the full amount of its 
249 
250 
Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 99. 
Smart (n 231) 26. 
251
 As an example, if the secured creditor is owed £100,000 and the charged property is 
estimated at least that amount. 
252
 As an example, if the debt is £100,000 but the current value of the collateral is at best 
estimate only £85,000. 
253
 Smart (n 231) 26-27. 
Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 93), Question 17. 
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(original) secured claim or whether the security interest would only 
stand as security for the reduced claim. 
2.126 Article 25 of the EIR provides that compositions approved by the court 
commencing main insolvency proceedings are to be recognized in all 
other Member States without further formalities. The question is 
whether Article 5 provides an exception to such recognition where 
secured assets are located in a Member State other than the State of 
opening. There is no case law yet on this issue and one view256 is that it 
would be a major inroad into the Lender's rights if Article 5 failed to 
protect the secured debt as well as the Lender's rights to enforce its 
security in respect of that debt. This important aspect of Article 5 is not 
clarified however the writer agrees that it would make little sense if 
Article 25 could be utilized to render an effect that erodes the protection 
given by Article 5. 
2.127 This contrasts with the observation made by commentators regarding 
the extent to which Article 5 safeguards holders of rights in rem. An 
alternative view is that, when compared with the national laws 
concerned, Article 5 may give a stronger level of protection against the 
insolvency of a debtor than that which national laws demand. In this 
sense the rule may "overprotect" the Lender. The EIR does not impose 
insolvency limits on the right in rem even though both the lex 
concursus and lex sitae do. The justification behind this 'over 
protection' relates to the need for simplification of the administration of 
insolvency proceedings. 
2.128 Article 5 refers to "rights in rem of creditors or third parties in respect 
of ....assets ...belonging to the debtor." The issue arises of how the 
phrase 'belonging to' should be interpreted. Does Article 5 include 
assets of which the debtor has 'economic ownership' and which (for the 
purposes of insolvency law) are regarded as belonging to his estate or 
255
 As compromised through the main insolvency proceeding. 
256
 Stewart & Marshall (n 246) 82. 
257See V & G (n 2) 105, para 164. 
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does it solely refer to rights in assets of which the debtor is a legal 
owner?258 
2.129 Veder submits that the importance of the issue depends on the 
applicability of Article 5 to forms of security ownership where, 
according to the applicable national property law, the debtor has an 
'economic interest' in the asset but is not the legal owner. Examples of 
the latter are financial lease contracts and transfer of ownership by way 
of security. A broad interpretation of Article 5 is necessary so it is 
understood to include any proprietary right in assets, regardless of the 
question of whether or not they form part of the debtor's estate under 
the lex concursus. Therefore the special regime created in Article 5, for 
proprietary rights with respect to assets 'belonging to' the debtor, is not 
limited to situations where the debtor is the legal owner of the asset. 
Consistent with the policy considerations of Article 5, ownership that 
serves as security for credit extended by the creditor, is also protected 
under Article 5. Therefore the implication is that title-based quasi -
security is also protected by Article 5 with the exception of the seller's 
rights based on a reservation of title.260 
2.130 Overall, some commentators refer to Article 5 as a rule of 'relative 
immunity', as it does not prevent the opening of secondary proceedings 
in the State where the asset is located provided that the debtor has an 
establishment there.261 In such a case, the liquidator in the main 
proceedings can request the opening of secondary proceedings. If the 
law applicable to these proceedings enables the said rights to be 
affected then the liquidator of the main proceedings can take advantage 
of this possibility.262 If the debtor does not have an establishment in the 
258
 Veder (n 31) 337. 
259Ibid.337. 
260
 See Article 7 of the EIR. 
261
 See V & G (n 2) 93, para 142. 
262
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 98. 
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State where the assets are situated, then Article 5 operates as a rule of 
absolute immunity.263 
2.131 Article 5(2) provides a list of types of rights that are normally 
considered by national laws as rights in rem. This list is drawn up with 
two main considerations. The first, that a right which exists only after 
insolvency proceedings have been opened, but not before, is not a right 
in rem for the purposes of Article 5 (which protect pre-existing rights). 
The second, that a right in rem has two characteristics: 
(a) its direct and immediate relationship with the asset it covers 
which is not dependent on the asset belonging to a person's 
estate or to the relationship between the holder of the right 
in rem and another person. 
(a) The right absolutely belongs to the holder. This means that 
the holder can enforce the right in rem against anyone who 
breaches or harms his right without his consent (e.g. such 
rights are typically protected by actions to recover); that the 
right can resist the transfer of ownership of the asset to a 
third party ( it has the restrictions characteristic of the 
protection of the bona fide purchaser); and that the right can 
thus resist individual enforcement by third parties and in 
collective insolvency proceedings (by its separation or 
individual satisfaction).264 
2.132 Virgos-Schmit265 specifically states that security rights such as the 
'floating charge' can be characterized as a right in rem for the purposes 
of the Convention and hence the EIR. Article 5(1) also includes rights 
characterized under national law as rights in rem over intangible assets 
or over rights also included provided that that location of the assets is 
non-fraudulent. 
This relates to the observation earlier regarding the possible "overprotection" to the holders 
of rights in rem. 
264
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), paral03. 
265/fe/.paral04. 
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2.133 The general rules governing actions for voidness, voidability or 
unenforceability (Articles 4(2)(m) and Article 13) apply where the 
establishment of a right in rem in favour of a particular creditor could 
be an act detrimental to all the creditors.266 
2.134 Article 5(3), directly and independently of national law, considers as a 
right in rem any right entered in a public register and enforceable 
against third parties, allowing a right in rem to be obtained. The 
rationale of Article 5 imposes certain limits to the national qualification 
of a right in rem. One needs to note that Article 5 represents an 
important exception regarding the application of the lex concursus and 
the universal effect of the main proceedings. It is also important to 
remember that secondary proceedings are only possible if the debtor 
has an establishment in that Member State. The mere presence of 
assets is not enough in order to open such proceedings.267 
2.135 Article 5, as intended, does not give an unreasonably wide interpretation 
of the national concept of a right in rem. For instance they do not 
include rights simply reinforced by a right to claim preferential 
payment, as is the case for a certain number of privileges 
Article 6: Set off 
2.136 Article 6 states that the opening of insolvency proceedings shall not 
affect the right of creditors to demand the set off of their claim against 
the claims of the debtor, where such set off is permitted by the law 
applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim. The availability of set off is 
important from the Lender's perspective as it reduces transaction costs 
and communication expenses especially in situations where there are 
loans and deposits in multiple accounts with the same bank. 
Ibid, para 106. 
Ibid, para 102. 
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2.137 Basically, Article 6 provides that the opening of insolvency proceedings 
does not affect a creditor's rights of set-off where they are permitted 
under the law applicable to the debtor's claim. Therefore such rights 
remain effective regardless of whether or not the law of the insolvency 
proceedings permits set-off in those proceedings.269 This is a very 
significant exception to the general rule set out in Article 4(2)(d) 270 
2.138 When determining whether set off is available the first step for the 
Lender, in relation to calculating the consequences of the other party's 
insolvency in a security transaction, must determine which Member 
State will potentially become the forum for main bankruptcy 
proceedings, or for any secondary proceedings involving the other party 
971 
as the insolvent debtor. 
2.139 Article 6 is therefore fully consistent with interpretative guidance 
979 
supplied by Recital 26 of the EIR which states " i f a set-off is not 
permitted under the law of the opening State, a creditor should 
nevertheless be entitled to the set-off i f it is possible under the law 
applicable to the claim of the insolvent debtor. In this way, set-off will 
acquire a kind of guarantee function based on the legal provisions on 
which the Lender concerned can rely at the time when the claim arises". 
2.140 By including two claims which offset each other, the question arises 
whether the right to set off should stem from: the cumulative 
application of laws applicable to the two claims; or the law applicable 
to the debtor's claim ('passive' claim in the set-off) against which the 
268
 Also see Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 107. 
269
 One should however note that Article 6(2) allows Article 4(2)(m) to apply with regard to 
cases where an exception is provided under Article 6(1). Consequently, the avoidance rules of 
the lex concursus still apply to any challenges regarding the validity or enforceability of any 
claim to which the principles of set-off may otherwise apply under Article 6(1). See M , F & I 
(n 38) 66, para 4.26. 
270
 See Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 109: If the lex concursus does not allow for set-off (e.g. 
since it requires both claims to be liquidated, matured and payable to a certain date), then 
Article 6 constitutes an exception to the general application of the law in that respect, by 
permitting the set-off according to the conditions established for insolvency set-off by the law 
applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim. 
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 See M , F & I (n 38) 66, para 4.23. 
272
 This is closely modelled upon statements contained in Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 109. 
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creditor intends to set off his counter-claim against the debtor ('active' 
97^ 
claim in the set-off). The EIR prefers the second interpretation. 
2.141 By following this approach whereby the policy of the lex concursus is 
displaced by that of the law of the passive claim, the authors of the EIR 
were applying the doctrine which scholars of the modern era seem to 
consider the better rule of decision for international cases. The 
"traditional approach", as favoured by a number of commentators 
formerly, necessitated the cumulative application of both the laws 
governing the active and the passive claim respectively, denying set-off 
974 
unless both laws agreed in allowing it to operate. 
2.142 Conversely, modern analysis, on the other hand, has placed a larger 
emphasis on the need to protect legitimate and reasonable expectations, 
and therefore on the need for a stable rule that allows the Lender to rely 
upon the provisions of a single system of law whose provisions are 
applicable in the context of his incurring an obligation towards the 
party who is subsequently the subject of insolvency proceedings. 
Modern scholars appear to agree that such stability and predictability is 
best achieved by the through the application of the rule contained in the 
97S 
law applicable to the passive claim. 
2.143 The combined effect of Article 4(2)(d) and Article 6 is that a creditor 
may be able to take advantage of the rights of set-off whether this is 
permitted under the law of the lex concursus (pursuant to Article 
4(2)(d)) or whether this is permitted under the law applicable to the 
debtor's claim (pursuant to Article 6). It is significant that both the 
contract law and insolvency law which has to permit rights of set-off is 
the law applicable to the debtor's claim and not the creditor's claim.276 
273
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 108. Article 6(1) provides that the creditor shall not be deprived 
of the right to demand the set-off of his claims against the debtor "where such a set-off is 
permitted by the law applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim'. This phrase is intended to 
denote 'the law applicable to the claim where the insolvent debtor is the creditor in relation to 
the other party'. See M , F & I (n 38) 57, para 4.24. 
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 Fletcher (n 212) 13. 
275
 This is the approach that would be followed today under English rules of private 
international law. See Fletcher (n 212) 13. 
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 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 108 & See M , F & I (n 38) 289, paras 8.199-8.200. 
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2.144 The laws of Member States vary contrastingly over the operation of 
set-off in the event of a debtor's insolvency. In the United Kingdom, 
set-off is regarded as a mandatory process which has to be applied, as a 
matter of public policy, in both individual and corporate 
977 
insolvencies. However in most civil law systems, the superseding 
view is that insolvency set-off constitutes a violation of pari passu 
distribution and that, as a matter of public policy, it must be restricted 
to very limited circumstances. Consequently, in a cross-border 
insolvency, the outcome for any creditor who is also a debtor to the 
estate can be significantly influenced by how the issue of the applicable 
law is resolved, if the competing laws happen to portray varying 
97R 
schools of opinion regarding set-off. The necessity for clear and 
97Q 
uniformly applicable choice of law rules is emphasized in cases 
concerning major commercial operations where large sums of money 
are involved. In the assessment of risk, the ability to determine the 
applicable law and fully investigate its provisions regarding set-off is 
especially important.280 
2.145 One of the issues that arises is how Article 6(1) relates to Article 6(2). 
Article 6(1) stipulates that the opening of insolvency proceedings shall 
not affect the rights of creditors to set-off and Article 6(2) creates a 
carve out for actions in relation to voidness, voidability or 
unenforceability. Set-off is mandatory in the U K if the necessary 
requirements are satisfied. However, in many of the civil law systems, 
insolvency laws do not allow set-off because it is construed as an 
improper preference of a particular creditor which is contrary to the 
avoidance provisions. The question arises whether Article 6(2) should 
be interpreted in this way, or does it just signify that the liquidator in 
277
 See Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243 ; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Frid [2004] 2 
A C 506 (HL). 
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 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213 illustrates this 
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 Fletcher contends that the need for this is emphasized by the fact that, despite the enormous 
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interests" an "establishment". See Fletcher (n 212) 8. 
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the insolvency proceedings can challenge the entering into of the 
transaction which gives rise to the right of set-off but not the exercise of 
the set-off right itself?281 
2.146 One issue that needs to be considered is the difference between 
contractual and equitable rights of set-off and the insolvency mandatory 
set off scheme contained in Rule 4.90 Insolvency Rules 1986 SI 
1986/1925. The effect of Rule 4.90, operating in the UK, is that a valid 
set-off is treated as a notional payment at the date of the liquidation. 
Administration set-off has been introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 
and is governed by Insolvency Rule 2.85. 
2.147 It would be to the Lender's advantage if it can be established that the 
law applicable to the debtor's claim against him is Rule 4.90. However 
Article 6 makes it both possible and important for the Lender, if he is 
likely to benefit from a set-off, to try and ensure that the debtor's claim 
against him is governed by a law which permits the widest possible 
rights of set-off. For instance, if an English lender lends money to a 
borrower who has his COMI in France, in a French main insolvency 
proceeding there would be significantly narrower rights of set-off than 
in English law. If the parties are in a position to choose the law by 
which the transactions are governed they may see it as expedient to 
ensure that a clear, express choice is made in favour of the law of the 
country whose rule concerning set-off is most suited to their 
requirements. For instance, it would be in the English lender's best 
interests to insist that any dealing which may give rise to claim against 
him by the debtor be governed by English law. In this case the creditor 
can, due to Article 6, rely on the wider rights of set-off permitted by 
English law.284 
Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 93), Question 16. 
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 For operation of r 2.85 see Re Kaupthing Singer v Friedland (in administration) [2010] 
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 See M , F & I (n 38) 290, para 8.205. 
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2.148 Generally, in identifying the national law that applies to the debtor's 
claim the normal rules of private international law apply including, in 
particular, Rome I. The possibility of contractual obligations is 
accepted by the express provision in Article 2 of Rome I which declares 
that "any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or 
not it is the law of a Member State". Furthermore Article 3 of Rome I 
gives effect to such a choice, which can be made with respect to the 
whole or to a particular part of the contract. As Rome I is directly 
applicable in all Member States, the literal and natural meaning of 
the expression "the law applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim" in 
Article 6(1) of the EIR is that it means any law capable of being 
identified as the applicable law of the obligation in question according 
to the choice of law now standardized among E U Member States by 
Rome I.288 
2.149 Contractual set-off implies an agreement subject to its own applicable 
law. The same rationale on which Article 5 is based explains that in the 
event of a contractual set-off agreement covering different claims 
between two parties, the law of the Member State applicable to that 
agreement will continue to govern the set-off claims covered by the 
agreement and incurred prior to the opening of insolvency 
proceedings.289 
2.150 The application of Rome I has been discussed in Chapter One.290 
Although confined in its application to those states which are members 
of the European Union, it is based upon the principle that the governing 
law of any contract to which its provisions apply may be that of some 
third state, rather than being limited to the laws of the Member States 
285
 See 1.27-1.43. 
286
 See M , F & I (n 38) 57, Para 4.25. 
287
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themselves. Most importantly, Article 6 does not include any reference 
to the 'member states', or their respective laws, in creating the 
exception in favour of the rule of set-off that is operated by 'the law 
applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim'. Consequently, in this 
situation, the law of some third state could form the basis for allowing 
the Lender to have the benefit of set-off which would otherwise be 
excluded under the regime of the lex concursus. It is argued that this 
omission of any limiting words from the drafting of Article 6 as finally 
enacted should be construed as an indication that this provision is 
intended to allow a wider spectrum of laws to be applicable in order to 
respect parties' legitimate expectations as to the availability of set-off 
9Q1 
arising under their previously concluded, contractual agreements. 
2.151 When it comes to the interpretation of Article 6 it becomes apparent 
that the text is not especially clear. Questions arise such as: does the 
9Q9 
'law applicable' refer to the applicable law of a Member State?; and 
is the reference to 'law' the general (civil or common) law of one 
Member State or does 'law' also encompass that Member State's 
insolvency law? It is argued that through 'forum shopping', the 
engineering of financial transactions could raise the possibilities for set-
off, despite this being contrary to the rationale of the EIR.294 This 
emphasizes the need to avoid 'incentives for the parties to transfer 
assets or judicial proceedings from one member state to another, 
seeking to obtain a more favourable legal position' in order to allow the 
9QS 
proper functioning of the internal market. 
291 
292 
See M , F & I (n 38) 57,para 4.25 & 66-67, paras 4.24-4.25. 
This seems the most likely interpretation. 
293
 Justice Timo Esko argues (and the writer agrees) that 'law applicable' does include the 
Member State's insolvency law. When the EIR refers to the 'law' of a Member State, it is 
natural that 'law' includes all the rules applicable in an insolvency situation. See M , F & I (n 
38) 290, para 8.203. 
294
 See Recital 4. 
295
 The example put forward by Wessels in M,F & I (n 38) 290, para 8.202 focuses on the 
distinction between Dutch 'general civil law', for instance, and Dutch insolvency law when it 
comes to the application of set-off. Under the former a creditor cannot set off a claim which 
has not yet matured, since the payability of the claim is a necessary condition; under the latter 
maturity is not a precondition. Authors who support the view that 'law' applies to both 
ordinary civil and insolvency law believe that the creditor can indeed set off. However, 
whether or not set off can apply, depends greatly on the circumstances. For instance in France, 
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2.152 Generally it is considered that Article 6 covers only rights to set-off 
arising in relation to mutual claims incurred prior to the opening of the 
main insolvency proceedings. Pursuant to Article 4(2)(d) the right to 
set-off should be determined in accordance with the law of the relevant 
insolvency proceedings in relation to claims incurred after the opening 
of proceedings. However Article 9 of the EIR provides for a specific 
case of set-off, between the parties to a payment or settlement system or 
to a financial market, to be governed solely by the law of the Member 
State applicable to the system or market concerned.296 
2.153 In formulating a rule for application in proceedings opened anywhere 
globally, what may require further deliberation, is whether the reference 
to the law applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim, instead of the law 
governing the obligation under which the insolvent debtor has the role 
of debtor towards the other party, is the appropriate rule in principle, or 
whether it should be possible to invoke set-off if such a right is 
available under the law applicable to either claim, or (more 
restrictively) only if such a right can be shown to be available under the 
law or laws applicable to both claims (assuming neither claim to be 
governed by the lex concursus)291 
2.154 Another issue for consideration is whether international set-off should 
be available merely on proof that such entitlement arises under one or 
other of the laws by which the mutual cross-obligations are governed, 
or whether there should be an additional requirement that the party 
invoking set-off must demonstrate that such a right has formed part of 
the legitimate expectations arising in the context of the relationship 
between the creditor and the insolvent debtor, so as to have been part of 
by applying the 'double standard' of both French civil law and insolvency law, the creditor is 
not able to set off his claim, as French insolvency law provides quite stringent conditions. 
However, the application of French civil law alone would provide the creditor with a right to 
set-off as general French law has considerably wider criteria for set-off. 
296
 See M , F & I (n 38) 290-291, para 8.205. 
297
 Unless the lex concursus itself permits set-off, in which case the need to invoke the 
exception would not arise. See Fletcher (n 212) 13. 
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the calculation of risk during the process of becoming a creditor on the 
terms agreed.298 
2.155 Overall, it is argued that the rule supplied by Article 6 is in harmony 
with modern views of the appropriate way in which to resolve the 
issues of set-off in international cases, and reflects the practice that 
would be followed in many jurisdictions (including England) even 
where the EIR is not applicable to the case in question.299 However in 
devising a rule that would be accepted by a wider international 
community beyond the frontiers of the European Union or which may 
form a beneficial amendment to the EIR it is important to analyze the 
questions raised in Chapter Three.300 
Article 13: Detrimental acts 
2.156 The aim of Article 13 is to uphold legitimate expectations of creditors 
or third parties of the validity of the act in accordance to the normally 
applicable national law, against interference from a different lex 
concursus. . Regarding the protection of legitimate interests, the 
operation of Article 13 is justified in relation to acts carried out prior to 
the opening of insolvency proceedings, and threatened by either the 
retroactive nature of the insolvency proceedings opened in another 
country or actions to set aside previous acts of the debtor brought by the 
liquidator in those proceedings. The Lender's reliance on the validity 
of the national law that is applicable in non-insolvency situations is no 
298
 It should be noted that, generally, under cross-border insolvency law, all creditors can 
participate on equal footing. Any rule which provides an exception to the pari passu principle 
needs strong justification and should be prevented from applying as an "arbitrary device" 
without a consideration of the context under which parties have had dealings with the debtor. 
See Fletcher (n 212) 13. 
299See Fletcher (n 212) 14. 
300
 See Chapter Three generally and 3.49- 3.52 in relation to Article 6. 
301
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), paral38. Note, for instance, that an English lender will be expecting 
'English' security to be governed by lender friendly avoidance provisions such as ss 238-239 
ofthelA. 
302
 Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 138. 
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longer justified after the proceedings have been opened in a Member 
State. Al l unauthorized disposals by the debtor will be ineffective as he 
no longer has the power to dispose of the assets and such effect is 
recognized in all Member States. Article 13 does not protect against 
such an effect of the insolvency proceedings and it is not applicable to 
disposals occurring after the opening of insolvency proceedings. 
2.157 It is argued that Article 13 does not clarify the preliminary question as 
to which system of conflict of rules should be used in respect of the 
detrimental act. The following could apply or have an effect: the 
conflict-of-laws system of the court hearing the matter; the rules of 
Community or international law; as well as domestic rules of 
international private law applicable to the same matter.304 Therefore, 
the person who benefited from an act detrimental to all creditors is first 
required to prove that, pursuant to the conflict-of-laws system of the 
court called upon to adjudicate the case, the act to be set aside is 
governed by the law of a Member State other than the lex concursus 
As, in most cases, such act will be governed by a contract (subject to 
the applicable lex contractus). 
2.158 Secondly, the person benefiting from the detrimental act is required to 
give evidence to fulfill the condition under the second indent of Article 
13 that 'that law does not allow any means of challenging that act in the 
relevant case'. The definition of what is meant precisely by a 
'derimental act' and 'any means' is left unclear. By 'any means' it 
appears that the beneficiary of the detrimental act must show that the 
act is not capable of being challenged in light of any provisions of 
either insolvency law or the national law applicable to the act or 
(contract). Generally Article 13 only requires that the act is capable of 
being challenged and no evidence is required for the act to be set aside, 
voided or annulled. The view taken by most Italian commentators is 
to construe 'any means' in a broader sense so that the beneficiary will 
303
 Ibid, para 138. 
304
 M Frigessi D i Rattalma, 'Avoidance actions under Article 13 EC Regulation: An Italian 
View, European Company Law 6, no I (2009): 27-33. 
305
 See Rattalma (n 304) and other Italian authors therein cited. 
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have to show that the act is unaffected by any flaws which may make it 
not only unenforceable against all the creditors but void or voidable as 
well. 'In the relevant case' means that the act should not be capable of 
being challenged after taking into account all the concrete 
circumstances of the case. It is not sufficient to determine whether it 
can be challenged in the abstract.306 It is also questioned what the 
wording "subject to" means in the context of Article 13. For example, 
is the giving of security "subject to" English law if English law is the 
governing law of the security document? In addition, is a payment 
made under a contract at a time when there are not enough assets to pay 
all creditors "subject" to the law governing the contract under which the 
payment was made, or does it depend on the location of the 
recipient?307 
2.159 Finally, the issue arises about the real scope of the burden of allegation 
and proof provided for by Article 13. For instance, the defence allowed 
by Article 13 is usually relied upon by the defendant in an avoidance 
action. It would clearly be contrary to the purpose of Article 13 if the 
defendant claimed he had discharged the burden of proof placed on him 
by Article 13 by merely objecting and showing that, based on the 
applicable lex contractus, there were no flaws, defects or other grounds 
for avoidance in an act corresponding to the one alleged by the plaintiff 
seeking avoidance on the basis of the lex concursus. It can be inferred 
from the wording of the provision, that quite a stringent burden of 
allegation and proof is placed on the person pleading exemption from 
avoidance actions under Article 13. Therefore, the defendant will, in 
order for his defence under Article 13 to be validly submitted, allege all 
the facts relevant to the act the avoidance of which is sought, and he 
will then have to prove that the law system of the applicable lex 
contractus allows no means of challenging that act. 
Virgos-Schmit (n 42), para 137. 
Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 93), Question 16. 
See Rattalma (n 304), 6.1. 
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2.160 Article 13 clearly leaves open and unresolved several relevant issues. 
One other criticism is that Article 13 could lead to the undesirable result 
that the parties to a contract detrimental to the general body of 
creditors, may succeed in protecting it from being challenged by 
introducing into it a choice-of-law clause in favour of a legal system not 
permitting the challenge. The law thus chosen must be the law of a 
Member State but need not have any natural connection with the 
contract in question.309 
SUMMARY 
How successful has the EIR been in addressing 'insolvency effects'? 
2.161 At the inception of a security transaction, the Lender's main concern is 
ensuring the lending transaction and underlying security interest are 
valid and enforceable in the event of insolvency. 'Insolvency effects', 
as discussed in Chapter One and this Chapter, can be greater or lesser 
depending on the legislative policy decisions of each State. The 
concepts of universalism and territorialism have been shown to have a 
considerable influence on insolvency policies and which systems are 
more 'interventionist' than others. Therefore the 'modified 
No such connection is required by Rome I. 
150 
universalism' approach as adopted by the EIR is of considerable 
importance to the Lender. 
2.162 This Chapter has focused on the most important provisions of the EIR 
in relation to evaluating how far the Lender's security rights are 
protected from the 'insolvency effects' where the laws of unanticipated 
jurisdictions come into play. As discussed, this involves focusing 
mostly on the carve out provisions provided to the applicable law under 
Article 4 which are articles: 5;6;13; and 16. 
2.163 In summary the following points can be made. The Lender can rely on 
Article 5 in relation to protection of rights in rem which is particularly 
significant in countering the unpredictability in taking security over 
movable property. Although there has been some controversy, in the 
writer's opinion, the Lender can safely assume that Article 5 will 
protect the Lender's secured debt as well as the Lender's rights to 
enforce his security in respect of that debt. The application of Article 6 
under the EIR gives the Lender a right of set off and is successful in the 
sense that it is straightforward and reflects the practice that would be 
followed in many jurisdictions even where the EIR is not applicable. 
Article 13 requires further clarification before the Lender can fully rely 
on the effects of the provision however no major amendment is 
required. The effects of Article 16 acts as an important and 
fundamental safeguard for the Lender, in relation to predictability and 
risk assessment, as the principle of automatic recognition reflects the 
principle that, without further formalities, insolvency proceedings 
commenced in one Member State will have universal effect, 
encompassing all of the debtor's assets wherever situated within the 
European Union (except Denmark). 
2.164 Given the vital role played by the concept of COMI within the EIR, it 
has come under considerable scrutiny and criticism by practitioners and 
scholars. However, there have been hardly any proposals as to 
alternative definitions that would be workable in practice. In addition, 
in light of the alternative unworkable concepts that were used in the 
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Phase 1 and Phase II drafts, it seems likely that i f any other definition 
was proposed it would also be met with widespread criticism. It is 
clear overall that reform is required in relation to group insolvencies. 
Chapter Three explores further the Lender's concerns regarding COMI 
and to what extent reform is required. 
How far has the EIR progressed since the Phase I drafts? Is the 
EIR's enactment a success story? 
2.165 In order to determine how successful the EIR has been in addressing the 
concerns of the Lender it is important to note how far the EIR has 
progressed beyond the earlier draft Conventions. It can be concluded 
that the EIR's drafters 'learned' from the unworkable proposals of the 
past and, in particular, the failings of the Phase I and II drafts of the 
Bankruptcy Convention. It can be argued that the production of the 
1970 draft Convention was a precursor to the production of a 
Q 1 1 
'simplified and rationalist system of bankruptcy' for the E U and, 
based on this original proposal, revisions resulting in the incorporation 
of numerous modifications and refinements in detail and some 
transformations on matters of principle have eventually lead to text that 
has been successfully adopted by Member States. 
2.166 The essential difference of the EIR, which ultimately accounts for the 
success story of its enactment as supranational EC/EU law by Member 
States, is the fact that, although it is an instrument of directly applicable 
E U law, it does not interfere with certain international concepts in the 
domestic insolvency law of Member States itself. This is a huge leap 
from the unrealistic approach of the Phase I drafts in superimposing a 
unitary set of mandatory jurisdictional rules and their adherence in 
310
 See generally A. 1-A. 11. 
311
 See I F Fletcher, 'The Proposed Community Convention in Bankruptcy and Related 
Matters', Final Chapter in K. Lipstein, Harmonization of Private International Law by the 
EEC, (1977) Chameleon/ Institute of Advanced Legal Studies: London, 135. 
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following a strict universalist approach. The EIR therefore abandons 
the arguably futile aim of seeking overall harmonization of laws and 
focuses on a more predictable framework for coordinating cross-border 
insolvencies which, broadly speaking, seeks to respect Lender's rights. 
The modified universality approach is argued as representing work-in-
progress towards getting states to understand the effectiveness of 
reducing the costs and formalities inherent in international insolvency 
and inducing acceptance of partial harmonization of the rules of 
procedure. 
2.167 The Istanbul Convention's main failing was its choice of adopting 
indirect jurisdiction and not imposing any mandatory jurisdictional 
rules. It, however, introduced the proposal that main proceedings could 
be supplemented by any secondary proceedings in which the debtor has 
an 'establishment'.314 The EIR's refinement of this concept,315 
including removal of any possibility of opt-out provisions,316 is a clear 
example of how the EIR gives proper consideration to the expectations 
of the Lender, for example, if he has had dealings with the debtor 
outside the context of the latter's forum of bankruptcy. A further 
example of prioritizing the Lender's rights is how the EIR, following 
the policy adopted by the draftsmen of the former Convention text of 
1995, has deliberately refrained from imposing its own definition of a 
right in rem which could result in assets having to be classified in a way 
which is in conflict with the approach followed by the law of the situs. 
312
 See A.5 - A.7 in relation to the extreme universalist approach envisaged by the Phase 1 
draft conventions. See A. 8 for criticism of this approach. See A. 10 outlining the unsuccessful 
attempt in the Phase 1 drafts to apply the twin principles of unity and universality of 
bankruptcy. 
313
 See A. 11 on how the Istanbul Convention adopted a more flexible approach to the 
universalist theory. See A. 14 as to why it was not an ambitious enough model. See A. 16 
regarding how 'modified universalism' better protects the interests of secured creditors. See 
alsoA.19-A.20. 
314
 European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, June 5, 1990, Europ. 
T.S No. 136 (hereinafter Istanbul Convention), Art 17. 
315
 Note that, through the refining process that resulted in the E U Convention, (amendments 
passed down to the EIR), all categories of creditors, not only local creditors, were allowed to 
participate in secondary proceedings and be paid from the estate. 
316
 Opt-out provisions were first envisaged in the E U Convention. It was concluded that some 
issues were better covered by conflict of law principles and therefore excluded from the 
application of the E U Convention. See A. 16. 
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2.168 One can argue against unrealistic expectations of the EIR's success 
being measured by whether it governs all the possibilities that might 
occur within a single insolvency and that infinite scenarios can be 
conceived in relation to the specifics of each cross-border insolvency. 
That is arguably why the ECJ has been given a wide power of 
discretion in providing guidance through instructive case law. If one 
follows the journey from the 1970 draft Convention to the European 
Convention, approximately 40 years' worth of cumulative effort by 
legislators, and then notes the refinements perceived in the EIR, it is 
difficult to not to conclude that the eventual enactment of the EIR 
represents a success story. The textual evolution apparent within the 
EIR clearly reflects a better understanding of the Lender's concerns 
than was ever conceived in any of the previous drafts. 
2.169 There have been a number of issues identified which require reform and 
these are discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. The lack of 
provisions within the EIR in dealing with group insolvencies is 
identified as a major concern. However it can be argued that the EIR is 
far from a failure because it does not address this issue. The problem 
regarding group insolvencies has been magnified since the time of the 
E U Convention and the enactment of the EIR because of the growth 
of large multinational corporate groups. The Convention purposely did 
not have specific rules on parent-subsidiary relationships. The 
reasoning behind this was the fact that it was perceived that Member 
States of the E U have widely divergent views on the legal 
Q 1 O 
consequences of parent-subsidiary relationships. 
2.170 Rather than requiring a major overhaul, in terms of amendments, the 
EIR requires modernization which is why Article 46 has been built into 
the text, arguably because it was expected that, the legislation needed to 
be adapted with the changing times in order for it to be practically 
applied in the future. Furthermore, in relation to forum shopping, in 
317
 See generally A. 15-A.22 
318
 See M Balz, 'The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings', 1996, 70 Am. Bankr 
L.J 485, 503-504 for further detail. 
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light of recent cases, it can be argued there is no major concern where 
creditors have been the initiators of forum shopping as those creditors 
"in the money" consented to the COMI migration before proceedings 
were opened. It is argued that a "more efficient insolvency 
procedure" refers to the situation where creditors are in favour of the 
company's migration into another jurisdiction, and more significantly, 
-190 
if they actually instigate the re-location. The Lender's main concern 
is where there has been or there is the possibility of "bad" forum 
shopping and this is possibly an area that needs to be addressed. This 
means concentrating on situations such as where the debtor re-locates 
abroad without getting the consent of the majority of the shareholders. 
Conversely, even when certain major creditors (such as large banks like 
the Lender) do give their consent in support of a migration, there may 
be a number of dissenting junior creditors. Chapter Three addresses 
amendment of the EIR and puts forward some tentative proposals 
regarding reform. 
319
 This was the case in the Schefenacker restructuring: see G Tett and I Simensen, ' 
Schefenacker considers move to London', Financial Times (London 16th October 2006); I 
Simensen, 'Schefenacker restructuring holds up mirror to cross-border differences; Financial 
Times (London 11 October 2007). 
320
 Especially for institutional lenders who regularly conduct large restructurings, this can be 
perceived as a recognized advantage of pre-insolvency migration. See WG Ringe, 'Forum 
shopping under the EU Insolvency Regulation', University of Oxford, Legal Research Paper 
series, Paper No 33/2008, August 2008, electronic copy: <http://ssrn.com/abstract+1209822> 
19. The important factor is whether the COMI migration is in the interests of efficiency and 
helps in maximizing the full potential of net assets available to satisfy creditors' claims. It is 
argued that, if it does, the COMI migration cannot be regarded as abusive. See Eidenmuller (n 
100) 13. 
321
 e.g. unsecured, junior and typically involuntary creditors. See Ringe (n 320). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REFORM OF THE EIR 
Introduction 
3.1 There are several issues that need to be explored further in this last 
chapter before we can conclude on the many questions that have been 
raised in the first two chapters. These factors all relate to the main 
focus of this thesis which is to consider, from the Lender's perspective, 
what legal concerns are faced in relation to the potential effects of 
insolvency proceedings on cross border security and the best way the 
Lender can address these anticipated risks to get the maximum 
realization of his security. The issue of insolvency effects and how 
these can be mitigated by the Lender leads to the pertinent question of 
how efficient the EIR is in ensuring that there is minimal erosion of the 
Lender's realized security by different insolvency laws which favour 
other creditors. If the EIR falls short in addressing this fundamental 
concern then are there any steps the Lender can take to minimize risk? 
3.2 In order to review how successful the EIR has been in addressing the 
concerns of secured creditors it will be helpful to consider the issues 
identified in the Insolvency Service's Evaluation Questionnaire (the 
Questionnaire) which focus on the problematic areas of the EIR over 
which there has been much controversy. The European Commission is 
required to report on the EIR by 1 June 2012 and, i f necessary, to 
produce proposals for its amendment. To this end, the Commission 
intends to launch a study of the EIR this year and the Insolvency 
Service are currently carrying out their own evaluation so as to be in a 
1
 See Article 46 of the EIR. 
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position to inform and influence the Commission's Report. The aim of 
the Questionnaire is therefore to gather information on the experiences 
of individuals working with the EIR in practice to assess whether or not 
it meets its objectives. 
(1) Making jurisdiction 'stick' 
The use of COMI covenants 
3.3 Chapter Two raises the concerns the Lender potentially faces in relation 
to the uncertainty of the location of COMI; the lack of a comprehensive 
definition; and the prospect of COMI migration. An important factor 
to consider is whether the use of banking covenants exerts some 
measure of control over the Lender's risk factor and how far, in 
practice, these covenants protect the Lender's position. The Lender is 
faced with difficulties as risks and remedies may vary in a different 
Member State and the location of the debtor's COMI may impact both 
on his ability to enforce and the effectiveness of his security. 
3.4 One of the questions raised in the Questionnaire specifically relates to 
whether the lack of a comprehensive definition of COMI is a problem 
and, if so, in what way and how the difficulties can be overcome. 
Indirectly this leads us to the question of whether the lack of a proper 
definition for COMI may not be such a problematic issue in 
ascertaining COMI i f COMI covenants can be successfully used. It was 
seen in the previous chapter that the lack of a proper definition of 
2
 The Insolvency Service, 'Evaluation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 
2000 on Insolvency Proceedings - Evaluation Questionnaire', www.insolvency.gov.uk (The 
Questionnaire) 2. 
3
 Ibid. Question 4 : 'Does any uncertainty as to the location of a debtor's COMI or the fact that 
the debtor can change this COMI at some future date (i.e. after the debt has been incurred) 
cause difficulties for creditors or other parties such as directors, employees or regulatory 
authorities in assessing the risks of entering into business transactions?'. 
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COMI may cause problems for the Lender. This is especially in 
relation to the initial assessing of risk factors as, in the absence of 
further clarification from the ECJ, there may be a lack of consistency in 
determining jurisdiction across the EU. Depending on where the assets 
are located, there is a continuing risk that local Member State courts 
may consider different objective factors and give them different 
weightings in terms of importance. Uncertainty as to the location of the 
debtor's COMI, whether it is largely because of the lack of proper 
COMI definition or not, means that different creditors or interested 
parties may perceive the COMI to be in a number of different Member 
States. This raises the question of what approach the courts will take in 
the situation where competing creditors consider a debtors' COMI to be 
in different Member States. 
3.5 In addition to the uncertainty in determining a debtor's COMI when a 
transaction is entered into, it was seen in Chapter Two that it is possible 
that the COMI may move after the security transaction has been 
completed. The issue of forum shopping is further explored later in the 
chapter. Nevertheless certainty and predictability of the insolvency 
regime applicable if the debtor goes into financial difficulty is very 
important to the Lender. It has already been discussed in Chapter One 
that, when conducting a risk assessment, the Lender will seek to 
identify the jurisdictions in which insolvency proceedings might occur 
in order to assess the effects of the insolvency laws of those 
jurisdictions upon the transaction in question. It is common for 
syndicated loan agreements to contain clauses with which the debtor 
represents that its COMI is in a particular Member State. However, to 
more effectively protect his position, it is common for the Lender to 
obtain covenants that the debtor will not take any steps that would 
4
 An example of a clause in a loan document is as follows: 
"For the purposes of 'the Council of the European Union Regulation No. 1346/2000 on 
Insolvency Proceedings', [the debtor's] centre of main interest is situated in England and it has 
no 'establishment' in any other jurisdiction." 
See H. Eidenmuller, 'Abuse of law in the context of European Insolvency Law', April 2009. 
European Company and Financial Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 1,11. 
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cause the COMI to change or seek the consent of the Lender with 
respect to a planned COMI shift. Failing to get the Lender's approval 
for a proposed COMI migration would result in an acceleration of the 
underlying payment obligation.5 In practice, however, it is uncertain 
whether COMI covenants will provide the ultimate solution in 
protecting the Lender's position. Will COMI covenants ultimately 
deter debtors that are determined to effectuate a COMI shift in order to 
benefit at the expense of their creditors? 
3.6 Although some degree of control can perhaps be established by using 
covenants, it is argued that it does not seem probable that, if jurisdiction 
existed, the courts of that country would refuse to accept that 
jurisdiction on the sole grounds that the factors bringing the debtor 
company within its jurisdiction had involved a breach of banking 
covenants.6 Furthermore if COMI was moved in breach of a COMI 
covenant, the issue arises of what remedy the Lender would have in this 
instance and whether it would be enough of a compensation. The 
breach of a covenant from the debtor would only give rise to a claim in 
damages. This may be of limited use if the debtor is in financial 
difficulty. In this instance the Lender can only hope that the court will 
take into account COMI covenants when considering what is 
ascertainable to third parties on COMI. In terms of assessing risks 
however, this means relying a great deal on the discretion of the court. 
Conversely, COMI covenants might be useful as evidence of 
'ascertainability' and, coupled with an event of default triggered by any 
step to move COMI, they may be useful in some cases. 
Although this thesis is concerned mainly with safeguarding the Lender's interests it needs to 
be noted that, for trade creditors, it is normally uneconomical to seek and draft detailed 
covenants to obtain an enhanced level of protection. For them, retention of title clauses are a 
much more common and sensible means of self-help. See Eidenmuller (n 4) 11. 
6
 See IF Fletcher & H Anderson, 'The Insolvency Issues' in Michael Bridge & Robert Stevens 
(eds), Cross Border Security and Insolvency (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 263. 
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(2) Moving jurisdiction 
Forum Shopping - COMI Migration 
3.7 One of the questions put forward in the Questionnaire is: 
'Is there evidence of debtors relocating their COMI from one Member 
State to another in order to frustrate creditor claims or to benefit from 
insolvency laws more advantageous to them?' 
In Chapter Two the issue of 'good' versus 'bad' forum shopping was 
•7 
introduced. It was discussed that the latter is generally where a 
particular stakeholder selects a jurisdiction based on self interest in 
order to escape creditors, whereas the former is where a jurisdiction is 
selected with the best interests of all stakeholders in mind. 
3.8 Whilst there may be little evidence that debtors are relocating their 
COMI from one Member State with the sole intent of frustrating 
o 
creditor claims, cases such as Schefenacker, Deutsche Nickel and Hans 
Brochier involved debtors moving their COMI to take advantage of 
another Member State's insolvency regime in pursuit of more favorable 
restructuring laws. It should be noted that in cases such as these large 
scale reorganizations that will be involved in effecting a corporate 
migration, secured creditors are hardly taken by surprise. In practice, 
due to the number of banking covenants focusing on COMI, major 
creditors will need to be on board if the migration is to succeed. 
7
 See 2.46, 2.172, 3.7 & 3.14. 
8
 A debtor apparently has the right to move his COMI, even in the case where he is trying to 
remove himself from the Member State where he has incurred the debt and where his creditors 
are located. See Shierson v Vlieland-Boddy [2005] EWCA Civ 974, [2005] 1 WLR 3966. See 
also Official Receiver v Eichler [2007] BPIR 1636, HCJ. 
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3.9 In terms of what the future holds for COMI migrations it should be 
noted that U K schemes of arrangement9 are increasingly being used as 
a mechanism for restructuring, and enable a restructuring plan to be 
forced through where a minority of creditors oppose it. Cases such as 
IMO Car Wash and Wind Hellas show how senior secured creditors 
have been able to exploit COMI mobility to their advantage. 
3.10 The English High Court recently delivered judgment in the IMO case in 
which the High Court considered whether to sanction three related 
schemes of arrangement for restructuring indebtedness proposed by the 
IMO Car Wash group to the senior lenders of the relevant group 
companies. Four legal principles that relate to junior and senior secured 
lenders were emphasized by Mann J: firstly, a company is able to 
choose the creditors with whom it wants to enter into an arrangement 
and this does not need to include those creditors whose rights remain 
unaffected by the scheme; secondly, the company is not required to 
consult any class of unaffected creditors prior to entering into the 
scheme based on one of the following reasons:(i) because their rights 
remain intact (ii) because they do not have an economic interest in the 
9
 A scheme is a statutory procedure which permits a company to propose an arrangement to its 
shareholders or creditors (or any class of them). Provided that the scheme is approved by the 
requisite majorities of shareholders and creditors and subsequently approved by the court, it is 
binding on 100% of those shareholders and creditors (or any class of them) who were entitled 
to vote, irrespective of whether or how they voted. So a scheme can be used for any 
transaction where a company is concerned to bind creditors and shareholders by an 
arrangement. For more detail, see: "The scheme: a most convenient and modern arrangement", 
www.practicallaw.com/5-380-7686. The question arises as to how far a scheme will be 
recognized in other jurisdictions as it is not an 'insolvency proceeding' for the purposes of the 
EIR. There may however be a way forward by sheltering behind an administration and then 
relying on Article 25(1) auto recognition of judicially approved compositions. 
10
 Re BluebrookLtd [2009] E W H C 2114 (Ch), [2010] 1 B C L C 338. 
11
 Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) IISCA[ [2009] E W H C 3199 (Ch). 
12
 R Watts & C Newell, "Firms flock to 'bankruptcy brothel' U K " , The Sunday Times, 
(London, March 7, 2010: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7052729.ece> 
13
 This is based on the following case law: Perusahaan Perseroan (Persero) PT Perusahaan 
Penerbangan Garuda Indonesia [2001] A l l ER (D) 53 (Oct) and Re British & Commonwealth 
Holdings pic (1992) 1 WLR672. See Ashurst London, " IMO Car wash restructuring approved; 
analysis of the "Rollover Scheme & Pre-pack" (September 2009) <www.ashurst.com> , See 
also C Scott-Priestley, ' IMO Car Wash: A Washout for Junior Creditors?' (2009), Squire, 
Sanders & Dempsey L L P , <www.ssd.com> 
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company; the court can determine whether a certain class of creditors 
really has an economic interest in the company and distinguish this 
from a situation where this is only based on theory prior to taking the 
appropriate action;15 and junior lenders can object as creditors on 
grounds of unfairness if the schemes unfairly prejudice them in ways 
other than altering their strict rights. 
3.11 This case is a useful demonstration of how the court's approach is 
likely to affect junior creditors when schemes of arrangement are used 
as a mechanism for restructuring. Enabling such a restructuring plan to 
be forced through, which could serve as an effective threat to dissenting 
creditors, may well involve a manipulation of COMI to the senior 
creditors' advantage.16 Practically, this case illustrates the significance 
of the provisions in an inter-creditor agreement in enabling senior 
lenders, when they are enforcing their security, to release the claims of 
junior lenders. The junior lenders have a limited course of action if it is 
clear: that the senior lenders have wide reaching powers under the 
agreement; the restructuring can be implemented through an 
enforcement sale; and the value will reduce the senior debt. It is 
therefore argued that junior lenders who grant wide inter-creditor 
release rights in favour of senior lenders "contract away their place at 
14
 See Tea Corporation Limited (1904) 1 CHI2. 
15
 The mere fact that there is a possibility of establishing a negotiating position and extracting a 
benefit from the deal is not the same as having a real economic interest. Furthermore the 
question of which creditors have a genuine economic interest in the distressed company is 
determined by the present market value of the company, tested on a going-concern basis. If the 
value is less than the senior debt, a restructuring excluding junior lenders will merely 
implement the subordination provisions envisaged in the loan documents. See Scott-Priestley 
(n 13). 
16
 Wind Hellas (n 11). In this case: the head office was moved to Luxembourg to the U K a 
week before investors were informed that the company was considering restructuring its debt. 
Hence there was a strategic move to shift COMI in order to take advantage of the U K ' s 
insolvency regime. See also Sunday Times (n 12), the chief executive of SPQR, one of the 
creditors, was quoted as saying: 
"Any business can set up a tiny office in London and cheat their creditors out of debts of 
hundreds of millions of pounds this is entirely legal under U K laws - and signed off by 
High Court judges". 
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the negotiating table if the value of the business falls below the 
1 n 
quantum of the senior debt." 
3.12 The Wind Hellas restructuring was based on a pre-packaged 
administration sale in England. However, as in the above-mentioned 
case, the court focused on the fact that the sale of the company's 
1 o 
assets required the consent of senior creditors who, in accordance 
with an inter-creditor deed, had been allocated priority over different 
classes of creditor. Lewison J, in his judgment, referred to the fact, that 
based on the evidence before the court, the senior creditors made it 
clear that the only bid they were willing sanction was the bid made by 
the company 'Weather' which was part of the same group. Therefore 
there was no alternative for the administrators other than to proceed 
with the pre-pack sale to Weather.19 
3.13 Leaving aside the issues relating to the distinction between junior and 
senior creditors, if a COMI migration is desired then, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, certain steps need to be taken. The creditors will need to 
ensure that enough is done within the migration process so that COMI 
can really be established in the new location especially if the 
company's registered office remains in the original jurisdiction. To be 
successful, any movement of COMI must have sufficient substance to 
be credible and must also satisfy the requirements of Recital 13 that the 
COMI be the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his 
interests on a 'regular basis' and is therefore ascertainable by third 
parties. An 'element of permanence' is required and courts have a duty 
to scrutinize carefully situations where it appeared the move had been 
made with impending insolvency in mind. It should be noted from 
Wind Hellas, per Lewison J, that the purpose of COMI is to enable 
creditors in particular to know where the company is and where it may 
17SeeAshurst(nl3). 
18
 The shares in the operating company. 
19
 This was despite the fact that complaints were made by junior lenders regarding the fact that 
Weather, the successful bidder, was given an advantage over other bidders and there had been 
an abuse in the process. See Wind Hellas ( n i l ) . 
20
 See Re Ci4net.com Inc [2005] BCC 277 and Shierson (n 8). 
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deal with the company. The most important feature raised in the 
evidence in this case was the fact that all the negotiations between the 
91 
company and its creditors took place in London. 
99 
3.14 It is submitted overall that perhaps Recital 4 of the EIR needs to be 
reviewed in light of what is considered bad forum shopping. It is 
argued, and the writer agrees, that the ability to move COMI is 
consistent with the principle of freedom of establishment within the 
9^ 
EU. It therefore follows from this that, if COMI is moved with a view 
to benefiting creditors and not prejudicing them, there is nothing wrong 
with COMI migration in order to take advantage of more favourable 
94 
restructuring laws existing in a particular Member State. In fact 
recent case law shows this is a more progressive way of following the 
guidance under the EIR for the benefit of secured creditors. However 
this type of forum shopping should be distinguished, for example, from 
the situation where a debtor seeks to move its COMI outside the E U in 
order to avoid the commencement of insolvency proceedings in any 
Member State and to prejudice creditors in the EU. In such a case there 
is no question of freedom of establishment within the E U and there is a 
strain in applying the principle that COMI falls to be assessed as at the 
date of the opening of proceedings against preventing abuse of the EIR 
by debtors. Where it can be shown that the steps to move COMI 
outside the E U are plainly abusive and for the purpose of avoiding 
insolvency proceedings under the EIR, it would clearly be in the 
9S 
creditors best interests i f such steps were ignored. From case law 
21
 Wind Hellas (n 11), per Lewison J, para 5. Note that the company took a number of other 
steps to achieve a successful COMI migration: a new head office was opened in London, at 
which board meetings were held and from which correspondence was sent out; notices of 
change of address were sent to trustees and agents; the company was registered at Companies 
House etc. See, 'Financial restructuring of Wind Hellas', Financial Briefing (December 2009), 
Slaughter and May: <http://www.slaughterandmay.com> 
22
 It is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market to avoid incentives for the 
parties to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to 
obtain a more favourable legal position (forum shopping). 
23
 The ability to move COMI is consistent with the principle of freedom of establishment under 
what is now Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the E U (TFEU). 
24
 G Moss, I Fletcher and S Isaacs, The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, A 
Commentary and Annotated Guide, (Oxford, 2nd ed, 2009), 8.102. 
25
 See Hans Brochier Holdings Ltd v Exner [2007] BCC 12. See also M , F & I (n 24), 8.106, 
8.336 and F N 18. 
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such as Wind Hellas and IMO Car Wash it is not so clear cut when 
trying to distinguish between what is in the best interests of secured 
creditors as a whole as some restructuring solutions may weigh more in 
the favour of senior lenders over junior ones. 
3.15 However, in relation to creditors as a whole, it is argued that the EIR 
does contain creditor protection measures in the face of forum 
shopping.26 On the one hand, every creditor is free to oppose the 
opening decision of the insolvency proceedings in the alleged COMI 
state. A more difficult option would be for the creditor to attempt to 
file for insolvency in the Member State where he or she believes the 
97 
real COMI is located. In the event that a COMI migration takes place 
which results in detrimental consequences for creditors, the most 
significant remedy will be the possibility of opening 'secondary 
proceedings' as provided by Article 3(2) of the EIR. Creditors situated 
in a Member State other than the COMI Member State will get 
insolvency protection through secondary proceedings being opened in 
their state allowing the operation of local rules and separate treatment 
from the main proceedings. Drawing these issues together, there 
appears no reason why forum shopping should not be permitted. If a 
cross-border migration is supported or initiated by creditors expecting a 
more efficient restructuring for themselves then this can be seen as a 
strong indicator that the migration will entail beneficial effects. In the 
case where the creditors do not support the COMI migration, in 
9R 
addition to safeguards provided under domestic law depending on the 
Member State, the EIR provides certain creditor protection safeguards. 
The question then arises as to whether these safeguards are adequate in 
26
 See W Ringe, 'Forum shopping under the E U Insolvency Regulation', University of Oxford, 
Legal Research Paper series, Paper No 33/2008, August 2008, electronic copy: <http: 
ssrn.com/abstract+1209822>20-22. 
27
 This solution has become more difficult since ( C-341/04) Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd (2006) 
ECR 1-3813, [2006] BCC 639 ECJ and the ECJ emphasising the principle of mutual trust. 
2 8 UNCITRAL 30th Session, 12-30 May 1997: Official Records of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, 52nd Session, Supplement No 17 (A152/17), Part II, paras 12- 225. Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law, 2004 . See e.g. sections 13, 14, 21 and 22. The U K implemented 
the Model Law by enacting the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006. Thereby, creditor 
protection is also ensured in cross-border insolvency cases which do not relate to other E U 
Member States. See Ringe (n 26) 21. 
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ensuring protection against 'bad forum shopping' or whether reform is 
needed.29 
3.16 Directly linked to the issue of COMI shifting is the fact that the EIR 
does not recognize the commercial reality of multinational corporate 
groups and hence there is no degree of co-operation between 
proceedings across groups. The effect of the lack of special provisions 
within the EIR in dealing with group companies is discussed further in 
the following section. However, for as long as the concept of COMI 
depends on a debtor's factual circumstances, and there remains a 
misalignment between the commercial reality of corporate groups and 
the strict legal requirement to recognize single legal entities on 
insolvency, forum shopping by COMI migration is likely to occur. 
Although criticized for its lack of certainty and artificiality, the 
flexibility provided by COMI migration arguably offers the best 
solution available to debtors or debtor groups and secured creditors 
wishing to take advantage of the insolvency regime of a particular 
jurisdiction. It has been established that in many cases COMI 
migration and a resultant restructuring has lead to a higher return for 
creditors. 
See Ringe (n 26) 22. 
Note that there have been developments which have the potential to aid COMI migration in 
future restructurings. See the European Directive on Cross-Border Mergers of Limited 
Liability Companies (Directive 2005/56/EC of 26 October 2005) which has been largely 
implemented across the EU and enables two limited liability companies incorporated in 
different member states of the EU to merge and the remaining entity may have its COMI in 
either member state. See <www.practicallaw.com/0-201 -4689>. The main reservation is 
whether the registration and formal requirements are too time consuming and costly in a 
restructuring environment. See Robert Spedding, 'COMI migration: history and future', (2008) 
6CRI 183. 
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Possible reform of Articles 3 & 4 in relation to the 
obscurity of the C O M I approach 
3.17 As has been discussed in the previous Chapter, the current 
unpredictability of a criterion that is of such importance has been the 
topic of much scholarly debate. In light of this, what could be the 
alternative to the present system? Two ways are suggested to amend 
the current law so that it will supposedly fit into the route of 
compatibility with the freedom of establishment as interpreted by the 
EC J and shed some clarity regarding the definition of COMI.31 
However the writer is not convinced that these options will be workable 
as alternatives. 
3.18 The first approach would be to eradicate the possibility of a rebuttable 
presumption and alternatively connect both jurisdiction and the 
applicable law to the relevant Member State of incorporation. 
Following from this, Article 3(1) of the EIR could be amended as 
follows: 
" The courts of the Member State within which the centre of a debtor's 
main interests is situated shall have the jurisdiction to open insolvency 
proceedings. In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the 
registered office shall constitute the centre of its main interests." 
Article 4 of the EIR would remain unaltered however, by amending 
Article 3, it is argued that the Lender would be put in the advantageous 
position of having both a predictable jurisdiction venue and applicable 
law. However, as emphasized in the Eurofood case, with this 
suggested reform there would be no distinction in the case of a 
'letterbox company' and genuinely ascertaining where the debtor's 
centre of main interests is really located. 
See Ringe (n 26) 27-29. 
Ibid. 27. 
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3.19 The second and less heavy-handed alternative could be to reform the 
choice-of-law rule in Article 4 of the EIR so that the applicable law 
would be the one of the Member State of the origin, whereas the 
jurisdiction clause in Article 3 would remain the same. Therefore, 
Article 4 could be amended as follows: 
"Save as otherwise provided in this Regulation, the law applicable to 
insolvency proceedings and their effects shall be that of the Member 
State within the territory of which the debtor's registered office is 
situated, hereafter referred to as the 'State of the opening of 
proceedings." 
This solution will arguably have the same benefits as the first option in 
relation to reform, however, insolvency proceedings could be opened in 
the Member State where the debtor has its COMI, subsequently taking 
into consideration the convenience of such a jurisdiction venue for most 
creditors which have dealings with a letterbox company in the host 
Member State. However this solution may result in practical problems 
if the particular situation necessitates courts of the host Member State 
applying the insolvency law of the state of origin and taking such steps 
such as winding up the debtor company. 
3.20 In relation to the proposals above, the question arises whether the 
significant disadvantages outweigh the general advantages over the 
current system in the protection of the Lender's rights. The writer does 
not agree that pursuing these suggestions for reform will create a 
genuinely reliable system of cross-border insolvency in the 
Community, giving the Lender a predictable answer as to which 
insolvency regime applies when the company becomes insolvent. For 
instance, the first option may require the Lender to pursue his claim in a 
Member State different from his own. Furthermore if he decides to file 
for insolvency, he will have to familiarize himself in relation to the 
laws of a different Member State which includes incurring expenses 
Ibid. 28. 
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such as travel costs and choosing another legal representative.34 In the 
case of option two, as discussed earlier, the situation may arise 
necessitating the application of foreign insolvency law by Member 
States which will create difficulties especially when it comes to 
winding up companies. The implications of the suggested reform 
options on forum shopping may be to reduce the likelihood of COMI 
migration on the basis that the registered office is not freely 
transferable. If a company were to forum shop under the proposed 
regime, it would need to take on the onerous task of registering in a 
new Member State. However, in relation to finding a more efficient 
solution for dealing with the insolvency of corporate groups, currently a 
more problematic issue for the Lender than the impact of COMI 
migration,36 no solution is provided. Firmly linking the COMI with the 
'registered office' leads to the consequence that no common insolvency 
procedure for corporate groups can be established. It needs to be noted 
that, rather than focusing predominantly on countering possible forum 
shopping, in recitals 2, 8, 16, 19 and 20 of the EIR, the efficient and 
effective administration of cross-border insolvencies is emphasized. 
34
 It is noted however that there is the option of opening secondary proceedings under Article 
3(3) of the EIR where an 'establishment' exists. Ringe (n 26) 28. 
35
 Currently, the cross-border move of the registered office is only available via the European 
Company (SE) Regulation (Article 8 provides for the cross-border transfer of the registered 
office) or indirectly via a cross-border merger (see Merger Directive (n 30). See Ringe (n 26) 
30. 
36
 In order for the COMI migration to succeed it is more than likely that the Lender will have 
consented. There are also the additional safeguards available of taking COMI covenants. 
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Is the lack of special provisions dealing with group 
companies detrimental to the Lender?37 If so, in what 
way and how might this be addressed? 
3.21 As discussed in Chapter Two, the EIR does not provide adequate 
guidance in dealing with the insolvency of affiliated companies. 
Furthermore Virgos Schmit38 clearly refrains from developing a clear 
approach in relation to the COMI of group companies. It has been 
established earlier that the lack of an explicit solution to the particular 
case of group companies within the EIR poses a threat to the protection 
of the Lender's rights. The difficulty that arises is that different 
creditors involved with the group may have different interests and 
expectations regarding the location in which any given group member's 
insolvency will be handled. 
3.22 For instance, creditors of a certain subsidiary may wish that the 
company will be managed separately, while the creditors of other 
related companies may expect all proceedings to be conducted jointly 
due to their impression that they have been dealing with the entire 
group. In terms of finding a solution as to how this issue might be 
reformed it has been argued that applying the simplified rule of treating 
each company separately without a prior consideration of the group 
context may result in considerable unfairness towards the majority of 
the group's creditors.39 Furthermore splitting up the business sale 
process within a group could cause a significant loss of value to the 
assets of the group as whole or create an obstacle to an easily 
coordinated continuation of the business while a reorganization takes 
place. It is also important to consider the fact that one set of insolvency 
37
 This is adapted from Question 20 of the Questionnaire (n 2): 'Is the lack of special 
provisions dealing with group companies detrimental to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
cross border insolvency proceedings and, if so, in what way might this be addressed'. 
38
 Para 76. 
39
 IR. Mevorach, 'Centralizing insolvencies of pan-European corporate groups: a creditor's 
dream or nightmare?'J.B.L (August 2006), 468-486. 
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officeholders appointed on behalf of the consolidated group is more 
likely to promote efficiency and effectiveness40 as it could save time 
and costs and make the administration of the insolvency or 
reorganization proceedings more efficient. 
3.23 Chapter Two discusses the arguments surrounding the effectiveness of 
the "Head Office functions Test" and mentions the impact of Re 
Stanford International Bank in relation to the future use of that test, 
especially in light of the recent Court of Appeal's decision. It is 
argued that, in light of the recent Court of Appeal decision, it will be 
considerably more difficult to adopt the group COMI approach in the 
United Kingdom then was common practice before.43 
3.24 As discussed in Chapter Two44 it is apparent that the most prominent 
decision of the ECJ concerning the issue of group companies is that 
relating to the Eurofood case. This decision has raised the evidential 
bar that has to be overcome to show that a subsidiary has its COMI in 
the same place as its parent company. The question is left open 
regarding what level of parental control will be sufficient to rebut the 
registered office presumption and to lead third parties to conclude 
(based on objective and ascertainable factors) that the subsidiary has its 
COMI in the same jurisdiction as its parent's. It is clear however that 
the ECJ decision has not prevented courts, in particular circumstances, 
from concluding that all subsidiaries within a group have their 
respective COMIs in the same place. The Eurotunnel case was referred 
to earlier where the French court was prepared to place companies with 
their registered offices in Member States other than France into 
sauvegarde proceedings based on the control exercised by the French 
40 This is in accordance with Recital 8 of the EIR which focuses on improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings. 
41
 Re, _Stanford International Bank Ltd (In Receivership), Re [2009] E W H C 1441 (Ch), [2009] 
B.P.I.R. 1157. 
42
 Stanford International Bank Ltd (In Receivership), Re [2010] E W C A Civ 137. 
43
 See N W A Tollenaar, 'Dealing with the insolvency of multi-national groups under the 
European Insolvency Regulation', Insolv. Int. 2010, 23(5), 65-73. 
44
 See 2.17 - 2.24 and Eurofood (n 27). 
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parent company.45 In this case the court laid emphasis on case law 
which suggests that courts of Member States would take a "pragmatic 
approach" to groups of companies, taking into account the fact that all 
their functions could be consolidated into a "single headquarters 
function."46 Similar conclusions regarding COMI's location at the head 
office were reached in the following cases: Lennox Holdings PLC., Re 
Crisscross Telecommunications Group; Re Collins & Aikman:, Re 
MG Rover;50 Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd;51 Re MPOTEC GmbH;52 and Re 
Energotech Sari. 
3.25 However, in Stanford Bank, Lewison J conducted a detailed analysis of 
the rationale of the Eurofood decision, and of its implications for other 
decisions of English courts concerning the same or related issues, and 
concluded that the "head office functions test", as a purely factual test 
of the whereabouts of the COMI, was incomplete in view of the 
emphasis placed by the ECJ5 4 on the elements of transparency, 
objectivity and ascertainability by third parties.55 Lewison J referred to 
the view regarding COMI expressed by Chadwick J in Shierson v 
Vlieland Boddy: 
45
 RG 07/ 05764, jurista No. 2007/346870 and RG 07/05752, jurista No. 2007/354294, 
Tribunal de commerce de Paris. 15 January 2007; Bull. Joly 2007 p. 459; Court of Appeal of 
Paris; 3rd court, Section B, 29 November 2007. 
46
 See M , F & I (n 24), 8.89. 
47
 [2009] B.C.C 155, Chancery Division, 20 June 2000. However note that in Stanford Bank 
(n 41), when reformulating the test to be applied, Lewison J conceded that he had followed the 
wrong course in this earlier decision. 
48
 (20 May 2003), Rimer J. 
49[2005] EWCH 1754 (Ch); [2006] BCC 606. 
50
 [2005] EWHC 874, Ch. The question arises, however, as to whether the English court would 
have been able to reach the decisions it did in MG Rover and Collins & Aikman if these cases 
had been heard after the ECJ' decision in Eurofood (n 27). 
512003 WL 21353254; [2003] BCC 562 ; [2004] BPIR 30. 
52
 [2006] BCC 681, Tribunal de Commerce de Nanterre. 
53
 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lure, 29 March 2006. 
54
 See also view of Advocate General, Francis Jacobs, in is separate non-binding at paras 118-
124. 
55
 Note that, in also considering the link between UNCITRAL Model Law and the EIR, 
Lewison J considered it reasonable to infer that the intention of the framers of the Model Law 
was that COMI in the Model Law would bear the same meaning as in the EC Regulation. 
56
 [2005] EWCA Civ 974, [2005] 1 WLR 3966. 
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" As Chadwick LJ says, one of the important features is the perception 
of the objective observer. One important purpose of COMI is that it 
provides certainty and forseeability for creditors of the company at the 
time that they enter into a transaction. It would impose a quite 
unrealistic burden on them if every transaction had to be preceded by a 
set of inquiries before contract to establish where the underlying reality 
en 
differed from the apparent facts". 
3.26 On this issue the court concluded that: the presumption that COMI 
coincides with the location of the company's registered office was a 
true presumption; and the burden lies upon the party seeking to rebut it 
with connecting factors that were objectively ascertainable by third 
parties. It is submitted that the Court of Appeal's decision in Re 
Stanford may provide a welcome opportunity for a "precedent-forming 
pronouncement, post-Eurofood, regarding the test for overcoming the 
presumption that the COMI of a corporate debtor is at the place of its 
C O 
registered office." In any case, what is clear, is that it would be 
helpful if the proposed amendments to the EIR included clarification of 
how to treat group insolvencies. 
3.27 It has been suggested that one way forward is to use a clearly defined 
centralized approach to deal with insolvencies within multinational 
corporate groups (MCGs). This would involve placing MCGs under 
insolvency in a single location, de facto subject to a single supervision 
and single insolvency regime.59 Under the EIR, as discussed, this is 
only achievable when all companies involved have their COMI in the 
same state. Otherwise, if related companies have their COMI in 
different countries, then, under the EIR it is impossible to control their 
insolvencies from a single location and the proceedings are then 
handled separately. It is argued that, in addition to many other 
reasons,60 centralization would dispose of the need to have a patchwork 
See the judgment at [62]. 57 
58
 See I F Fletcher, 'Rival foreign proceedings compete for recognition under the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Regulations', Insolv. Int. 2010, 23(2), 26-28. 
59
 See Mevorach (n 39) 468. 
60
 Ibid 46S. 
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of various cases in different countries, thus resulting in better returns to 
the creditor. However, overall the main concern is the issue of fairness 
to creditors. 
3.28 The following questions therefore arise: does a centralized approach 
fulfill the Lender's expectations in relation to jurisdiction and does it 
accord with his legitimate interests regarding the situation of insolvency 
proceedings; can it successfully address creditor's forum shopping; and 
does it facilitate the Lender's involvement in the process and give him 
sufficient representation?61 The issue of centralization needs 
consideration in light of these questions in order to evaluate the way 
forward in reforming the lack of rules in relation to cross-border 
insolvencies of affiliated companies. 
3.29 When discussing the Lender's expectations it is important to consider 
the scenario where the creditors are related to a certain company but not 
to a group of companies. In this case they may have expectations of 
asserting their rights in relation to that company whether or not there 
are any other connections to other companies within the group 
structure. It would clearly not be fair to these creditors if their rights 
were prejudiced because of "group considerations". Clearly a 
centralized approach will be unsuccessful in this situation as it will 
conflict with creditor expectations and may not conform with their 
views relating to which forum should oversee the process. As raised 
earlier however there are cases where treating the insolvent subsidiary 
separately from the group context will actually discord with creditors' 
expectations. This applies where creditors may have dealt with the 
subsidiary as if it was the entire group or were given the impression that 
the whole weight of the group is behind the specific subsidiary they 
were dealing with. Whilst the currently used "segregated" approach in 
dealing with affiliated companies may not be entirely successful it is 
Ibid. 469 
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clear that using only a centralized approach is not the way forward 
either.62 
3.30 The centralized approach should also be evaluated in relation to the 
possibility of creditor forum shopping. Creditors will be motivated to 
choose a particular forum over another if insolvency encompasses the 
entire group or one of its companies. This is because national laws may 
vary in their dealings with group issues in the onset of insolvency 
proceedings. Rather than focusing on what is in the best interests of the 
group as a whole, some local creditors may want certain subsidiaries to 
fall within the ambit of the local insolvency regime.63 Local creditors 
may be able to cause problems by initiating secondary proceedings 
where there is an establishment unless some sort of compromise is 
reached with them as in the case of Collins & Aikman. They will be 
able to engage in forum manipulation because the local insolvency laws 
might better suit their aims regarding the debtor and increase their 
ability to apply close control over the insolvency. 
3.31 The issue to consider is whether using a centralized approach might 
provide a solution to minimizing this type of manipulation. It is argued 
that the strength of using a centralized approach is that it may 
"disregard 'pure' formalities that may obscure the 'real' state of affairs 
of the group at stake."65 Therefore, in order to truly overcome 
creditors' forum shopping, the way forward will be to designate the 
place to which the group as a whole has the strongest connection as the 
COMI of the M C G . By putting in place a system that strives to reflect 
the state of affairs prior to the onset of insolvency proceedings and 
using a broader evaluation of the M C G , it is submitted that creditors' 
manipulation will be drained of its essence.66 However it has been 
discussed earlier that simply replacing a segregated approach in dealing 
62Mevorach(n39)470 
63
 Ibid. 473. 
64
 Collins (n 49). 
65
 For example where the group was fragmented into separate entities yet all operated a single 
business directed and managed from a single location. See Mevorach (n 39) 473. 
66
 Ibid. 473. 
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with companies with a centralized approach will not necessarily be in 
the best interests of all the creditors involved. 
3.32 One of the potential flaws in using a centralized system is apparent 
when analyzing creditor rights of involvement and adequate 
representation in the group context. Here a centralized approach may 
have the effect of neglecting some creditors and therefore 
compromising their involvement and representation rights. The 
appointee or appointees, if handling the whole proceedings together, 
may be representing different interests and may be more concerned 
with a certain party's needs and expectations while forsaking those of 
other perhaps more 'remote' creditors.67 Therefore dealing with the 
proceedings of each entity on an individual basis and in accordance 
with local law is most likely to ensure the involvement of creditors in 
the process of the subsidiary, to which they directly relate, in the most 
easiest and accessible way. Conversely, it should be noted that 
insolvency occurring within a M C G may be relevant not only to 
members directly under the proceedings but also to other affiliates 
which may be located in other states. A centralized approach may be 
beneficial in a situation such as this where the financial situation of one 
member may influence another and there may be mutual claims or 
questions of group liability. In this type of case it will be paramount 
that the wishes and views of creditors of affiliated companies will be 
heard. A centralized approach that gives authority to a certain court to 
look at the group insolvency as a whole may ensure that the Lender is 
given an opportunity to present his views and that they will be taken 
into account.68 
3.33 It is apparent that a decision regarding the location of proceedings 
should take into account the expectations and views of the group's 
creditors as a whole and not only a specific subset of them. Therefore a 
"one size fits all" approach, whereby proceedings relating to group 
Ibid. A13-A1A 
Mevorach (n 39) 469 
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companies are dealt with at one location or otherwise always conducted 
in separate proceedings with no link between the proceedings, will 
prevent the overall facilitation of protecting creditors' rights.69 It is 
argued that a more flexible methodology is required whereby the 
creditors expecting to have a unified process for the entire M C G are 
accommodated as well as the case where creditors are dealing with a 
70 
specific subsidiary as a separate entity. However, in practice, 
amending the EIR to accomplish this flexibility might be difficult. 
3.34 One suggestion would be to identify the COMI for the entire integrated 
M C G rather than for a single debtor, i.e. via the concept of 
centralization, however by using a flexible methodology with some 
exceptions. An adaptable methodology can be applied in both the 
following situations: where all the subsidiary companies should be 
located at the MCG's COMI; and where some subsidiaries are actually 
"locally separated". Where there are cases involving local proceedings 
of independent subsidiaries, the supervisory role over the whole process 
should be allocated to the place where main decisions are made. 
However the extent of control asserted over the other companies' 
71 
processes will depend on the specific circumstances of the case. 
3.35 Recital 19 of the EIR can be used as a tool to facilitate the application 
of a flexible methodology in complex cases by allowing the opening of 
secondary proceedings in complex cases. This would apply, for 
instance, in cases where the debtor shares a number of functionalities 
with a wholly owned subsidiary such as financial and commercial 
79 
administration and a common IT platform. 
3.36 There are obvious benefits in assigning COMI to the state from which 
the business is actually controlled and managed rather than a "facade of 
headquarters." The main issue is how to diminish the problem of 
69
 Ibid. All. 
70Mevorach(n39)477. 
71
 Ibid. 478 
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 M , F & I (n 24), 8.91. 
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creditors' difficulties in ascertaining these headquarters and how to set 
up rules for the transparent representation of a company's COMI and its 
relationship with the rest of the group. 
3.37 One method would be to ensure that the company's documentation 
contains a specific reference in relation to whether the company 
belongs to part of a group structure and, if it does, then where the 
COMI of the M C G is situated.74 Each affiliate that the M C G is 
comprised of should state the same information on its business 
documentation. Annually, the company's auditors will be requested to 
verify the accuracy of the representations on the business documents 
and report whether the details correspond to the way the business is 
actually functioning. These representations can, in addition, be included 
in: transaction documents; and statements and prohibitions in relation to 
COMI migration or the relocation of the company within the M C G . It 
is argued that this will ensure maximum creditor protection and 
diminish and potential gaps between the "impression" and "reality" of 
the companies' operations and their impact on jurisdiction matters. 
3.38 Overall, in relation to responses to the Questionnaire, it has been 
acknowledged that there is a lack of special provisions dealing with 
group companies which is detrimental to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of cross border insolvency proceedings.76 However the 
Insolvency Law Committee of the City of London Law Society, for 
instance, did not put forward any proposals as to how this issue could 
be resolved and neither have there been any other radical propositions 
for a way forward. It is specifically stated that, whilst this has been 
the subject of extensive debate in domestic law for a number of years, it 
is not an easy issue to resolve. In light of emerging case law in relation 
74
 See Mevorach (n 39) 477. Note however the earlier mentioned caveats in relying on COMI 
representations and covenants in 3.3- 3.7. 
15
 Ibid. All. 
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 See 'Evaluation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings', Response form for Evaluation Questionnaire completed by The Insolvency Law 
Committee of the City of London Law Society: 
<http://www.citvsolicitors.org.uk/Default.aspx?sID= 920&IID=0> accessed April 2010, 
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to group insolvencies national courts may come under pressure to find 
that the COMI of a number of group insolvencies are in the same place. 
However, the application of Article 16 and the recognition principle 
may result in conflicts over COMI between Member States and 
potentially result in a race to the court. In light of this, it is argued that 
"any attempt to incorporate a concept of 'group' into the EIR would 
need to be afforded significant further consideration."77 
3.39 A flexible methodology of centralization will only work if the 
necessary tools and protective measures are put into place. These 
measures will enable creditors to be sufficiently represented in the 
process so there is a better chance of finding solution which accords 
with the specific facts and realities of the situation.78 In practice it may 
be difficult to put into place any legislation or rules that will solve all 
the outstanding problems identified in relation to group insolvencies. 
For instance, the possibility of debtors strategically manipulating the 
location of the group's headquarters still needs to be dealt with as well 
as the debtor's ability to use successive filings79 to choose a preferable 
jurisdiction for the M C G in anticipated distress. It is argued that, in 
order to avoid manipulations of the MCG's centre being taken at the 
"eve of insolvency," a model that operates worldwide should seek for 
"the real centre of control" for an identifiable period of time prior to the 
onset of insolvency proceedings. If there is more than one possible 
location then the chosen venue should be "where the place of control 
was residing longer."80 It remains to be seen whether this approach 
could meet with any success especially in light of effective creditor 
representation and forum shopping. What is certain however is that, if 
this approach is vulnerable to manipulation, then the Lender's 
"Ibid. 
78
 See Mevorach (n 39) 480. 
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Namely, manipulating the order in which group members file insolvency petitions, by filing 
initially by one or more members of the group followed later by filings of other members, 
postponing for instance the filing of the controlling entity to a larger stage, making it difficult 
to then transfer the process to the centre of the group. See L M LoPucki, "Cooperation in 
International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach" (1999), 84 Cornell Law Review: 696 
at p. 722-723, See also Mevorach (n 39) 474. 
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expectations will not be met and the identified centre will probably not 
reflect their views with regard to the MCG's operation. 
Countering insolvency effects (Articles 5-15) 
3.40 The Questionnaire raises the issue whether the exceptions to the general 
rule that the law applicable to the proceedings is that of the State of the 
opening of proceedings (Articles 5-15) "adequately protects 
expectations and certainty of transactions? " "Are these exceptions 
appropriate; do they work; and are they sufficiently clear? " 
Article 5 
3.41 It has been established that, even if the Lender conducts a thorough pre-
bankruptcy risk assessment, there is no assurance that he will be right in 
predicting which forum will end up governing the insolvency 
proceedings. The issue therefore arises of whether the exceptions 
provided to the lex concursus by the EIR effectively enable the 
preservation of rights or interests of secured creditors and protect them 
from the uncertainties or inconsistencies in policy that may result from 
the application of a foreign lex concursus. This issue is specifically 
raised by the Insolvency Service in the Questionnaire. 
3.42 As discussed in Chapter Two, when it comes to relying on Article 5, 
creditors need to be clear about what is included in the definition of the 
term "rights in rem" however this is not adequately provided for in the 
EIR however Articles 5(1) and 5(2) do provide some indicative 
81
 For example, do they strike the right balance between the need to protect secured creditors 
and the general principle that the applicable law should be that of the State of opening? As 
adapted from Question 16, 'The Questionnaire' (n 2). 
82
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parameters. When considering how or whether to expand on a 
definition within the EIR, paragraph 100 of the Virgos-Schmit needs to 
be considered. This expressly provides that there is a risk in having a 
rigid definition of what encompasses 'rights in rem'. This is because 
the EIR might start describing as rights in rem legal positions which the 
law of the State where the assets are located does not consider to be 
rights in rem, or of not encompassing rights in rem which do not fulfill 
the conditions of that definition. The EIR does not take on the 
impossible task of harmonizing all the national laws of E U countries 
and therefore imposing a strict definition of 'rights in rem' may be 
more confusing than helpful. There is also the danger of providing an 
unreasonably wide interpretation of the national concept of a right in 
rem. The writer concludes that it is sufficient that Article 5(2) of the 
EIR provides some guidance in facilitating the application of the EIR 
by providing a list of types of rights that are normally considered by 
national laws as rights in rem. 
3.43 The Lender needs to be sure that, in the onset of insolvency, the laws of 
every concerned jurisdiction will fully accept that the right in rem is 
valid and enforceable and its enforcement or realization will not be 
affected in any way that decreases its economic value. One of the 
issues that needs to be explored further is whether it is "necessary for 
the Lender to perfect or register any security over the asset in question 
in the jurisdiction in which the asset is deemed to be located for the 
purposes of Article 2(g)." It is argued that this will result in a "dual due 
diligence requirement with the need to perfect the security according to 
both where it is situated on traditional conflict of laws principles and on 
the basis of definitions in Article 2(g)." This may run contrary to the 
principles of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency 
proceedings on which the EIR is based. Furthermore there is then 
scope for the Lender not being able to register or perfect his security 
interest because all the possibly onerous formalities concerned with the 
Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 76), Question 16. 
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procedure may not able to be met in order for the recognition of a valid 
security interest in the applicable forum under Article 2(g). 
3.44 One of the issues of concern for the Lender in relation to certainty of 
transactions and protected expectations is the issue of movable assets. 
When taking security over movable property, the Lender will be 
concerned that the asset may be moved to another Member State, or 
some non-Member State and therefore become subject to a different 
legal regime at the relevant time. Although actions for voidness, 
voidability or unenforceability are not precluded by virtue of Article 
5(4), the issue of timing will be important for the Lender. A movable 
asset can change location between the time the creditor's security right 
was created and the time when proceedings are opened. A secured 
creditor will be placed in a vulnerable position if the asset is relocated 
to a jurisdiction which does not recognize the security interest at the 
time proceedings are opened. Conversely, if the Member State where 
the asset has been moved to strengthens the position of the secured 
creditor by maximizing his rights, then the unsecured creditors will be 
disadvantaged. 
3.45 As discussed above, in terms of perfecting the security, this would have 
been carried out in the place where the asset was previously located and 
the Lender will have to ensure that security over the asset in the new 
location doesn't fall short of any formal requirements. The Lender will 
need to find a way of placing restrictions on certain assets and 
structuring transactions to try and eliminate this risk. This might be 
difficult considering the wide inclusion of Article 5(1) to encompass 
assets such as those that are of a future character at the time the security 
interest is created. 86 
3.46 Can the position of the Lender in relation to assets which are situated or 
move to a state that is not a Member State under the EIR be improved 
in any way? The Lender's rights in this instance are of course 
Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 76), Question 16. 
See 3.3-3.7 for discussion on effectiveness of COMI covenants. 
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dependant by the extent to which the lex situs is prepared to recognize 
and give effect to the foreign insolvency proceedings. A situation could 
arise where the rights of the Lender are not recognized by the lex situs 
as prevailing over the claims of the liquidator and the Lender will have 
no choice but to participate in the insolvency process as an unsecured 
creditor. However, unless there is a word-wide instrument in place 
recognized globally in terms of what amounts to a right in rem, this 
situation is difficult to avoid. 
3.47 Trying to enforce security rights over intangible assets is another area 
where the Lender may be faced with difficulties in interpreting Article 
5. It is argued that in these cases it may be difficult to establish the 
location of an asset to fulfill the requirements of the Article 5 
exception. For example, in the case of bank accounts, some 
commentators have suggested that the account is situated at the place 
"where the bank has its own COMI rather than the place of the branch 
holding the account. " It would therefore be useful to get more 
clarification under the EIR. 
3.48 One of the key considerations for the Lender, as discussed in more 
oo 
detail in Chapter Two, is whether Article 5 "protects the secured debt 
as well as the security interest itself." Further clarification is required 
in the situation where a Lender's claim is reduced as a result of main 
proceedings regarding whether the Lender can apply Article 5 to 
enforce its security over assets in another Member State in respect of 
the entire value of its original secured claim.90 It would be completely 
contrary to creditor expectations if the Lender's protection was limited 
to the amount in the reduced claim as compromised in the main 
insolvency proceeding. The writer takes the view that Article 5 does not 
erode the underlying claim, however the point needs some sort of 
Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 76) 8 (Q 16). 
88
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affirmation under the EIR especially as there is no instructive case law 
yet. 
Article 6 
3.49 As discussed in Chapter Two, although set-off is not strictly security as 
a matter of English property and commercial law, it is important to the 
Lender because not only is it treated as a mandatory process which 
must be applied in the United Kingdom, the Lender's rights of set off 
remains effective regardless of whether or not set-off is permitted under 
the law of the opening state. 
3.50 However the relationship between Article 6(1) and 6(2) needs to be 
defined more clearly in order to be more consistent with the 
interpretative guidance supplied by Recital 26. Does Article 6 really 
accomplish the effect of bestowing the Lender with a guarantee 
function based on the legal provisions on which the Lender concerned 
can rely when a claim arises? As argued in Chapter Two, clarification is 
required as to whether Article 6(2) means that the liquidator in the 
insolvency proceedings can challenge the entering into of the 
transaction which gives rise to the right of set-off, and not the exercise 
of the set-off right itself91 
3.51 Another issue requiring clarification is the carve out provision in 
Article 20 in relation to Articles 5 and 7 but not Article 6. Perhaps the 
exclusion of Article 6 was an oversight and this issue needs to be 
amended within the EIR. 
Insolvency Law Committee Response (n 76) Question 17. 
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Article 13 
3.52 The earlier textual analysis in Chapter Two outlines how the aim of 
Article 13 is to uphold legitimate expectations of creditors. Avoidance 
rules of the Member State in which proceedings are opened shall not 
apply if the person who benefited can show that the 'detrimental' act is 
subject to the law of another Member State and that law does not allow 
any means of challenging that act in the relevant case. 
3.53 It is argued that some aspects of Article 13 are unclear and require 
further clarification before the Lender can fully rely on the effects of 
such a provision. For instance, the meaning of the phrase 'subject to' 
as discussed earlier. The members of the Insolvency Law Committee 
also submit that the provision is not sufficiently clear as to whether, 
once the applicable law has been established, the insolvency law of that 
jurisdiction needs to be considered even in the situation where no 
insolvency proceedings have been commenced there. It is queried 
whether a transaction governed by English law, which is capable of 
being challenged by a liquidator or administrator, can be challenged if 
insolvency proceedings have not been commenced in the UK. If it can 
be challenged then what "hardening period" should be used? 
3.54 The problem is the wording "that law does not allow any means of 
challenging that act in the relevant case". On the face of it office holder 
actions, e.g. under 238, 239, 245, can only be commenced if there is an 
English administration or liquidation as a matter of English law. 
Therefore, if the applicable law is English law, there is an argument that 
the transaction cannot be challenged "in the relevant case" unless there 
is an English liquidation or administration based on an establishment 
under Article 2. If we assume that this argument would not be accepted 
and so the question becomes, (assuming a hypothetical liquidation or 
administration in England and Wales): 'would the transaction be 
-Ibid,Q. 17, pg 11. 
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vulnerable "in the relevant case" under 238, 239, 245?' the question 
that follows is how relevant time is computed?' Would one also have 
to hypothesize that the English liquidation or administration 
commenced on the same day as the foreign main proceeding and count 
back 6 months, 12 months or 2 years depending? Based on the current 
state of Article 13, one could argue that if these issues arose in a case 
and their resolution would be outcome determinative there would 
probably have to be a reference to the ECJ for a definitive 
interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
3.55 It was concluded, in Chapter Two, that the enactment of the EIR has 
proved beneficial from the Lender's perspective, in relation to generally 
protecting his security interests, and one can argue that, in light of the 
previous attempts within the history of the evolution of the EIR and 
how far it has advanced, the EIR is in fact a success story. However, 
in light of the upcoming review of the EIR, several issues arise in 
relation to the amendment of certain sections. Chapters Two and Three 
illuminate which areas of the EIR are in need of direct legislative 
attention. However it has been discussed how, in some of these areas 
within the existing framework, the Lender can take steps to mitigate 
risk and take advantage of practical methods that have been 
commercially devised to counter the risks of 'insolvency effects'. For 
instance, it can be argued that the Lender can presently safeguard his 
security interest by exploiting COMI, (through COMI migration and 
forum shopping), to achieve global restructuring. Furthermore, legal 
practitioners seem to have found a way of dealing with group 
See A. 10, A. 14, and A. 16 -A.21. 
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companies, through uniformity and consistency, by arranging an 
effective COMI migration for all the companies to one location. 
3.56 Overall, the most important issue that has been raised for reform relates 
to the concept of COMI which was conceived in the Phase I draft 
Conventions94 and has, since then, been amended and supplemented by 
a barrage of case law. However, despite, the 'learning process' that the 
EIR has undergone, issues in relation to COMI are still subject to a 
great deal of criticism by scholars and practitioners alike. Three main 
issues arise in relation to the reform of COMI in the EIR: does it require 
greater definition; in relation to COMI migration and the possibility for 
the Lender to take advantage of more favourable restructuring regimes, 
should more aggressive rules be inserted to address the perceived risks 
to junior creditors of COMI migration; and, in light of the recent 
Stanford Bank case95 and criticism of the 'Head office functions test', is 
a new concept of Group COMI required? 
3.57 The writer submits that a more restrictive interpretation of COMI will 
have a negative impact on the flexibility of courts to apply the 
provisions of the EIR on a case by case basis in light of factors derived 
from the content of the EIR as interpreted by the ECJ. The intentional 
lack of definition of COMI therefore leaves some scope for judicial 
discretion and encourages common sense to be exercised. In relation to 
protecting junior creditors, it is argued that by just ranking as creditors 
lower down the chain, they entered into a security transaction well 
aware of the risks of being subordinate to a greater claim by more 
senior creditors and hence protection of the Lender's rights is a more 
fundamental concern. The difficult issues that arise in relation to group 
insolvencies has been discussed in this Chapter and it has become 
apparent that the EIR does need to provide more guidance as to how to 
deal with MEGs that become insolvent. In relation to Articles 5 to 15 
which operate as 'carve out' provisions to the applicable law, the 
crucial question is whether, in their present format, they do in practice 
14
 SeeA.7. 
5
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help in mitigating against potential 'insolvency effects'. It has been 
suggested that, other than minor adjustment of wording in order to 
provide more clarity, these provisions work quite well in practice and 
are not in need of any major reform. It will be helpful to consider the 
overall responses of practitioners in relation to the Questionnaire, based 
on the cases they have been involved in which have necessitated a 
practical application of the EIR. 
3.58 It remains to be seen what will be proposed in the Report of the 
European Commission that has to be submitted by 1st June 2012. In the 
meantime, however, the Lender will benefit by continuing to make use 
of COMI covenants in security transactions and by taking advantage of 
'good forum shopping' and making use of more favorable restructuring 
regimes if this is a solution to providing maximum return on his 
investment. It will be interesting to note what further measures are 
developed by secured creditors and practitioners to take advantage of or 
circumvent the provisions of the EIR once it has been amended. 
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APPENDIX I 
HISTORY OF THE EIR: EVOLUTION OF THE TEXT 
The Phase I Draft Conventions (1960 -1980) 
A. 1 The need for a Convention among certain European member states to coordinate 
the conduct of their insolvency proceedings was foreseen by the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) 1957. Article 220 of 
that Treaty provided, inter alia, that Member States should enter into 
negotiations with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals the 
simplification of the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition of 
judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards. This provided the U K 
with the incentive to begin negotiations with other Member States concerning a 
draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention. l The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters was 
signed by the original six Member States of the Communities on 27 September 
1968 and entered into force between them on 1 February 1973. However the 
Brussels Convention,3 by Article 1(2),4 specifically excluded judgments relating 
to 'bankruptcy, winding-up, arrangements, compositions or similar proceedings' 
thus leaving a large gap that needed to be addressed. 
A.2 Over the period from 1960 to 1996 the Bankruptcy Convention project featured 
on the agenda of the institutions of the European Community/European Union, 
particularly the Commission and the Council. During those years, work 
advanced in various stages of irregular duration, interspersed by periods of 
1
 E Comm Doc 3.327/ 1/ XIV770- F, dated 16 February 1970 (the 1970 draft Convention). The English 
version of the text of the Preliminary Draft Convention was published as Appendix 10 to the Report of 
the Bankruptcy Convention Advisory Committee, in August 1976 (Cmnd 6602). 
2
 The original six members of the European Communities (including the Coal and Steel and Atomic 
Energy Communities, as well as the Economic Community) were Belgium, France, (West) Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
3
 As discussed in Chapter One the Brussels Convention has largely been superseded by the Brussels 
Regulation (Brussels I) which came into force on March 1 2002. 
4
 See now Brussels I, Art l(2)(b). 
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almost total dormancy.5 Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs suggest that the period when 
the majority of reform took place can generally be divided into two main phases, 
of which the first can be further divided into two parts. The preliminary part of 
Phase 1 took place in the years before February 1970. During that time a group 
of experts,6 the members of which were selected from the original six Member 
States, was convened as a Working Party by the European Commission". 
From 1963 the Working Party began meeting under the Chairmanship of M . 
Jean Noel, Counsellor at the French Cour de Cassation to prepare a Preliminary 
Draft Convention on Bankruptcy (the 1970 Convention). This draft was 
published on 16 February 1970, together with a Report prepared by M . Noel and 
M . Jacques Lemontey (the N L Report).9 
A.3 The draftsmen prepared what was seen as an 'ambitious scheme',10 the main 
objects of which were: 
"to channel bankruptcy jurisdiction within the European Communities to a 
single and appropriate national court; to secure that the liquidator appointed by 
that court had virtually exclusive authority to administer the insolvent estate, 
wherever situated in within the Communities; to simplify the tasks of the 
liquidator by achieving some harmonization as to the effects of the bankruptcy 
order, and by authorizing him, apart from the harmonized rules, to apply the 
rules of his own winding up code, including those relating to his powers as a 
liquidator, both when dealing with the recovery of the bankrupt's estate and 
5
 G Moss, I Fletcher and S Isaacs, The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, A Commentary and 
Annotated Guide, (Oxford, 2nd ed, 2009) (M, F & I) 2, para 1.03. 
The Committee of Experts was originally formed in July 1960 and proceeded with the drafting of what 
was to become the Brussels Convention. It was however decided that insolvency and related matters 
were a special subject that required separate treatment and this lead to the setting up of a Working Party 
to consider the matter separately. Their aim was to develop a Bankruptcy Convention which would 
complement the Brussels Convention and thereby accomplish the task of 'simplification of formalities 
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments' mentioned in the fourth indent of 
Article 220. See M , F & I (n 5) 7, para 1.10. 
7
 When discussing the draft Conventions the Member States which agreed to be bound by the terms of the 
Conventions shall be referred to as the 'Contracting States' to avoid confusion. 
8 M , F & I ( n 5 ) , 2,para 1.03. 
The gap left by the exclusion of insolvency proceedings from the scope of the Brussels Convention was 
to be filled by the 1970 Convention (n 1) which, according to the NL Report, would apply to 'any 
proceedings which being founded, according to different legislations, on the condition of cessation of 
payments, insolvency or undermining of the debtor's credit, imply an intervention of the judicial 
authority, not only suspending individual proceedings, but achieving forced and collective realizations of 
assets, or simply, control of a debtor's business'. See Cmnd 6602 (n 1) 2, paras 7, 8 & 24. 
10
 See Cmnd 6602 (n 1) Chapter 9, para 408. 
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when pronouncing upon claims made against it; and to assist the foreign creditor 
in presenting his claim to such liquidator with the least complication and 
expense, including the avoidance or reduction of the legal costs of prosecuting 
his claim."11 
A.4 The second part of Phase I followed the accession of the first three additional 
Member States from 1 January 1973. Work was resumed on the basis of text of 
the 1970 Convention, with a view to its being adopted by all nine members. 
Many alterations were made to the original text during the last stage of Phase I. 
This was partly due to critical comments widely published after 1970, and also 
1 Q 
in response to specific concerns raised by new participants in the negotiations. 
For instance, following the UK's accession to the EEC, an advisory committee 
was appointed in 1973 under the chairmanship of Mr Kenneth Cork14 to 
"consider the terms of the 1970 Convention and to advise the U K Department of 
Trade upon the effect of implementation of the Convention in its then present 
terms and to recommend such modifications as were considered necessary and 
practicable."15 The essential features of the 1970 Convention were subsequently 
carried through into the Convention submitted to the Council in April 1980 for 
further study and potential adoption. The failure to promote the adoption of the 
1980 Draft marked the end of Phase 1 which was followed by several years of 
inactivity and uncertainty. 
A. 5 Both draft Conventions in Phase I followed the radical approach of 
superimposing a unitary set of rules of direct jurisdiction in place of the variety 
of nationally-evolved rules previously applied by the individual Contracting 
States.16 There are two contrasting methods of dealing with jurisdiction in 
Ibid 
12
 Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, and the UK together joined the European Communities. Norway, 
which had also negotiated terms of accession, did not take up membership following a negative outcome 
of its national referendum held for that purpose. See M , F & I(n 2) 3, para 1.03 and FN 5 
1 3M,F&I(n5)3,paral.03. 
14
 Referred to hereafter as Cork's advisory committee. 
15
 The resulting report was a substantial document extending to some 180 pages stressing that a 
comprehensive review of insolvency was required, not only in order to participate in negotiations with 
other EEC Member States, but also because the state of the law demanded this, It should be noted that 
prior to this there seemed to have been no overall national study by a widely based national committee, 
consulting with important professional organisations and involving different professional, business and 
financial bodies to study the draft convention: see M Hunter, 'The Draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention a 
Further Examination', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (April 1976, Vol 25), 312. 
16
 See 1970 Convention (n 1) and 1980 Convention, E Comm Doc III/D/72/80 Title II (Arts 3-16). 
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international treaties. Jurisdiction can be dealt with directly or indirectly. In a 
system of direct jurisdiction, the method by which jurisdiction is allocated 
amongst states does not allow for any other State to claim jurisdiction in relation 
to a case where an alternate State has authority to act judicially. This system 
generates mandatory rules of jurisdiction for all cases falling within its scope. In 
a system of indirect jurisdiction, only specific conditions are agreed by the 
parties in relation to the recognition of each other's decisions. This type of 
system wi l l generally contain rules of recognition and enforcement, for instance, 
1 n 
without imposing a mandatory set of jurisdictional rules. 
A . 6 The important feature of the 'Uniform L a w ' was that, in order to incorporate its 
provisions, a Contracting State might have to amend its existing national law i f 
required or, i f it declined to take this course of action, to make reservations 
expressly refusing to incorporate the provisions. To comply with such an 
obligation, it was essential firstly to ensure an accurate and 'authentic' 
translation into English of the obligations and statutes referred to in the Phase I 
1 o 
drafts. However this was clearly not the case as the advisory committees 
struggled with various translations. Furthermore it can be argued that a law 
could hardly be regarded as "uniform" when it was subject to extensive 
reservations from Contracting States.19 
A.7 To apply in conjunction with the application of Uniform Law, the Phase 1 drafts 
proposed three levels of jurisdictional criteria connecting the debtor to the 
territory of the State in which proceedings could be opened: 
17
 See M Balz, 'The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings', 1996, 70 Am. Bankr L.J 485, 493 
& FN 32; See also I F Fletcher, 'The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An 
overview and comment, with U.S Interest in mind', 23 Brook. J.Int'l L. 25 1997-1998, 28-29. 
18
 Hunter M , 'The Draft Bankruptcy Convention of the European Economic Communities', 21 Int'l & 
Comp. L.Q682, 1972,696. 
19
 The draftsmen admitted that, although the ideal course would have been to draft a uniform bankruptcy 
law for the whole of the Community (i.e. one comparable to the Federal Bankruptcy Code of the United 
States of America), this was politically an unattainable objective at that time. Instead a number of uniform 
provisions were produced as set out in the Annexes to the draft Conventions. The question arises as to 
how anyone could perceive that the radical approach of getting different countries to agree to be governed 
by uniform substantive insolvency law could ever be a realistic attainable objective? See Hunter 1972 (n 
17)694,696. 
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"Firstly, the courts where the debtor's 'centre of administration' was situated 
90 
were declared to have 'exclusive jurisdiction' to declare the debtor bankrupt. 
The second was intended to apply to situations where the debtor's centre of 
administration was not located in any of the Contracting States. In that case, the 
courts of any Contracting State in which the debtor had an establishment were 
91 
awarded jurisdiction to declare the debtor bankrupt". 
Unlike the EIR, there was just one set of proceedings allowed which was the 
only proceedings rather than 'main' proceedings and there was no possibility of 
opening 'secondary proceedings' where there was an establishment. There was 
also no definition of 'establishment' in the 1970 text. Proceedings opened 
according to the primary and secondary rules of jurisdiction would constitute the 
only proceedings allowed to take place through the Contracting states, and 
would have automatic effect in relation to the debtor's property anywhere within 
those states. The third took effect where neither the centre of administration nor 
any establishment was situated in a Contracting State and allowed the courts of 
99 
any Contracting State, whose law so permitted, to declare the debtor bankrupt. 
Such bankruptcies were given "the full advantages of recognition and 
enforcement throughout the Community" in the 1970 Convention but not in the 
1980 draft which was modified so as to exclude such bankruptcies from falling 
9^ 
within the scope of the Convention. 
A.8 Overall, the 1970 Convention can be viewed as a precursor to the production of 
94 
a 'simplified and rationalist system of bankruptcy' for the Community. 
However, because of reasons that will become apparent in the later discussion of 
the important provisions of the draft texts, the realization of this hope is much 
9S 
doubted. Despite having been weakened considerably, the 1980 Convention 
remained unpopular with all the Member States for varying reasons. As will be 
See Art 3(1) of both th l970 (n 1) a d 1980 Conventions (n 16)(the wording is identical). 
See Art 4(1) of both thel970 (n 1) and 1980 Conventions (n 16) (the wording is identical). See M , F & 
I (n 5) 8, para 1.14. 
S e e M , F & I ( n 5 ) 8 , p a r a l . l 4 . 22 
23
 See Art 5 in the respective versions of the 1970 (n 1) and 1980 (n 16) draft Conventions. See M , F & I 
(n 5) 8, para 1.14. 
24
 See I F Fletcher, 'The Proposed Community Convention in Bankruptcy and Related Matters', Final 
Chapter in K. Lipstein, Harmonization of Private International Law by the EEC, (1977) Chameleon/ 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies: London, 135. 
25
 P Omar, 'Genesis of the European Initiative in Insolvency Law', (2003) 12 International Insolvency 
Review, p 147-170, 152. 
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discussed, criticism focused mainly around concerns that it would be 
unworkable for one forum to administer one centralized insolvency estate, given 
the enormous range of differences in countries' insolvency laws.26 It was 
97 
criticized by some as being an "over ambitious model" and unacceptable for 
9R 
most European countries because it required an "overly rigid centralisation'. 
Furthermore other complaints included a fear that it discriminated against those 
outside the community.29 
A.9 The 1980 Convention was abandoned in 1985 and negotiations were resumed in 
1989 in a different form known as the European Union Convention on 
Insolvency Proceedings. However prior to this, the Council of 
Europe convened and began to draft the European Convention on Certain 
International Aspects of Bankruptcy. It eventually proposed a multilateral treaty 
named the European Convention on Certain International Aspects of 
Q 1 
Bankruptcy also known as the Istanbul Convention. 
A. 10 The unsuccessful attempt in the Phase I drafts to apply the twin 
principles of unity and universality of bankruptcy emphasized the shortcomings 
of the jurisdictional rules in these conventions. In terms of how 'interventionist' 
these early drafts were, there is some contention as to the degree to which the 
principles of unity and universality had genuinely been assimilated into the 
substance of the provisions to which the Contracting States would be 
committing themselves. Moss. Fletcher and Isaacs submit that, early in their 
26Balz(nl6)492. 
27
 See IF Fletcher, 'International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment', 27 Int'l Law (1993) 429, 
437. 
28
 Burton, L A, 'Toward an International Bankruptcy Policy in Europe: Four Decades in Search of a 
Treaty', 5 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L 205 1999, p. 212. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 The Council of Europe founded on May 5 1949 aimed to promote cooperation between the European 
countries. In 1990 the twenty members were: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Holy See, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and Switzerland. The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental 
organization that was formed to promote cooperation between the European countries and should not be 
confused with the Council of Ministers or the European Council, which are organs of the European 
Union. 
31
 European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, June 5, 1990, Europ. T.S No. 
136 (hereinafter Istanbul Convention). 
32
 See Art 2 of both the 1970 draft Convention (n 1) & 1980 draft Convention (n 16), which bear the 
heading: Unity of the Bankruptcy, and Art 33 of the 1970 draft Convention (n 1) and Art 34 of the 1980 
draft Convention (n 16), both headed Universality of the Bankruptcy. See also M , F & I (n 5 ) 10, para 
1.16. 
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discussions, the negotiators had ascertained that the domestic laws of the 
original six Member States which were currently in place drastically varied 
regarding specific issues such as the way they dealt with security and the rights 
of preferential creditors. This led them to conclude how futile it would be in the 
foreseeable future to try and harmonize substantive laws. Under 'direct' 
Conventions such as the Phase I drafts, all interested parties have to rely almost 
completely on the integrity of the legal process at the point where jurisdiction is 
first exercised. This places fundamental importance on the rules for allocation 
of jurisdiction being intrinsically sound and sensible. There is only limited 
possibility to rectify any misapplication or misuse of the Conventions' 
provisions and so their meaning and effects needed to be as clear and 
unambiguous as possible, in the interests of enabling creditors to understand 
their legal position and arrange their affairs with adequate certainty. The 
balance between achieving this goal and applying a radical full 
universality/unitarian approach was clearly not met by any of the Phase I drafts. 
Phase II: The Istanbul Convention, the Convention on 
Insolvency Proceedings (1995) and progression to the adoption of 
the EIR 
A. 11 The Istanbul Convention rejected the unitarian approach that had been so 
heavily criticised in the earlier 1970 Convention and instead adopted a flexible 
approach to the universalist theory.34 Further, the Istanbul Convention relied on 
'indirect jurisdiction'. Thus although it contained rules for recognizing and 
enforcing judgments, it did not impose any mandatory jurisdictional rules,35 
thereby creating further potential for disagreements. 
33
 See M , F & I (n 5), 10-11,1.16. See also,e. g. the view expressed by Mr A E Anton who regarded the 
Conventions as "Revolutionary". See 1970 Convention (n 1) 106, para 4. Note that the position adopted 
by Anton is reflected in the work of modern territorialists such as Lopucki. See L LoPucki, (1999), 
"Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach", (1999) 84 Cornell Law 
Review: 696, See also J Pottow, 'Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy', 
(2005) Virginia Journal of International Law, 45 for more detail as to why more commentators, such as 
Pottow, saw problems in giving universal effect, at the normative level, to one country's insolvency law. 
34
 Anne Nielson, 'The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of 
International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J, 533, 1996, 540, FN 57. 
35
 Istanbul Convention (n 31), Art 4; Fletcher (n 15). 
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A. 12 It was proposed that one main insolvency proceeding would be opened in a 
centralized administrative forum in the country that was the "centre of...[the 
insolvent debtor's] main interests".36 The Istanbul Convention provided for the 
mutual recognition of only certain powers of the liquidator rather than the full 
effect of the mutual recognition of foreign proceedings. Basically the 
Convention refrained from also exporting the effects of a main bankruptcy 
-in 
proceeding to other jurisdictions. Secondary bankruptcies could be opened in 
other Member States where the debtor had substantial assets which would serve 
to pay secured and priority creditors, local employees, local tax authorities, and 
creditors whose claims arose from the local operations of the debtor. The 
adoption of secondary proceedings was aimed at protecting the interests of 
secured and priority creditors and of employees and other local creditors of 
foreign establishments of the insolvent debtor, whilst turning over any excess 
proceeds obtained from the secondary estate to the main estate. This illustrates 
how the principle of unity was abandoned in the Istanbul Convention and the 
principle of universality reduced in scope which was also emphasized by the 
complex system of reservations allowing Contracting States to choose to 
participate in the entire Convention, for the recognition of foreign liquidators' 
powers only, or for secondary bankruptcies. 
A. 13 The similarities between the Phase I drafts and the Istanbul Convention included 
the division between primary and secondary jurisdiction criteria with use of the 
'centre of administration'40 and the 'centre of main interests'41 to justify primary 
assumption of jurisdiction. However there were important differences in the 
latter's definitions in relation to COMI that were used to develop this concept 
further. With the Phase I drafts however, the second tier jurisdiction or 
secondary proceedings were only intended to apply where the debtor's centre of 
administration was not located in any of the contracting states and, in this case, 
36 Istanbul Convention (n 31), Art 4(1). 37
 essentially the powers to collect assets from all Member States and to sue and be sued in such States. In 
any Contracting State the liquidator could take provisional and protective measures legally possible under 
the laws of that State. See Istanbul Convention (n 30), Art 8. 
38
 Istanbul Convention (n 31), Art 21. 
39Balz(nl6)493-494. 
40
 in the Phase I drafts. 
41
 In the Istanbul Convention (n 31). 
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the courts of any contracting state in which the debtor had an 'establishment' 
49 
were awarded jurisdiction to declare the debtor bankrupt. Under the Istanbul 
Convention it was provided that the main proceeding need not be the only 
authorized forum; it could be supplemented by secondary proceedings in any 
other country in which the debtor had an 'establishment'.43 Creditors such as 
those holding priority and secured claims would be allowed to file their claims 
in a secondary proceeding in their own country, instead of in the main 
proceeding.44 The secondary proceedings would therefore be administered 
under local law thus resolving problems arising from issues such as the validity 
of security interests.45 It was proposed that from the assets subject to the 
secondary proceedings, claims filed in the secondary proceeding would be paid 
first. The balance of the assets remaining would then be forwarded to the main 
proceeding where the other creditors could file their claims and be paid.46 
A. 14 The general view was that the fact that the Istanbul Convention sought to 
provide countries with some freedom to apply their own domestic insolvency 
law in the secondary proceedings was unfair and contrary to the aim of 
insolvency proceedings which was to facilitate, the administration of the 
debtor's assets in one forum and equal distribution to all creditors under a 
47 
uniform set of laws. This is interesting because the Istanbul Convention did not 
have the choice of law rules and carve outs in what is Articles 4 to 15 of the 
EIR. By allowing countries to opt-out of the universality provisions of the 
Istanbul Convention and by using indirect jurisdiction provisions, its drafters 
AQ 
weakened it. The Istanbul Convention did not fully uphold a universalist 
position due to the fact that it allowed autonomy in the application of diverse 
national rules.49 Some commentators argue that, unlike the earlier 
'overambitious' Phase I drafts, this Convention was not ambitious enough or 
42 See Art 4(1) of both the 1970 draft Convention (n 1) and 1980 draft Convention ( n 16) versions (the 
wording is identical). In the Phase I drafts once one country had jurisdiction over the insolvency, no 
other country could conduct any insolvency proceedings on its own. 
43
 Istanbul Convention (n 31), Art 17. 
44
 Ibid, Arts 11, 21. 
45
 Ibid, Arts 19-22. 
46
 Ibid, Arts 22, 31. 
47
 Burton (n 28) 215. 
4S
 Ibid. 216. 
49
 See Fletcher (n 27), 439. 
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strongly universalist because of its extensive opt out provisions.50 In contrast to 
the Phase I drafts, which were too strong, the Istanbul Convention was too weak. 
A. 15 When it became apparent evident that the majority of EEC countries would not 
ratify the Istanbul Convention, the EEC Council of Ministers established a 
Working Group on Bankruptcy in late 1989. In 1995 this working group 
produced the European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (EU 
Convention).51 It ultimately lapsed as well, albeit for different reasons than 
those that toppled the Phase I drafts and the Istanbul Convention. However the 
objectives of this attempt at harmonization were, among other things, to: 
"retain the principle of universality to the extent practicable; create a unitary 
system (without reservations) binding on all Member States; adapt the system of 
secondary proceedings so as to make it compatible with maximum universality; 
allocate jurisdiction directly (rather than indirectly as did the Istanbul 
Convention) among Member States, both for main and secondary bankruptcies; 
harmonize certain conflict rules that bear on the administration of bankruptcies; 
take proper account of the introduction of rehabilitation (or reorganization) 
proceedings into the laws of some Member States; and create a more efficient 
and closely-knit system of legal cooperation within the emerging internal market 
than the Istanbul Convention." 
A. 16 The E U Convention attempted to harmonize laws by choosing a modified 
universalist theory, amalgamating a "framework of member state cooperation" 
with a recognition of the "unique aspects of member states' laws". It has been 
submitted that these provisions in the E U Convention are reminiscent of the best 
parts of the Phase I drafts. The universalist treatment was calculated as the most 
effective method of fulfilling the main aim of insolvency proceedings which is 
to ensure the consolidation of all assets in one forum therefore maximizing the 
50
 Burton (n 28) 216. 
51
 European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (EU Convention) opened for signature, Nov 
23, 1995, 35 I.L.M 1223 (1996). Many consider this Convention as a continuation or revitalization of the 
earlier EEC Draft Convention. See Fletcher (n 27) 439. 
52Balz(nl6)495. 
53
 EU moves toward the creation of a European Convention, EURO WATCH, April 15, 1996. See Burton 
(n 28) 218 & FN 69. 
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potential for equal treatment of all creditors. 54 However the drafters of the E U 
Convention wisely concluded that some issues were better covered by conflict of 
laws principles and these were excluded in the Convention. These included the 
validity of security interests55 and issues regarding sales of property under a 
reservation of title,56 both of which were to be determined by the laws of the 
situs of the property. The E U Convention took a similar approach to the 
Istanbul Convention in relation to allowing secondary proceedings in order to 
liquidate some assets locally. The reasoning behind allowing the opening of 
secondary proceedings was to facilitate resolution of the rights of secured 
creditors and practical problems that were likely to arise due to liquidating assets 
en 
from a distance. 
A. 17 Unlike the Phase I drafts, the provisions for main and secondary proceedings 
inherent in both Conventions sought to eliminate some of the problems 
anticipated in the pure universalist approach. It has been argued that the key 
distinction to be considered is the treatment of secured creditors as opposed to 
unsecured creditors. In relation to secured creditors and their expectations 
regarding assets situated locally, it is reasonable that rights in assets pledged as 
collateral should be determined locally, at the situs of the collateral, when the 
validity of the secured interest is governed by local law. Unsecured creditors, 
however, have no claim to the debtor's assets and should therefore not be 
concerned with where those assets are liquidated. The author therefore agrees 
that applying a universal law to unsecured creditors is reasonable when 
C O 
considering the ultimate aim of providing equal treatment for such creditors. 
A. 18 The term "centre of...[the insolvent debtor's] main interests" originally taken 
from the Istanbul Convention was also adopted in the E U Convention and it is 
curious how it was conceptualized. In both Conventions the concept of COMI 
was not defined and it appeared to be an entirely artificial term without precedent 
in any one State's national laws.59 Although, logically, there could only be one 
54
 Burton (n 28) 220. 
55
 EU Convention (n 51), Art 5. 
56
 Ibid, Art 6. 
57
 Ibid, Art 3(2). 
58
 Burton (n 28) 221 
59 Balz (n 16) 504. 
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centre of main interests, both Conventions did not address the scenario where two 
or more States claimed to have the centre of the debtor's main interests. The 
ambiguity of this central concept is a problem that continues in the existing 
Regulation and there are similar criticisms in relation to the increased 
opportunities of forum shopping and disputes over jurisdiction. One notable 
defect in the Istanbul Convention (in contrast to the E U Convention and the EIR) 
which did not help interpretive difficulties was the absence of a court within the 
Council of Europe hierarchy for deciding matters other than human rights.60 
Therefore there would have been no means of uniformity and any ambiguities in 
the Istanbul Convention would be subject to varying and conflicting national 
interpretations.61 
A. 19 Overall, most importantly, the E U Convention did not allow countries to 'opt 
out' of any part of the Convention. As discussed earlier, this was a fundamental 
problem with the Istanbul Convention and the drafters of the E U Convention 
were keen to move further away from the 'unity theory' that had been adopted in 
the earlier Phase I drafts and the Istanbul Convention. The drafters believed that 
fairness was best achieved by plural, but properly coordinated, 
administrations".62 Thus the E U Convention far exceeded the Istanbul 
Convention in its promotion of universality. Furthermore the E U Convention 
relied on direct jurisdiction64 with the more likely result of achieving a truly 
international system65 and, as opposed to the Istanbul Convention, it had a forum 
to interpret its provisions. The ECJ was authorized by the E U Convention to 
interpret its provisions with binding effect on all signatories66 and to give 
advisory opinions at the request of national courts 67 
A.20 The progression from the Phase I drafts to the EIR that is in force today 
demonstrates the gradual recognition that the concept of universality is not 
60
 See Fletcher (n 27) 438-439. 
61
 Burton (n 28) 215. 
62
 Fletcher (n 27) 440. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 The major similarity in the operation of Article 3 between the Phase I drafts and the Istanbul 
Convention which would lead to their ultimate downfall was, as discussed earlier, that all drafts only 
operated through indirect jurisdiction. 
65
 Burton (n 28) 222. 
66
 EU Convention (n 50), Arts 43-46. 
61
 Ibid, Art 44. 
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exclusively dependent upon that of unity. There can be other methods of 
achieving the goal of implementing the universal administration and resolution 
of the global affairs of an insolvent debtor without really requiring all rights and 
interests, as well as all proceedings, to be subordinated to the dominance of a 
single forum and its system of law.68 By giving an element of discretion to the 
courts of other interested countries and including the possibility of opening 
secondary bankruptcy proceedings, or some type of ancillary proceedings,69 
proper consideration is given to the expectations of secured creditors who may 
have had had dealings with the debtor outside the context of the latter's forum of 
bankruptcy. It is argued that the final position may be one of universality, 
though it is obtained by a cumulative method that cannot be described as 
'unitary'.70 
A.21 Although the E U Convention seemed to have resolved most of the troublesome 
issues that had plagued past attempts to reach an insolvency convention, it could 
71 
not be made effective at its deadline date of 23 May 1996. It was not until 
1999 that the then-defunct E U Insolvency Convention revived in the form of the 
EIR which included most of the main provisions of the E U Convention with no 
real amendments apart from drafting adjustments. The EIR was subsequently 
adopted on May 2000 an entered into force on 31 May 2002.72 
A.22 The terms of the EIR do not seem to differ greatly from the body of the E U 
Convention. There seems to have been a conscious effort at preserving the 
numerical order of the articles in the main body of the text. Subject to the 
See Nielson (n 34) 534 (espousing a "modified universality theory" resulting in a central administrative 
forum in one country with secondary proceedings in other countries). See also Fletcher, I F, 'The 
European Union Convention on Insolvency: Choice of Law Provisions', (1998) 33 Tex. Int'l L. J. 119, 
122. 
69
 as well as invoking the rules of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
70
 See Fletcher (n 68) 122. 
71
 This is because it was mandatory that the EU Convention could not enter into force until it had been 
ratified, accepted or approved by all the Member States of the European Union on the date on which the 
Convention was closed for signature. This failed to happen and as the EU Convention itself contained no 
provision for extending the deadline date, under its own terms it could not become law if it were not 
signed by all 15 Member States by that date. The United Kingdom refused to sign in retaliation over a 
completely different matter with regard to the ban on British beef arising from concerns over transmission 
of "mad cow's disease" to humans and sovereignty issues regarding Gibraltar. Twelve of the fifteen 
Member States signed in November 1995. The Netherlands signed in March 1996 and Ireland in April 
1996 bringing the total to 14 Member States. 
72
 Block-Lieb S & Halliday T (2007), "Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking", Fordham University 
School of Law: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=964425> 30. 
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necessary updates due to the expansion in membership of the European 
Community and by improvements to domestic insolvency laws, any 
commentary on the earlier text could be applied to the EIR. For this reason, this 
textual commentary in relation to the Convention has been combined with that 
of the EIR. Furthermore the Virgos and Schmit Report (1995) which 
accompanied the Convention is referred to as an explanatory report when 
interpreting the EIR. 
73
 The Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, prepared by Professor M Virgos and M E 
Schmit (hereafter referred to as 'Virgos-Schmit'), was circulated as E U Council Doc 6500/96, DRS 8 
(CFC), bearing the date 3 May 1996. It was unpublished, and remains unapproved by the Council, which 
means it does not have the status of travaux preparatoires, either in relation to the Convention or those 
provisions of the EIR which are directly derived from the Convention. It is nevertheless a valuable aid to 
understanding the intended meaning of those provisions. See M , F & I ( n 5 ) para 1.06, F N 11 and ( C-
341/04) Re Eurofoods IFSC Ltd (2006) ECR 1-3813, [2006] BCC 639 ECJ [511]. 
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